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WHO GETS THE ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT VOTE? CRISIS,
ELECTIONS, AND POPULISM IN WESTERN EUROPE

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Who Gets the Anti-Establishment Vote? Crisis, Elections, and
Populism in Western Europe

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Por fim, o agradecimento mais importante: aos meus pais, pelo amor incondicional.

*Acendo a televisão
Vejo o Passos Coelho a dizer que em breve saímos da recessão
Porque é que a gente vota nesses políticos?
São extensões do poder económico, tá mais que explícito*

*Assaltam o estado, dão cargos aos aliados
Das autarquias aos ministérios, tá tudo manietado
Privatizam a justiça em nome deles
Instrumentalizam os media para nos deixarem alienados*

*É a falência da democracia representativa
Que apenas pariu corrupção e uma massa passiva
Uma massa inofensiva de homens que se subjugaram
Que abdicaram do país que eles usurparam e desmantelaram*

Trecho de “No Meu Quarto”, do *rapper* português Valete¹

¹Valete. *No meu quarto*. Valete. 2012. MP3.

Abstract

Why does the extreme right grow in some parts of Europe while the radical left rises in others? In studies about both party groups, the hypothesis that economic distress provides them with opportunity is frequently tested. Yet, little effort has been employed in comparing their performances under different economic conditions. This article fills this gap through panel data analysis, with disaggregated data from eight countries in election years between 2002 and 2011. It finds that voting for extreme right parties increases significantly after the financial crisis outbreak of 2008, with no corresponding evidence for radical left parties. Also, extreme right support has a positive link to regional GDP per capita and a negative link to unemployment rates. In contrast, radical left parties perform better where unemployment is higher. The results suggest that economic downturns are mostly beneficial to extreme right parties, but this effect is increasingly neutralized in regions of high unemployment.

Keywords: Electoral Success, Radical left, Extreme Right, Polarization, Populism

Resumo

Por que a extrema direita cresce em alguns países europeus, ao passo que a esquerda radical cresce em outros? Em estudos sobre ambas as categorias de partido, testa-se frequentemente a hipótese segundo a qual eles têm janelas de oportunidade em crises. Ainda assim, pouco esforço vem sendo feito para comparar como eles se saem sob diferentes contextos econômicos. Este artigo preenche tal lacuna através de análise de dados em painel, com dados desagregados de oito países, em eleições entre 2002 e 2011. O artigo aponta que a votação da extrema direita aumenta significativamente com o desenrolar da crise de 2008, ao passo que não se encontram evidências correspondentes para a esquerda radical. Ademais, o apoio eleitoral à extrema direita é positivamente ligado a índices regionais de PIB per capita, e negativamente ligado a taxas de desemprego. Por contraste, partidos de esquerda radical se saem melhores onde o desemprego é alto. Os resultados sugerem que quedas na atividade econômica são majoritariamente benéficas à extrema direita, mas que tal efeito é crescentemente neutralizado em regiões de alto desemprego.

Keywords: Sucesso eleitoral, esquerda radical, extrema direita, polarização, populismo

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1 Introduction

Anti-political establishment parties (APEs), left and right, are on the rise in Western Europe²: in some countries, they have become active players, thus earning greater attention³. Existing evidence links economic anxiety to political polarization⁴, but little is known on why different countries have the vector of radicalism pointing to opposing ends.

This puzzle motivates the present article, which compares economic conditions that associate with voting for radical left parties (RLPs) and extreme right parties (ERPs). I test corresponding models for each party group - with subnational data from seventeen contests in eight countries - to examine if economic growth, unemployment, and income per capita are linked to vote shares for radical parties. In this way, I clarify the link between economic anxiety and political polarization, therefore supporting future analyses that shall approach this issue from different angles.

Rising populism⁵ is not exclusive to Europe, as it also occurs across the Atlantic. Neither is it novel to frame populist upsurge from an economic standpoint. For example, Rodrik (2017) addresses the broader context of populist backlash by stressing the role of economic globalization. As he argues, globalization sets the stage for populism because specific groups suffer with exposure to trade openness, financial liberalization, and growing capital mobility. Indeed, multiple studies show that APEs thrive where employment is hurt by foreign trade⁶, though evidence is weaker for the roles of financial liberalization and capital mobility.

Economic shocks are considered demand-side factors - in accordance with the sup-

²Eleven out of fourteen European countries had radical parties with vote shares above ten percent in parliamentary elections held until June 2016 (see Figure 1 on page 11).

³Examples of recent studies directed at APEs include March and Rommerskirchen (2015), Dennison and Pardijs (2016), Rodrik (2017), Guiso, Herrera, and Morelli (2017), and Colantone and Stanig (2016), to name but a few.

⁴See Section 3 on page 13.

⁵For remarks on the terms “anti-establishment”, “populism”, “radicalism”, and “extremism”, see page 9.

⁶See Subsection 3.1 on page 15.

ply and demand conceptual framework developed for radical parties (as in Mudde, 2007; March and Rommerskirchen, 2015; Burni, 2017). Accordingly, the demand side consists of economic and cultural backgrounds - social settings that provide insurgent parties with windows of opportunity, potentially leading more voters to comply with radicalism. On the other hand, the supply side involves external competition, institutional factors, and party leadership (March and Rommerskirchen, 2015, p. 41).

In Rodrik's approach, the demand side for a populist surge has dislocated citizens growing angry with the political establishment, thus becoming potential supporters of anti-system platforms. On the supply side, populist actors seek to resonate with their base by framing specific groups as being guilty of economic disarray. The targets will differ for each variant of populism: While populists on the right point to minorities and out-groups (immigrants, roma, foreign competitors), left-wing populists blame corporations and economic elites (Rodrik, 2017, p. 25).

To the best of my knowledge, no more than two attempts have been made at explaining the determinants of success for each variant of populism, one of them from Rodrik himself: Where disaffected voters are surrounded by immigrants, the cleavage emphasized by right-wing populists becomes more salient. As a result, it gets easier to channel economic anxiety into hostility to migrants. This would be the case of European countries where the extreme right is on the rise. Conversely, where the shocks of globalization can be traced to financial crises and foreign interference in domestic affairs, the cleavage emphasized by left-wing populists comes to the surface, prompting mobilization against economic elites. That would be the case of Latin America and, similarly, the European countries where left-wing populism is successful, such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal (Rodrik, 2017, p. 4).

The parallel between southern Europe and Latin America is also present in a second answer, elaborated by Philippe Schmitter⁷. Borrowing from Italian-Argentine sociolo-

⁷Elaborated during an interview for Mundo (2017, podcast) - transcript on page 45.

gist Gino Germani, Schmitter uses the concept of *status incongruence*⁸ to hypothesize that populists gain support from people whose self-image of societal status is not reflected in reality. An example of the *incongruous*, in this sense of the word, is a group with accomplishments that are not recognized by the ruling elite. This would be the case of Argentine *peronistas* and, similarly, voters of radical left parties in southern Europe. In contrast, a second example of an incongruous group is a middle class facing economic decline - a “downward” rather than “upward” incongruity. In the Northern European case, the downward incongruous would be precisely the workers threatened by globalization and de-industrialization.

Noticeably, the two propositions are not mutually exclusive, as they could be simultaneously at play. My data does not allow to determine which explanation is the most pertinent. It does, however, allow us to examine the link between economic anxiety and anti-establishment vote in further detail, therefore extending what we know. For example, before laying out his account, Rodrik states that economic shocks produce opportunities for populism, but do not determine its political orientation. While I forcefully agree, my results show that different indicators of economic anxiety correlate with support for different variants of populism. These findings, coupled with additional existing evidence, shall help to set the tone for a more nuanced understanding of anti-establishment vote.

I proceed by addressing some idiosyncrasies of the European case, such as the continent’s radical parties, the political economy of European Union membership, and its ongoing crisis. Still in the following section, I draw an overview of recent performances by APEs in parliamentary elections. Subsequently, I examine the existing literature on economic anxiety and political polarization, before exposing my data, methodology, and results. I conclude by examining how the results relate to existing hypotheses on the rise of different variants of populism.

⁸As in Germani, Tella, and Ianni (1977, p. 42).

2 European populism in context

Before contextualizing European populism, it is important to address issues of conceptual clarity. I depart from the definition of *populism* as a rhetoric emphasizing the cleavage between masses and elites⁹. As such, it can be employed by both left-wing and right-wing actors. Especially in the current European context, *anti-establishment* discourse is a common feature of populist parties (Dennison and Pardijs, 2016; Rodrik, 2017), in a way that the two terms can be used interchangeably without a loss of precision. Finally, I follow the bulk of the literature by employing the term *radical* for populist left-wing parties and *extreme* for populist right-wing parties.

Extreme right and radical left parties alike have undergone renewal in the last decades. Transformation in extreme right parties occurred from the 1980s onward: unlike their predecessors, contemporary ERPs do not advocate for dictatorial orders, being supportive of republican principles and democratic institutions (Minkenberg, 2013). Instead, the renewed far right focuses on identity politics, claiming to stand against a political elite that allegedly betrays the population by allowing the inflow of migrants and therefore threatening national identities (Mudde, 2010).

In parallel, radical left parties faced renewal during the aftermath of 1989, by no longer presenting themselves as the vanguard of the proletariat. By the last decade, March and Mudde (2005) spoke of “decline and mutation” among the radical left, in that mutation was meant by RLPs presenting themselves as the “voice of the people” against organized interests of ruling financial elites. This reflects a move away from advocating soviet-like socialism, assimilating what is now considered an important trait of the radical left: a distrust in non-elected bureaucracies and ensuing defense of electoral accountability (ibid; March, 2008)¹⁰.

⁹For more on this account of the term, see Panizza (2005), Derks (2006), and Tella (2010).

¹⁰Interestingly, already in 1988, Herbert Kitschelt stressed this feature in a paper on left-libertarian parties: “left-libertarians oppose the centralized bureaucratic welfare state and the hegemony of professional expertise in public policy and society. In their view, the formal rationalities of markets and bureaucracies expropriate the citizen’s capacity to determine their own lives and must be checked by institutions that impose substantive standards of rationality on their boundless expansive dynamic.” Kitschelt (1988, p. 197).

Resulting from concurrent transitions, radical left and extreme right have come to share a common trait in their populist tones. Considering the end of the cold war with integrating markets, capital mobility, and financial globalization, it is reasonable to suppose that shifts have occurred as means of adaptation to societal change, with parties compelled to shift their attention to cleavages that became more salient due to economic globalization.

The European case includes yet a particular trait that speaks directly to this adjustment: According to Mair (2013, p. 129), the advancement of European integration generated a profound representative crisis, owing to the bureaucratized, non-democratic nature of the European Union's political system. To Mair, EU politics is non-democratic due to its lack democratic accountability, with its decision-makers rarely mandated by voters. Consequently, EU politics leaves little scope for opposition within its own system, engendering anti-political sentiment across electorates.

Challenging the political establishment, then, becomes an opportune strategy as bureaucratization feeds into popular frustration, which should occur especially when policy areas that get transferred from ballots to technocrats are precisely the ones that unnerve radical parties. While radical left parties contest the imposition of austerity measures by non-elected technocrats, right-wing populists emphasize national identities in opposition to integration and resent losing national autonomy over border controls.

If radical parties could find an opportune scenario with the EU bureaucratized political system, the more so when the continent faces a widespread economic crisis. For Müller (2014), the European crisis strengthens radical parties by aggravating anti-political sentiment. Accordingly, voters would tolerate the democratic deficit so long as elites were trusted and people's daily lives were not affected. With the erosion of this tacit agreement, disapproval of traditional politicians ensues, bringing about growing polarization.

Figure 1: Anti-political establishment party (APE) vote shares in recent elections




Figure 1 shows the performances of APEs in 14 Western EU members¹¹, in the most recent parliamentary election until June 2016. I classify parties into five categories of APE performance: where a party surpasses ten percent of the vote, I assign it as relevant, and parties above the twenty percent mark are considered strong¹².

The resulting map reveals a blatant geographical cleavage: extreme right parties thrive mostly in northern countries, whereas the majority of successful radical left parties (RLPs) are in the south. But what else can be said about the “leftist” south as opposed to the “right-wing” north? In order to contrast these countries, I lay out the different categories of APE success against five indicators, as seen in Figure 2¹³.

The data disclose additional cleavages. Firstly, RLPs perform well in countries where government consumption expenditure shrank the most. Voters in Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain saw the outrage of radical left parties as their countries received financial assistance under the imposition of austerity measures. Interestingly, budget cuts are the only indicator at which Ireland, the sole northern country with a relevant


¹¹This includes the United Kingdom, still a member in 2015.

¹²At any country, a party with more than ten percent of the vote places itself on the top quartile of the distribution among parties. I take this as a sign of relevance. Further, a party with a vote share above twenty percent will be above the 5th percentile in any country, which I take as a sign of strength.

¹³Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI) and European Values Study (EVS); Indicators are collected at the election year for contests that take place during the second semester. For elections held in the first semester, a one-year lag applies. As in Minkenberg (2013), a person is classified as “xenophobic” when he/she responds to the question, “Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?,” by mentioning at least one of the following categories: “Muslims,” “Immigrants,” and “People of a different race.”

RLP, stands next to its southern counterparts.

Figure 2: Economic conditions and radical party vote, 2011-16



Greece, Portugal, and Spain, in turn, form a cohort with not only considerable budget cuts but also lower GDP per capita and high unemployment rates. As for levels of unemployment, the two countries with the highest figures (Greece and Spain) also show the greatest support for the radical left. Portugal lags behind next to Italy, the exemplary counterfactual case, lacking a relevant RLP albeit moving along with its neighbors at every economic indicator, from budget cuts to unemployment to GDP per capita.

Moving onto extreme right support, we can see that “blue” countries, in general, have above-average GDP, lower unemployment rates, and virtually no sign of fiscal austerity measures, with the Netherlands as the sole case of an overall decrease in government expenditure. Denmark and Austria, the two countries where ERPs perform the best, are seen cut off from most of their neighbors as nations with especially high levels of GDP per capita. Overall, countries where the extreme right shows strength display comparatively favorable economic indicators.

Contrary to some expectations (e.g. Golder, 2003; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers, 2002), migration levels do not separate left from right-leaning electorates, neither do aggregate levels of xenophobic attitudes. Both countries with low (Portugal, Finland) and high levels of migrants (Spain, Ireland, Germany, Sweden, Austria) have electoral results ranging across the board. Similarly, no cleavage can be detected by looking at the extent to which citizens discriminate against minorities, for diverse electoral results take place both among countries with low (Spain, Sweden, France) and high rates (Ireland, Austria, Germany).

We have seen that three out of four countries with relevant radical felt parties share high levels on unemployment, below-average GDP per capita, and draconian austerity measures. The latter indicator also applies to Ireland, the sole left-leaning country outside of southern Europe. North of the continent, where most right-leaning countries are located, high GDP per capita and low unemployment rates stand out as distinctive features. Neither economic growth rates nor indicators of ethnic diversity appear as distinguishing variables.

This country-level descriptive analysis allowed including variables that are not available in subnational data. However, as we move on to panel data analysis, we aggregate more observations and greater variability. Because I focus on economic variables, I proceed to review the literature on economic anxiety and political polarization.

3 Polarization and Economics

One could expect the literature on economic voting as the frame of reference for a study on economic issues and populist party vote. Yet, there are limits to how it can contribute to research on anti-political establishment parties (APEs). Knowingly, the economic voting theory proposes that voters will support the government in times of prosperity and withdraw support in times of hardship (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2011). Focusing on government-opposition dichotomy differs economic voting theory

from analyses that look at specific, unorthodox party groups that may or may not be in government coalitions. In any case, we should consider a study by Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2012). After examining debt-burdened European countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain), they conclude that economic voting has greater weight in these electorates than anywhere else in Europe. An implication could be that radical left parties tend to profit when socioeconomic issues gain salience. But then again, this finding does not address far-left parties directly, meaning that one should look elsewhere for a solid background on anti-establishment parties.

Few studies analyze APE performance through a comparative take on far-left and far-right parties, with results suggesting that economic distress is more conducive to populism on the right. For example, using electoral data from developed countries, Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch (2015) indicate that financial crises increase extreme right party (ERP) support, with little evidence of impact for the radical left. Similarly, analyzing aggregate survey data from OECD countries, Brückner and Grüner (2010) find a negative effect of GDP per capita growth on support for the far-right, while results for communist parties are inconclusive. Finally, Burni (2017) employs individual-level data to show that extreme-right voters tend to be less satisfied with the economy than supporters of the radical left. Taken together, these results could lead one to discard a connection between RLP performance and economic anxiety.

However, research on European radical left parties (RLPs) directly contradicts this picture. Studies on France (Sperber, 2010), Germany (Bowyer and Vail, 2011), and a cross-country comparison by March and Rommerskirchen (2015) have coinciding results, all stressing high unemployment rates, poor economic conditions, and a broad sense of economic insecurity as boosters of RLP support. In particular, Bowyer and Vail (2011, pp. 701-702) also show that German supporters of *Die Linke* are more likely to come from disadvantaged groups. Yet, when addressing macroeconomic conditions, they ponder that the relationship between economic distress and far-left appeal may not be monotonic, and could pertain to specific circumstances.

The literature on radical left parties is in unison some central issues, perhaps owing to its limited scope. Only a few studies focus on RLP performance, with most analyses concerned with their organization and behavior (E.g. Bartolini, 2007; Hudson, 2012; Bale and Dunphy, 2011). This can be a reflection of how radical left parties have only recently begun to rise (March and Mudde, 2005; March, 2008; March and Rommerskirchen, 2015), after remaining sluggish for most of the 1990s and 2000s. In contrast, studies on ERP support date from way before (E.g. Beyme, 1988; Husbands, 1991; Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Knigge, 1998), which reflects on a wider range of methods, samples, and claims. Jointly, it is a more controversial field, overall deserving of a somewhat lengthy, detailed exposition. I do so by focusing on the issue that directly concerns this work.

3.1 Right-wing Populism: Is it the Economy?

In addition to evidence from comparative studies on anti-establishment parties, research on globalization shocks highlight the role of trade exposure in explaining far-right success (Swank and Betz, 2003; Dippel, Gold, and Heblich, 2015; Autor et al., 2016; Colantone and Stanig, 2017; Guiso, Herrera, and Morelli, 2017). Additionally, Becker, Fetzer, and Novy (2016) and Colantone and Stanig (2016) show a correlation between exposure to import competition and “Leave” voting on the Brexit referendum. These analyses make the case for framing right-wing populism as a reaction from workers threatened by international trade: In Rodrik’s words, “even when the underlying shock is fundamentally economic the political manifestations can be cultural and nativist. What may look like a racist or xenophobic backlash may have its roots in economic anxieties and dislocations” (Rodrik, 2017, p. 24).

Yet, the emphasis on economic insecurity is rebuffed by important experts on right-wing populism¹⁴. For instance, Cas Mudde (2007, p. 230) claims that even by demonstrating that globalization shocks feed into nativist backlash, cross-country differences

¹⁴In particular, Cas Mudde appears to be especially emphatic about this contention, to the point of his 2007 book including a chapter entitled *“It’s not the economy, stupid!”*

would remain unexplained - since globalization shocks are present across Europe, and ERPs are not successful everywhere. The same reasoning would apply to levels of political resentment and xenophobia, also seen as pan-European phenomena. While acknowledging contextual factors as creators of fertile grounds, Mudde asserts that populist right parties, like any other, mobilize only a fraction of their potential electorates. Therefore, the existence of such fertile grounds are deemed a necessary, but not sufficient condition for ERP rise.

Also, not only do ERPs fail to attract the totality of “globalization losers”, as they also have cross-class, heterogeneous electorates that comprise the wealthy (Müller, 2016; Evans, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Zhirkov, 2014). Indeed, studies looking at aggregate levels of wealth and employment have diverging results, with the majority showing that ERPs are more successful where unemployment is lower, and income, higher¹⁵. Finally, an individual-level study by De Weerd et al. (2004) shows that, on average, economic insecurity tends to mitigate extreme right party affinity, while the opposite applies to people in comfortable situations. Regarding this evidence, Müller (2016, p. 14) reasons that well-off citizens often display Social Darwinist attitudes toward the disfavored. Others (Mudde, 2007; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers, 2002) hypothesize that wealthier citizens may be afraid of losing their economic advantage when confronted with perceived threats of globalization, including mass immigration.

But even regarding immigration, results from empirical research are contradictory. While some studies associate extreme right support with higher contingents of migrants (Golder, 2003; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers, 2002), others find no correlation at all (Wendt, 2003; Norris, 2005; Mudde, 2007). Further, despite the evidence that individual xenophobic attitudes translate into ERP support, additional research indicates that this relationship does not carry over to national aggregate levels (Norris, 2005; Mudde, 2007). Indeed, descriptive data shown in Figure 2 endorse a lack of

¹⁵To best of my knowledge, only Jackman and Volpert (1996) associate ERP vote shares with higher unemployment, whereas the inverse is found by Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers (2002) and Knigge (1998). Additionally, Coffé, Heyndels, and Vermeir (2007) indicate that wealthier Belgian districts tend to be more reliable supporters of the *Vlams Blok*.

relationship on the national level, both in terms of international migrant stocks and of aggregate levels of xenophobic attitudes. All in all, previous studies on ethnic diversity and socioeconomic conditions seem to contradict the portrait of right-wing backlash as resulting from globalization losers' resentment.

In light of conflicting data, how should we grasp the evidence that far-right parties succeed where growth rates are lower and trade exposure is greater? The answer possibly lies in the heterogeneity of ERP electorates. Or at least one could reasonably expect that as a rejoinder from authors like Cas Mudde and Jan-Werner Müller, who label the “losers of globalization thesis” as simplistic and insufficient. Arguably, trade shocks translate into far-right support via impact on one of the subgroups that integrate ERP voter bases. If this assumption holds true, trade shocks, even if significant, would still leave a substantial part of the puzzle unaddressed.

Regarding the present work, a possible implication can be that it provides an incomplete picture, given that, in Mudde's terms, fertile grounds are a “necessary, but not sufficient condition”. However, considering the effort of integrating radical left and extreme right support into the analysis, the importance of comparison becomes clear. In this sense, Mudde's claim could be rephrased to state that economic conditions are “not sufficient, but necessary”. Therefore, understanding who has the edge when faced with certain economic climates is the first step to solving a pressing puzzle. It is to that effort that I now turn.

4 Data and Methods

4.1 Data and Sources

This work runs regressions for two dependent variables: the vote shares of extreme right parties (ERPs) and radical left parties (RLPs) in nineteen parliamentary elections. The sample contains electoral and economic data from elections in eight countries,

held between 2002 and 2011¹⁶. By disaggregating data by 138 subnational regions¹⁷, the sample gains extensive variability - not only in economic variables but also in vote shares for radical parties (page 34 in the Appendix).

To classify parties as belonging to the extreme right or radical left, I turn to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). The CHES attributes numeral scale scores to parties' positions in four different dimensions, also listing parties into families according to experts' answers. By selecting the parties that the survey counts as "Radical Right" and "Radical Left", the sample computes eight ERPs and eight RLPs. This output is endorsed by different sources on European party families¹⁸.

Table 1: Countries, Anti-Political Establishment Parties (APEs), and Election Years

Country	Extreme Right	Radical Left	Election Years
Austria	FPÖ, BZÖ	-	2002, 2006, 2008
Belgium	VB	WPB	2003, 2007, 2010
Denmark	DF	SF	2007
France	FN	PCF	2002
Germany	NPD	Linke	2005
Greece	LAOS	SYRIZA, KKE	2004, 2007, 2009
Netherlands	PVV	SP	2002, 2003, 2006, 2010
Spain	-	IU	2004, 2008, 2011

Noticeably, the time-span omits the emergence of recent insurgent parties, such as *Podemos* in Spain and *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) in Germany. It also fails to grasp the skyrocketing performances by SYRIZA from 2012 onward. Yet, testing for associations during over a decade – comprising contests before and after the 2008 crisis outbreak – should provide relevant insights to understanding APE support in contrasting backgrounds. Allied with national aggregate data, regression estimates from this period can illustrate a large piece of the puzzle.

¹⁶Independent variables correspond to the election year if a contest is held during the second semester, and lagged otherwise.

¹⁷Regional division by the European Union's geocode standard: Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). Data are disaggregated by NUTS 2 regions, roughly correspondent to states. Electoral results provided by the European Election Database (EED); socioeconomic variables by Eurostat.

¹⁸For an account from different sources, see page 35.

4.2 Methodology

Because ERPs and RLPs are not present in every country, the bulk of the literature refrains from using ordinary least squares regressions. Running OLS models with missing values where a radical party is absent would exclude countries with economic conditions that discourage the anti-establishment vote, leading to biased and inconsistent estimates (Golder, 2003; Jesuit, Paradowski, and Mahler, 2009). In turn, by employing OLS while coding these observations as zero, one would assume that regressors and dependent variables have no correlation (March and Rommerskirchen 2015). Consequently, several studies¹⁹ use the Tobit estimator, which employs a maximum-likelihood estimator for left-censored variables and therefore accommodates the limited nature of the dependent variable. In the Tobit model, the coefficients represent the marginal effects of the regressors on the vote shares of radical left and extreme right parties.

The Tobit estimator has the problem of assuming normal and homoscedastic distribution of the error term. When a misspecification occurs, Tobit estimates are inconsistent and inefficient (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 533). In dealing with this problem, I include country dummies and compute Huber-White robust standard errors²⁰. Further, I run supplementary regressions after transforming dependent variables with the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS), which approximates a logarithm²¹. The IHS transformation ameliorates heteroscedasticity and the non-normality of the error term by reducing the variability of dependent variables²². Results of IHS regressions were partially similar to conventional ones (see page 37 in the Appendix).

¹⁹E.g. Jackman and Volpert (1996), Golder (2003), Jesuit, Paradowski, and Mahler (2009), Coffé, Heyndels, and Vermeir (2007), and March and Rommerskirchen (2015).

²⁰As in Golder (2003, country dummies only) and Jesuit, Paradowski, and Mahler (2009, both strategies).

²¹ $\sin^{-1}y = \ln(y + \sqrt{1 + y^2}) \approx \ln 2 + \ln y$

²²As in Jesuit, Paradowski, and Mahler (2009).

4.3 Models

Two separate dependent variables – vote shares for radical left and extreme right parties – are tested in two models, totaling four regressions. Most independent variables reflect this work’s focus on economic conditions. Yet, dummy variables control for the permissiveness of electoral systems and ideologies of incumbent coalitions, since neglecting them could lead to biased results (Golder, 2003; March and Rommerskirchen, 2015).

Model 1:

$$\begin{aligned} RLPVOTE(ERPVOTE) = & \\ & \beta_0 + \beta_1 GDP + \beta_2 UNEMP + \beta_3 GROWTH \\ & + \beta_4 THRESH + \beta_5 CONSINGOV(SOCINGOV) \\ & + \beta_n CountryDummies + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

Model 2:

$$\begin{aligned} RLPVOTE(ERPVOTE) = & \\ & \beta_0 + \beta_1 GDP + \beta_2 UNEMP + \beta_3 CRISIS \\ & + \beta_4 CRISIS * GDP + \beta_5 CRISIS * UNEMP \\ & + \beta_6 THRESH + \beta_7 CONSINGOV(SOCINGOV) \\ & + \beta_n CountryDummies + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

It is reasonable to expect an inverse association between GDP per capita and RLP vote, given the evidence of better performance under poor economic conditions (E.g. March and Rommerskirchen, 2015; Bowyer and Vail, 2011) and in less developed countries (Bartolini, 2007). Conversely, evidence for “prosperity-born bitterness” (as discussed in Mudde, 2007; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers, 2002) and from regional-level analysis by Coffé, Heyndels, and Vermeir (2007) suggest a positive link between

regional income levels and extreme right support:

Hypothesis 1: RLPs are more successful in regions with lower GDP per capita.

Hypothesis 2: ERPs are more successful in regions with higher GDP per capita.

As noted in Section 3, most analyses suggest that unemployment rates (UNEMP) have a positive link to radical left support, whereas the inverse applies to extreme right parties:

Hypothesis 3: RLPs are more successful in regions with higher unemployment.

Hypothesis 4: ERPs are more successful in regions with lower unemployment.

As noted by Brückner and Grüner (2010), GDP per capita growth (GROWTH) describes an economic *shock*, making it different from variables depicting ex-ante *levels* of wealth and employment. Studies on economic shocks and radical parties suggest that the far-right fares better in crisis contexts, with little evidence on the left (ibid, Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch, 2015). Even still, aforementioned studies on RLPs make a strong case for expecting a negative link to growth. Therefore:

Hypothesis 5: The lower the annual growth rate in a region, the higher the support for an RLP.

Hypothesis 6: The lower the annual growth rate in a region, the higher the support for an ERP.

Model 2 substitutes GROWTH for CRISIS - a dummy that takes the value 1 for elections held after September 2008²³. Model 2 also includes two interaction terms involving the crisis dummy (CRISIS*GDP and CRISIS*UNEMP). Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2012) state that economic issues have greater weight in elections during downturns:

Hypothesis 7: RLP support was greater between September 2008 and 2011.

Hypothesis 8: ERP support was greater between September 2008 and 2011.

Hypothesis 9: Relationships between economic indicators and anti-establishment

²³Correlation coefficient for GROWTH and CRISIS is -0.78 (see page 40).

party (APE) vote, when existent, became stronger after September 2008.

Dummy variables in the models control for external institutions and actors that can affect the performance of anti-political establishment parties. Specifically, they pertain to the ideologies of governing coalitions and the openness of institutions to political parties.

CONSINGOV and SOCINGOV control for incumbency: the former for center-right, conservative/Christian-democratic parties, and the latter for traditional social-democratic parties. They are tested alternately on the dependent variables: CONSINGOV against RLPVOTE; SOCINGOV against ERPVOTE. The radical left is found to perform better when the executive is held by a right-wing party (March and Rommerskirchen, 2015, p. 48), indicating that RLPs can excel as repositories of anti-right protest. Besides this hypothesis, I test if an equivalent process occurs with the extreme right:

Hypothesis 10: RLP support is higher when the executive is held by a right-wing party.

Hypothesis 11: ERP support is higher when the executive is held by a left-wing party.

As indicators of the openness of political institutions, one could attempt to thresholds of representation and/or proportionality of electoral systems (Lijphart and Aitkin, 1994, pp. 25-56). Because the vast majority of European systems are PR²⁴, I focus on thresholds. THRESH is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 where a party must obtain at least 3 percent of the votes to take one seat in the legislature²⁵:

Hypothesis 12: RLP support is lower in less permissive electoral systems.

Hypothesis 13: ERP support is lower in less permissive electoral systems.

Finally, country dummies are used in the face of heteroscedasticity (Golder, 2003; Jesuit, Paradowski, and Mahler, 2009), and to take account of potential country het-


²⁴For a detailed account of the electoral systems in the sample, see page 42.

²⁵The value 3 percent is chosen as it approximates the mean threshold in the sample (3.19%).

erogeneity (N. Beck, 2001). No hypothesis are drawn, and their results are not of interest in this study.

5 Results

Figure 3: Dependent Variables are the Vote Shares for Extreme Right and Radical Left Parties



Results are presented graphically in Figure 3²⁶, with Figures 3a/3b representing Model 1; 3c/3d reflecting Model 2. For better visualization, plots are broken down into continuous variables and interaction terms on the left-hand side (3a, 3c); and dummy variables on the right-hand side (3b, 3d). Discussion below focuses on Model 2.

Already at first glance, models for extreme right parties (ERPs) display more signif-

²⁶Detailed estimates in the Appendix (page 36).

icant estimates. They reveal an average increase of 14.75 percentage points in vote shares after 2008 (H8), and a negative correlation with growth rates (H6). Additionally, ERPs have greater appeal in wealthier regions (H2), and where unemployment is lower (H4). Also, estimates reveal that the negative link between unemployment and extreme right support is much stronger for elections held after the financial crisis outbreak (partially H9).


Conversely, radical left party (RLP) vote and unemployment show a positive link (H3). Figure 4a depicts the predictive margins of unemployment rates on RLP support, vertical lines representing mean (solid line) and bounds of standard deviation (dashed lines) of UNEMP. Noticeably, a one percent increase from mean unemployment of 8.8 percent is expected to result in additional 4 percentage points in RLP support²⁷.

On the other hand, neither GDP per capita nor growth rates display significant estimates, and far-left parties' votes do not increase after 2008 (H1-5-7). This sets an apparent contradiction, which is clarified by additional data. Box plots in Figure 4b contrast unemployment levels in years before and after 2008: Average unemployment rates rose from approximately 8.2 to 10.7 percentage points, with standard deviations of 4.9 and 7.7, respectively (see page 34 in the Appendix). These data signal that the post-2008 rise of unemployment was not meaningful to the point of implying a boost for the radical left.

The behavior of unemployment before and after 2008 also matters to understand extreme right support. Model 2 presents a significant, but remote coefficient at -0.22 for UNEMP in the pre-2008 period, contrasting with a slope of -2.15 for post-2008 years. Figure 5 compares the predictive margins of unemployment before and after the financial crisis outbreak: In post-2008 years, a decrease in one percentage point from 8.5 percent of unemployment should reflect a rise of 2 pp in ERP vote shares. Inversely, a rise from 11 to 12 percent of unemployment should imply a loss of 2.6

²⁷However, these results are not cross-validated by inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) regressions, thus weakening estimates' robustness. I consider the implications of this robustness check in the discussion section (page 27).

Figure 4: Unemployment and Radical Left Support




points. Contrasted with the estimate for CRISIS, this suggests that the post-2008 rise in ERP support was increasingly neutralized in high unemployment regions. In this sense, a poor job market may have been an “antidote” against right-wing backlash.

Further avowing the existence of “prosperity-born bitterness”, ERP support has a positive link with income per capita, its estimate suggesting that additional 10 thousand Dollars in income imply an additional 2.4 pp in ERP support. The coefficient looks minor, but it could help explain important variance, given the sample with GDPs above 40 thousand as well as below 20 thousand Dollars. For instance, data from 2003 reveal a gap of nearly 37 thousand Dollars between the Belgian provinces of Brussels and Hainaut. Coincidentally or not, that particular contest had the extreme right-wing Vlaams Blok attaining over 9% of the vote in Brussels, and a mere 0.85% in Hainaut. This further illustrates the validity of disaggregated data, for such a disparity would not be grasped by country-level analysis.

Moving onto external institutions and political actors, electoral thresholds and incumbent parties alike display significant estimates. Anti-establishment parties (APEs) perform much worse if electoral thresholds are above 3 percent (H12-13), especially regarding the far-right. ERPs are expected to receive 25 percentage points less in this circumstance, while a corresponding estimate of -7.5 applies to the radical left. Moreover, RLPs receive additional 2.5 pp of votes when the executive is held by a right-wing

Figure 5: Predictive Margins of Unemployment on Extreme Right Party Vote Share, Before and After 2008 (Model 2); 95% Confidence Intervals



party (H10). In contrast, estimates for CONSINGOV in ERP models go against expectations (H11), suggesting that far-right parties perform worse when left-wing parties are in power - almost 5 points less. It could be the case that mainstream conservative parties – also in the opposition – capture potential ERP voters by attracting “useful votes”. Yet, neither the data nor the literature provides clues to understanding the inverse signs among radical parties.

Taken together, results indicate that supply-side factors are crucial to understanding APE performance, but also make the case for testing it against economic conditions. While it may appear that crises and rising unemployment benefit radical parties as such, a lot can be clarified by disentangling these relationships. This is especially true for the diverging estimates for unemployment rates in models with radical left and right-wing parties - and how these connections behave after 2008. Seemingly, the post-2008 right-wing growth stumbled exactly where joblessness prompted the left.

Because regression data alone cannot sustain deeper insights, I turn to discussing hypotheses regarding the larger picture. To that end, I also reach out to the descriptive analysis from Section 2 and the literature examined in Section 3. In this way, I analyze new data alongside conflicting accounts on the political economy of radical party vote.

6 Discussion

This work shows that European far-right parties became stronger as the financial crisis of 2008 took place, while the same does not apply for the radical left. Such a pattern is confirmed by additional studies (Brückner and Grüner, 2010; Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch, 2015), leading to the central hypothesis that economic downturns, as a general rule, tend to strengthen right-wing extremism.

This would be the case irrespective of a nation's migrant stock or aggregate perception of ethnic diversity, and the losers of globalization would explain this backlash only partially. This is not to say that globalization shocks bear no relation to populism. Rather, I assume that degrees of exposure to economic globalization do not explain cross-country differences. Indeed, this is consistent with not assuming an aggregate level correlation between ethnic diversity and far-right support - which seems to be the most prudent take, given the diverging evidence²⁸.

Arguably, during a crisis, these voters don't necessarily blame minorities. The sole perception of outgroups as competitors for waning resources could suffice to trigger chauvinism. In other words, the primary motive would be less about scapegoating than about wanting to secure the natives' slice of a shrinking pie. This could apply both to blue-collar workers and to upper-class citizens, in a way that the hypothesis is coherent with the heterogeneity of far-right electorates²⁹. It is also in harmony with evidence that, among ERP supporters, xenophobic attitudes and negative perceptions of the economy prevail³⁰.

Contrastingly, radical left parties would profit where economic distress involves exceptional conditions. In the present case, these would be severe government budget cuts and unemployment soaring to unusual rates, even for a crisis context. People in these countries also witnessed national and supranational authorities in strenuous negotia-

²⁸As discussed on page 16.

²⁹As suggested by Ivarsflaten (2005), Evans (2005), and Zhirkov (2014).

³⁰E.g. Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers (2002), Zhirkov (2014), and Burni (2017).

tions, resulting in unpopular measures with a taste of external meddling. Admittedly, this work's estimates for unemployment in RLP models could be inconsistent, as results do not correspond to supplementary regressions with the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation (see page 37 in the Appendix). Yet, the link between unemployment and radical left support is largely agreed upon by the literature (E.g. March and Rommerskirchen, 2015; Bowyer and Vail, 2011; Sperber, 2010), and this work's descriptive analysis displays a clear cleavage on the national level: one that opposes high unemployment, austerity-driven countries with a relevant radical left; and low-unemployment, less fiscally conservative countries with weak or nonexistent RLPs. In sum, despite inconclusive regression results, additional sources indicate that the economic setting of southern Europe has helped to invigorate left-wing populism.

Granted, this general hypothesis is concerned exclusively with the demand side of populism: It proposes that economic conditions help to settle whether populists on the left or on the right have more potential. Whether this potential is fulfilled is a different question, one that demands reaching out to the supply side. In fact, past research emphasizes party leadership, past party success, and electoral systems as central to the performance of populist parties, left and right³¹. Arguably, distinguishing between demand and supply should be critical to understanding the counterfactual cases seen in Section 2. All being said, however, I hope to have made the case that analyses of populist party success should look attentively at economic conditions.

In conclusion, this work shows that 2008 has preceded a rise of extreme right parties, one that took place more intensely in wealthier regions, and regions with lower unemployment rates. In contrast, unemployment is possibly linked to far-left support, although results for the 2002-2011 reveal no evidence of a post-2008 rise in RLP voting. The models suggest that, as a general rule, the extreme right has a window of opportunity during economic crises, especially in regions of higher income, and with relatively low levels of unemployment. Where the outreach of unemployment is unusual, even

³¹E.g. Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers (2002), Golder (2003), Mudde (2007), and March and Rommerskirchen (2015).

for a country in crisis, the stage is set for an exception to the rule, at which right-wing extremism falters and the radical left might have the edge. By distinguishing between the settings where extreme right and radical left parties succeed, the results enable us to better understand the diverging anti-establishment votes.

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7 Appendix

Summary Statistics

Total (subnational data - NUTS 2 regions)

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
ERPVOTE1	273	5.562	7.677	0	47
RLPVOTE1	251	6.593	5.670	0	26.10
GDP	273	24,182	6,598	11,800	53,700
GROWTH	273	2.560	4.119	-15.56	16.83
UNEMP	264	8.808	5.809	1.200	31.50

2002-2008 (CRISIS = 0)

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
ERPVOTE1	209	4.534	6.154	0	32.71
RLPVOTE1	187	6.755	5.949	0	26.10
GDP	209	23,826	6,434	11,800	53,700
GROWTH	209	4.340	2.145	-1.650	16.83
UNEMP	200	8.198	4.945	1.200	31.50

Austria

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
ERPVOTE1	27	18.96	10.06	6.370	47
RLPVOTE1	27	0	0	0	0
GDP	27	28,052	5,921	17,800	40,300
GROWTH	27	3.656	2.492	-0.620	7.230
UNEMP	27	4.363	1.669	2.400	9.700

Denmark

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
ERPVOTE1	5	14.13	1.876	12.42	16.74
RLPVOTE1	5	12.57	1.951	10.29	15.60
GDP	5	28,100	5,150	21,900	36,200
GROWTH	5	4.430	0.826	3.300	5.360

Germany

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
ERPVOTE1	38	1.720	1.133	0.690	5.430
RLPVOTE1	38	8.953	8.045	3.050	26.10
GDP	38	25,239	6,220	17,300	47,300
GROWTH	38	4.404	1.370	1.850	8.470
UNEMP	36	10.81	4.325	5.800	21.40

Total (aggregate national data)

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
ERPVOTE1	19	9.635	6.631	0	28.24
RLPVOTE1	19	4.177	4.927	0	16.60
GDP	19	26,200	3,581	19,200	31,100
GROWTH	19	2.253	3.765	-7.463	5.802
UNEMP	19	7.447	4.441	2.100	21.40

2008-2011 (CRISIS = 1)

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
ERPVOTE1	64	8.919	10.70	0	47
RLPVOTE1	64	6.119	4.771	0	17.04
GDP	64	25,345	7,034	15,500	52,400
GROWTH	64	-3.250	3.643	-15.56	2.300
UNEMP	64	10.71	7.665	2.100	30.10

Belgium

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
ERPVOTE1	33	7.907	8.194	0	24.09
RLPVOTE1	11	1.455	0.671	0.700	3.100
GDP	33	25,982	9,647	16,700	53,700
GROWTH	33	1.385	4.366	-7.470	6.130
UNEMP	33	7.918	3.906	4.100	17.60

France

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
ERPVOTE1	26	9.412	5.112	0	19.02
RLPVOTE1	26	4.925	4.139	0	21.94
GDP	26	19,412	4,332	11,800	35,400
GROWTH	26	4.977	2.812	1.450	16.83
UNEMP	25	11.52	7.405	4.900	31.50

Greece

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
ERPVOTE1	39	3.027	1.681	0.650	7.530
RLPVOTE1	39	10.37	3.687	5.310	19.50
GDP	39	19,172	3,583	14,100	29,300
GROWTH	39	0.617	4.694	-8.100	10.39
UNEMP	39	9.536	1.945	5.300	15.90

Netherlands						Spain					
VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max	VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
ERPVOTE1	48	5.142	6.622	0	26.79	ERPVOTE1	57	0	0	0	0
RLPVOTE1	48	9.584	4.716	4.520	20.56	RLPVOTE1	57	4.272	2.715	0	13.42
GDP	48	27,429	5,309	19,100	40,700	GDP	57	23,130	4,929	13,400	33,900
GROWTH	48	1.251	5.962	-15.56	13.45	GROWTH	57	2.659	2.866	-2.340	7.980
UNEMP	48	3.144	0.956	1.200	5.200	UNEMP	56	13.32	6.830	4.700	30.10

Table 2: Summary of All Variables

Variable name	Description	Source
ERPVOTE	Extreme Right Party vote share	EED, CHES
RLPVOTE	Radical Left Party vote share	EED, CHES
UNEMP	Unemployment rates by NUTS 2 regions (%) - 15 years or over	Eurostat
GDP	Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 2 regions - Purchasing Power Standard per inhabitant	Eurostat
GROWTH	Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 2 regions - Annual Growth	Eurostat
CRISIS	1 if election after September 2008, 0 otherwise	Parties and Elections
THRESH	1 if a party must obtain a minimum of 3% vote share in order to take at least one seat in a legislature, 0 otherwise	Based on Beck et al. (2001)
CONSINGOV	1 if a right-wing government was in government at election date, 0 otherwise	Parties and Elections
SOCINGOV	1 if a left-wing government was in government at election date, 0 otherwise	Parties and Elections

Table 3: Dependent variables are the vote shares for extreme right and radical left parties

VARIABLES	Left		Right	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
GDP	8.00e-05 (5.97e-05)	0.000114 (7.63e-05)	0.000239*** (7.03e-05)	0.000209*** (6.08e-05)
UNEMP	0.373*** (0.101)	0.472*** (0.163)	-0.308*** (0.107)	-0.220** (0.0890)
GROWTH	0.143 (0.0941)		-0.485*** (0.125)	
CRISIS		3.287 (2.918)		14.76*** (3.398)
CRISIS*GDP		-6.93e-05 (9.43e-05)		0.000141 (8.75e-05)
CRISIS*UNEMP		-0.218 (0.155)		-1.891*** (0.232)
THRESH	-7.564*** (1.204)	-7.505*** (1.195)	-32.36*** (2.424)	-25.09*** (2.199)
CONSINGOV(SOCINGOV)	3.412*** (0.695)	2.561*** (0.650)	-4.253*** (1.271)	-4.903*** (1.016)
Country Dummies				
Constant	3.478* (1.793)	2.942 (2.130)	-1.294 (2.399)	-4.412** (2.090)
Log pseudolikelihood	-602.301	-602.118	-583.511	-552.661
Pseudo R2	0.1551	0.1554	0.1884	0.2313
N	242	242	264	264
Non-censored	210	210	170	170

Tobit regression, columns show coefficients with their standard errors in parentheses,
*significant at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent.

Table 4: Estimates - Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation on the dependent variables

VARIABLES	Left		Right	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
GDP	1.49e-05** (7.06e-06)	1.28e-05 (8.26e-06)	5.35e-05*** (1.23e-05)	5.14e-05*** (1.25e-05)
UNEMP	0.0302* (0.0160)	0.0217 (0.0262)	-0.0479** (0.0224)	-0.0347 (0.0214)
GROWTH	-0.00327 (0.0148)		-0.0669*** (0.0224)	
CRISIS		0.0872 (0.461)		2.062*** (0.662)
CRISIS*GDP		-1.05e-06 (1.38e-05)		1.58e-05 (1.93e-05)
CRISIS*UNEMP		0.00860 (0.0263)		-0.269*** (0.0432)
THRESH	-1.005*** (0.189)	-0.985*** (0.186)	-6.165*** (0.332)	-5.574*** (0.342)
CONSINGOV(SOCINGOV)	0.284** (0.113)	0.297*** (0.104)	-1.353*** (0.260)	-1.499*** (0.231)
Country Dummies				
Constant	2.135*** (0.224)	2.183*** (0.253)	0.166 (0.445)	-0.286 (0.446)
Log pseudolikelihood	-195.166	-194.223	-289.633	-272.997
Pseudo R2	0.4855	0.4880	0.3510	0.3883
N	242	242	264	264
Non-censored	210	210	170	170

Tobit regression, columns show coefficients with their standard errors in parentheses,
*significant at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent.

Table 5: Fit Statistics - RLP Model 1

Log-Lik Intercept Only	-712.903	Log-Lik Full Model	-602.301
D(230)	1204.603	LR(10)	221.204
Prob >LR	0.000		
McFadden's R2	0.155	McFadden's Adj R2	0.138
ML (Cox-Snell) R2	0.599	Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2	0.601
McKelvey & Zavoina's R2	0.846		
Variance of y*	110.810	Variance of error	17.039
AIC	5.077	AIC*n	1228.603
BIC	-57.853	BIC'	-166.315
BIC used by Stata	1270.470	AIC used by Stata	1228.603

Table 6: Fit Statistics - RLP Model 2

Log-Lik Intercept Only	-712.903	Log-Lik Full Model	-602.118
D(228)	1204.236	LR(12)	221.571
Prob >LR	0.000		
McFadden's R2	0.155	McFadden's Adj R2	0.136
ML (Cox-Snell) R2	0.600	Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2	0.601
McKelvey & Zavoina's R2	0.849		
Variance of y*	112.353	Variance of error	16.977
AIC	5.092	AIC*n	1232.236
BIC	-47.242	BIC'	-155.704
BIC used by Stata	1281.081	AIC used by Stata	1232.236

Table 7: Fit Statistics - ERP Model 1

Log-Lik Intercept Only	-718.981	Log-Lik Full Model	-583.511
D(252)	1167.022	LR(10)	270.940
Prob >LR	0.000		
McFadden's R2	0.188	McFadden's Adj R2	0.172
ML (Cox-Snell) R2	0.642	Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2	0.644
McKelvey & Zavoina's R2	0.896		
Variance of y*	377.634	Variance of error	39.167
AIC	4.511	AIC*n	1191.022
BIC	-238.117	BIC'	-215.181
BIC used by Stata	1233.933	AIC used by Stata	1191.022

Table 8: Fit Statistics - ERP Model 2

Log-Lik Intercept Only	-718.981	Log-Lik Full Model	-552.661
D(250)	1105.322	LR(12)	332.640
Prob >LR	0.000		
McFadden's R2	0.231	McFadden's Adj R2	0.212
ML (Cox-Snell) R2	0.716	Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2	0.719
McKelvey & Zavoina's R2	0.935		
Variance of y*	438.552	Variance of error	28.576
AIC	4.293	AIC*n	1133.322
BIC	-288.665	BIC'	-265.729
BIC used by Stata	1183.385	AIC used by Stata	1133.322

Table 9: Election Dates and Governing Coalitions

Contest	Date	Incumbent First party	Elected First Party	In Government
Austria 2002	24-11-02	ÖVP	ÖVP	ÖVP, FPÖ
Austria 2006	01-10-06	ÖVP	SPÖ	ÖVP, FPÖ
Austria 2008	28-09-08	SPÖ	SPÖ	SPÖ, ÖVP
Belgium 2003	18-05-03	VLD	VLD	VLD, PS, MR, SPA
Belgium 2007	10-06-07	VLD	CD&V	VLD, PS, MR, SPA*
Belgium 2010	13-10-10	CD&V	N-VA	CD&V, MR, PS, VLD, CDH
Denmark 2007	13-11-07	Venstre	Venstre	Venstre, KF
France 2002	09-06-02	UMP	UMP	UMP
Germany 2005	18-09-05	SPD	CDU/CSU	SPD, CDU/CSU
Greece 2004	07-03-04	PASOK	ND	ND
Greece 2007	16-09-07	ND	ND	ND
Greece 2009	04-10-09	ND	PASOK	PASOK
Netherlands 2002	15-05-02	PvdA	CDA	CDA, VVD, D66
Netherlands 2003	22-01-03	CDA	CDA	CDA, VVD, D66*
Netherlands 2006	22-11-06	CDA	CDA	CDA, VVD, D66
Netherlands 2010	09-06-10	CDA	VVD	VVD, CDA
Spain 2004	14-03-04	PP	PSOE	PSOE
Spain 2008	09-03-08	PSOE	PSOE	PSOE
Spain 2011	20-11-11	PSOE	PP	PP

Sources: Parties and Elections (parties-and-elections.eu).

Table 10: Correlation Matrix

	RLPVOTE1	ERPVOTE1	GDP	GROWTH	UNEMP	CRISIS	CONSGOV	SOCINGOV	THRESH
RLPVOTE1	1								
ERPVOTE1	-0.17121726	1							
GDP	-0.100936753	0.230356085	1						
GROWTH	-0.051565606	-0.211448565	-0.058255219	1					
UNEMP	0.139519884	-0.328971321	-0.36806489	0.032600942	1				
CRISIS	-0.02555632	0.304111878	0.122616148	-0.779895498	0.183459522	1			
CONSGOV	0.096811302	0.379005292	0.074706828	-0.143464606	-0.249457391	-0.049936679	1		
SOCINGOV	-0.068786154	-0.465964876	0.044636609	0.128416153	0.303950228	0.017105642	-0.649881811	1	
THRESH	-0.178221916	-0.011928892	-0.291076722	0.283121643	0.461979699	-0.161399243	-0.073678742	0.073796729	1

Table 11: Data For Descriptive Analysis in Section 2

Country	Year	GDP per Capita	Growth	Fiscal Austerity	Unemployment	Immigration	Xenophobia
European Union		36,083	2.53%	-1.9%	10.0%	10.2%	33.7%
Austria	2012	47,416	3.40%	0.7%	4.9%	15.2%	40.5%
Belgium	2013	43,057	2.69%	1.7%	8.4%	9.6%	18.0%
Denmark	2014	45,996	0.69%	0.5%	6.6%	9.2%	29.8%
Finland	2014	40,694	-0.63%	1.6%	8.6%	4.6%	29.5%
France	2011	37,325	4.00%	1.0%	9.2%	11.4%	11.7%
Germany	2012	44,185	1.34%	1.5%	5.3%	14.4%	36.0%
Greece	2014	26,680	-0.43%	-6.7%	24.9%	11.4%	25.5%
Ireland	2015	54,654	10.69%	-2.8%	9.4%	15.8%	43.3%
Italy	2012	35,900	0.08%	-3.2%	10.7%	9.7%	34.8%
Netherlands	2011	46,449	0.13%	-0.6%	5.3%	11.0%	28.2%
Portugal	2014	29,214	1.58%	-4.4%	12.4%	7.2%	24.4%
Spain	2015	34,527	2.68%	-3.5%	22.1%	13.5%	17.2%
Sweden	2013	45,298	0.51%	3.1%	8.0%	14.8%	17.2%
United Kingdom	2014	40,217	2.83%	0.2%	6.3%	12.1%	22.4%

Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI) and European Values Study (EVS).

Table 12: Political Institutions

Country	System of Government	Parliament Type	Electoral System Family	Electoral System	Number of tiers	Legislative size	Threshold (Beck et al., 2001)
Austria	Parliamentary	Bicameral	PR	List PR	3	183	4.0
Belgium	Parliamentary	Bicameral	PR	List PR	1	150	-
Denmark	Parliamentary	Unicameral	PR	List PR	2	179	0.0
France	Semi-presidential	Bicameral	Plurality/Majority	TRS	1	577	12.5
Germany	Parliamentary	Bicameral	Mixed	MMP	2	598	5.0
Greece	Parliamentary	Unicameral	PR	List PR	2	300	3.0
Netherlands	Parliamentary	Bicameral	PR	List PR	1	150	1.0
Spain	Parliamentary	Bicameral	PR	List PR	H	350	3.0

Source: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

Table 13: Radical Left Parties

Country	Party	CHES	Parties and Elections	ParlGov L-R Score
Belgium	WPB	Workers' Party of Belgium	Radical Left Socialism Communism	1.4
Denmark	SF	Socialist Peoples Party	Radical Left Green Politics Democratic Socialism	2.1347
France	PCF	French Communist Party	Radical Left Communism	1.3741
Germany	Linke	The Left	Radical Left Democratic Socialism	1.2152
Greece	SYRIZA	Coalition of the Radical Left	Radical Left Democratic Socialism Eco-socialism Anti-globalization	2.8947
Greece	KKE	Communist Party of Greece	Radical Left Communism Marxism-Leninism	1.253
Netherlands	SP	Socialist Party	Radical Left Democratic Socialism Eurocepticism	1.2146
Spain	Podemos	We Can	Radical Left Anti-globalization Direct Democracy Democratic Socialism	1.2
Spain	IU	United Left	Radical Left Socialism Communism	2.0183

Table 14: Extreme Right Parties

Country	Party	CHES	Parties and Elections	ParlGov L-R Score
Austria	FPO	Freedom Party of Austria	Radical Right	Right-wing Populism National Conservatism
				8.3494
Austria	BZO	Alliance for the Future of Austria	Radical Right	Right-wing Populism Economic Liberalism
				8.83
Belgium	VB	Flemish Block	Radical Right	Separatism, Nationalism Right-wing Populism
				9.6622
Denmark	DF	Danish Peoples Party	Radical Right	National Conservatism Social Conservatism Right-wing Populism
				8.2269
France	FN	National Front	Radical Right	Nationalism Right-wing Populism
				9.6854
Germany	AfD	Alternative for Germany	Radical Right	National Conservatism
				8.7
Germany	NPD	National Democratic Party	Radical Right	-
				9.8246
Greece	LAOS	Popular Orthodox Rally	Radical Right	-
				9.11
Greece	XA	Golden Dawn	-	Nationalism Far-right politics
				8.7
Netherlands	PVV	Party for Freedom	Radical Right	Right-wing Populism
				8.8

Transcript From Interview With Philippe Schmitter

The simplest answer is 'geographical': populism on the right comes from the north and populism on the left comes from the south. And that's just too superficial, but that's what it looks like if you look at a map, so to speak.

It seems to me that there's an important hypothesis, and this is a Latin American one. It's due to Gino Germani, I don't know if anybody still reads Gino, he was an Italian-Argentine sociologist, and one of his students, a close friend of mine – he died recently – Torcuato di Tella. Torcuato and I, he was the Argentine ambassador in Rome, so we organized a bunch of conferences between Rome and Florence, on the differences between European populism and Latin American populism. And the central hypothesis from Germani is that the population who are most likely to support populist leaders are people who have what he called status incongruence.

So they have accomplished something, but it hasn't been recognized by the previous aristocracy, or whoever is the oligarchy that's running the country. That's the perfect description of peronistas, for example, and he was studying peronistas, so he...

The inverse are people who had higher status in the past and are declining. So in both cases, you don't have a fit between how people think of themselves in terms of some hierarchy of status, and what has actually happened to them. In one case they (inaudible) don't get recognized and in the other case, they go down. So, the obvious hypothesis is, you get the left in the Latin American cases, and you get the right in Europe, that means, those parts of the population which are threatened by the globalization, de-industrialization, et cetera, these are people who had usually a fairly comfortable middle-class income and then find themselves increasingly, so to speak, relegated to the bottom of the pile.

So that's one way. I'm not saying that's all: obviously, there are a great many factors which differentiate from one country to another. So it's not an accident that populists tend to use nationalism as a major component, and nationalism almost by definition is a bit different in each nation, so the question of the kinds of resentments and the kinds of memories you have about the past, et cetera, tend to be different, so the expression becomes different in different countries, simply because of the attachment to national history.

Nevertheless, I think that that's the beginning of a general hypothesis, that what's happening now is that you have the inverse systems, that's just one hypothesis.

<https://soundcloud.com/vozdomundo/episodio-2#t=6:45>
(accessed 15/Jul/2017)