Pentecostals, Churches and Campaign Finance in 2014 Brazilian Elections

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ABSTRACT

Since the 1980s, the number of Pentecostal candidates elected for Brazilian legislatures has remarkably grown. Literature has argued that the phenomenon would be related to Pentecostal churches' support. To date, however, this claim was based only in ethnographies or studies relying in a few cases of elected candidates. Drawing from a new data set of Evangelical candidates for the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and state Assemblies, I try to answer the following questions: do Pentecostal candidates raise less campaign resources than other candidates? What is the effect of being a Pentecostal candidate on vote in Brazilian legislative elections? Is the structure of the church relevant to this effect? Using OLS regression models, I show that there is a positive statistical relationship between being a Pentecostal candidate and campaign spending, between being a Pentecostal and votes, and between the support of more centralized churches and votes.

1. Introduction

In recent decades, Evangelical electoral mobilization in Brazil has grown in a remarkable way. Evangelical candidates obtained third place in the 2002, 2010 and 2014 presidential elections. In 2015, a Pentecostal representative was elected speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. In the 2016 municipal elections, a "bishop" from the *Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus* was elected mayor of the city of Rio de Janeiro. The Evangelical presence has become stronger from the 1980s, when Pentecostal churches adopted the strategy of supporting official candidates. Since then, the number of elected Evangelicals has grown considerably, especially those supported by Pentecostal churches.

The political impact of Evangelical growth in Latin America received scholarly attention since the late 1960s. Part of the social science literature investigating the phenomenon stressed how Pentecostal churches would use clientelistic practices harmful to democracy, having strong electoral support from their faithful, depicted as "herd vote" of these politicians (D'Epinay 1970; Bastian 1994; Chesnut 1997; Gaskill 1997). The first Pentecostal churches arrived in Brazil at the beginning of the 20th century, and, just as the mainline Protestant churches, had a discrete political

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presence. However, from the 1980s on, Pentecostal churches began to mobilize electorally and politically, getting more academic attention (Mariano and Pierucci 1992; Freston 1993; Pierucci and Prandi 1995; Fernandes 1998; Oro 2003; Borges 2009; Mariano and Oro 2011; Machado and Burity 2014). This mobilization, combined with the growth of the Evangelical population, the electoral system of open-list proportional representation, and the high magnitude of Brazilian electoral districts, contributed to the Evangelical electoral success. If in 1998, little more than 29 Evangelical candidates were elected to the Chamber of Deputies, in 2014 this number reached 67, representing almost 15% of the federal legislature (Lacerda 2017). Although underrepresented in the Brazilian parliament, the political representation of Evangelicals is greater than that of other minority groups, such as women and Afro-Brazilians.

Brazil has the fourth largest Evangelical population of the world[2]. According to a sample survey conducted in December 2016, 29% of Brazilians declare themselves Evangelicals[3]. However, and despite a growing literature on Evangelical political mobilization in Brazil, few studies have provided evidences of the impact of churches' support on Evangelical candidates. Among the exceptions are Fernandes (1998), Bohn (2004) and Boas (2014). The reason for this shortage is, at least in part, the difficulty in obtaining data on Evangelical candidates and churches. Moreover, the few existing studies are based on surveys. As far as I know, there is no quantitative study of Brazilian Evangelical candidates which uses electoral data and includes non-elected candidates. The lack of more accurate research on the support of churches for Evangelical candidates, as well as on Evangelical electoral performance in general, renders any statement about the electoral strength of Evangelicals an untested assumption. Drawing from a new data set of Evangelical candidacies for the Chamber of Deputies and Legislative Assemblies, I try to fill this gap by offering new evidence for the debate on political representation of Evangelicals in Brazil. In particular, I try to answer the following questions: do Pentecostal candidates raise more or less campaign resources than other candidates? What is the effect of being a Pentecostal candidate in Brazilian legislative elections? Is the structure of the church relevant to this effect?

The findings of this paper shed new light on the understanding of Evangelical political representation. I present evidence that the use of religious titles (e.g., "pastor", "bishop") in candidates' official electoral names is made by uncompetitive Evangelical candidates. I show that candidates supported by Pentecostal churches have a lower "voting cost" than other candidates. However, although this fact could indicate that Pentecostal candidates have cheaper campaigns, tests with OLS regression models reveal that, ceteris paribus, being Pentecostal is not associated with less expenditure than other candidates. On the contrary, depending on the way campaign

[2] Pew Research Center (2011). *Global Christianity: a Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Christian Population*.
[3] "44% dos evangélicos são ex-católicos" (*Datafolha*, 28/12/16).

expenditure is measured, Pentecostals spend more than others. From these tests, I also find that there is an effect of being Pentecostal (i.e., being supported by a Pentecostal church) on vote, and such an effect is stronger to that of merely being an Evangelical candidate without church support. Finally, the effect of being supported by churches with larger and more centralized structures is greater than that of being supported by other churches. The tests do not completely isolate the mechanism explaining the effect of being Pentecostal on the vote. It is not possible, for example, to affirm that such an effect is due only to the church support, and not also to Evangelical identity, which could have an heuristic effect on Evangelical voters, inclining them to vote for candidates belonging to their own social group. However, I present data from six cases of Pentecostal politicians who lost their churches' support throughout the term, but still tried reelection. The fact that none of them succeeded in being reelected, and all of them got far less votes than they had when supported by the church, serves as a counterfactual to reinforce the conjecture on the importance of the support of a Pentecostal church.

Although this work focuses on Pentecostal churches in Brazil, its findings contribute to a broader debate on religion and comparative politics. Despite the predictions of secularization theories that religions would become more and more privatized and would suffer a slow and gradual decline, the empirical evidence that supports these two hypotheses has been challenged. Since the 1970s, religious movements have demonstrated growing vitality and political activism. The Iranian Revolution, the performance of Liberation Theology in Latin America and the rise of the New Christian Right in the United States are some of the best known examples (Casanova 1994). With regard to religious practice and belief, strong evidence suggests that there is no decline in these indicators, but, on the contrary, perhaps even growth (Stark 1999). This paper, while not directly addressing the debate on secularization, contributes to the discussion of the vitality and political role of religions in liberal democracies.

The rest of the article is organized as follows. I first provide an overview of the debate on Evangelicals and politics, and of legislative elections in Brazil. I next develop the theory and hypotheses, present the data and variables used. After presenting the results and findings, I offer qualitative evidence of candidates supported by churches who lost their support throughout the term, decided to run for reelection, and were not reelected. This evidence serves as a counterfactual argument that, were church support absent, Evangelical candidates would not have been elected. Finally, in the last section I discuss the findings and present final comments.

2.1 Pentecostals and elections

The growth of the Evangelical population in Latin America during the 20th century has aroused the interest of social scientists as to the causes and possible consequences of the

phenomenon[4]. From the outset, one of the researchers' concerns was with the relationship between Pentecostal growth and Latin American politics. From the beginning, too, the studies presented different visions and prognoses. While some have suggested that the growth of Protestantism could have positive effects on the region's democracies (Willems 1967, Stoll 1990, Martin 1990, Mariz 1992, Smith 1994, Dodson 1997), others have highlighted the possible negative effects (Epinay 1970, Bastian 1994, Chesnut 1997, Gaskill 1997). In this view, Pentecostal churches would enter politics by promoting clientelistic and harmful practices to democracy. Pentecostal leaders would act as brokers, supposedly controlling the votes of their congregations and using them in order to maintain unjust social structures. In the case of Brazil, bishops and pastors would be recruited by political parties – usually from the center or right – to run for legislative elections. Once elected, they would benefit their churches with pork. The argument is based on the assumption that a church's "electoral herd" would offer a considerable degree of electoral support to its leaders.

Since the 1990s, studies focused on the Brazilian case have noted that the entry of Evangelical leaders into electoral contests was a phenomenon circumscribed to a small set of Pentecostal churches. The process began with the *Assembleia de Deus* (AD) and the *Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus* (IURD), being later emulated by other churches. Despite organizational differences, these churches have started to support "official candidates" for legislative races, i.e., candidates officially supported by the churches (Freston 1993).

The growing number of Pentecostal representatives during redemocratization led social scientists to ask about the "strength" of Pentecostal candidates, as well as the degree of support of the congregations for their leaders[5]. From a sample survey applied in the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro and focused exclusively on Evangelicals, Fernandes (1998) revealed that 87% of the AD churchgoers reported they have voted for candidates supported for their church. In the case of the IURD churchgoers, this percentage reached 95%. Faithful respondents of the Baptist Church and other mainline churches said they voted more on Pentecostal candidates than on their own denominations. These evidences are not supported by a 2013 Datafolha Institute sample survey, according to which only 18% of Pentecostal voters said they had already voted for a candidate supported by their church[6]. These results should be viewed with caution. Due to a desirability bias, many respondents are likely to say they have never followed the orientation of their church or pastor, even though they have already done so.

[4] In this article, I use the terms "Evangelical" and "Protestant" in an equivalent manner, as most Latin American *evangélicos* do.

[5] For the sake of simplicity, I use the term "Pentecostal candidate" as an equivalent of "candidate supported by a Pentecostal church". In Brazil, most of the larger Pentecostal churches mobilize electorally and promote candidates to their congregations, though I recognize not all of them do so.

[6] "Fatia de católicos no Brasil é a menor em duas décadas" (*Datafolha*, 22/07/13).

The growth of Evangelical political representation in Brazil was mainly due to the success of Pentecostal candidates supported by their churches. To date, the most illustrative cases cited by researchers have been those of the AD, IURD and *Igreja do Evangelho Quadrangular* (IEQ). However, other Pentecostal churches also support official candidates, having also received media attention[7]. It is worth noting that in Brazil, it is illegal to make political advertising in churches and religious temples (Lei 9,504/97, Art. 37). The prohibition is not restricted to churches. Rather, it is a general ban against political propaganda in public places such as cinemas, clubs, stores, shopping centers and religious temples. The statute is vague, giving considerable scope for discussion of what activities and speeches would constitute political propaganda and where they could not be made.

In general, the electoral performance of Pentecostal candidates seems to be related to the type of church that supports them. Some variables would be of particular relevance, such as church size (number of temples, number of members), media structure, hierarchical centralization, and emphasis on candidate support. In other words, the larger the church is in terms of structure and numbers of believers, the greater and more emphatic is the institution's support for its candidates, and the more centralized its structure, the greater the likelihood of electoral success. Church centralization is also related to the process of candidate selection. In a church where there is strong decision-making centralization, candidates are selected by the hierarchy and the non-selected are left aside. On the other hand, the absence of centralization makes the selection process less controlled, allowing those who have not been officially selected to compete for the congregation's votes.

The IURD appears as the prototypical case of corporate Pentecostal representation. It is not only one of the largest Pentecostal churches in Brazil, but it is also known to be more emphatic in supporting its candidates than the others, and certainly has one of the most centralized ecclesial structures among Evangelical churches (Oro 2003a; Mariano 2004; Barbosa 2015). The AD, on the other hand, being the largest Evangelical church in Brazil, is relatively decentralized, and, at least until 2014, did not have rigorous candidates' selection control. The church allows members to run as candidates despite having been defeated in church primaries. Hence, the congregation votes may end up dispersed among several candidates (Borges Jr. 2010). Finally, the IEQ has a number of members close to that of the IURD, but, despite its organizational structure and support for official candidates (Schoenfelder and Paz 2006), its admission process does not seem as controlled as IURD's, or to it imply in the same amount of "pressure" on its members, as with IURD churchgoers.

[7] See, for example: "TRE faz operação em igrejas evangélicas de Caxias e apreende material de candidatos" (*O Globo*, 17/09/14); e "Deputados ligados à Igreja Mundial são cassados por 'abuso de poder religioso'" (*Gospel Prime*, 1/09/15).

The hypothesis that there is a relationship between the performance of Pentecostal candidates and the type of their church assumes that the votes received by candidates come from their own congregations. However, one could also suggest that some of their votes come from voters of other churches[8]. In Brazilian open-list proportional representation (OLPR) elections, the number of candidates who use Evangelical titles ("bishops", "pastors", "apostles", etc.) in their official electoral names has grown. This increase suggests that such a strategy could serve as a religious "cue" to attract Evangelical voters, signaling the candidate's Evangelical identity. The strategy could be explained by the characteristics of the Brazilian political system: high party fragmentation, parties with diluted "brands", high number of candidates (due to the high district magnitude), and expensive campaigns.

Whether because they receive their congregations' votes or the votes from Evangelicals for whom they signal their religious identity, Pentecostal candidates could, in theory, run for legislative seats in Brazil counting on a considerable share of votes and with comparatively less expensive campaigns. The relationship between vote and campaign spending was investigated by Figueiredo Netto and Speck (2015). The authors' general hypothesis is that Evangelicals would receive more votes with less campaign financing. They used data from the 2014 elections for the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and State Assemblies and considered as Evangelical candidates all of those who used titles ("bishop", "pastor", etc.) in their electoral names. Their results indicate that Evangelicals would receive fewer resources, but being an Evangelical candidate would not have a positive effect on votes. When interacting the *dummy* variable "pastor" with campaign spending, there would be a positive and statistically significant effect.

There is, however, a problem in using religious titles as a proxy for Evangelical candidates. Many Evangelicals do not use titles in their electoral names, and certainly the use of religious title is not random, but it is rather correlated with other variables. Figure 1, below, shows the dispersion of the % of valid votes of Evangelical candidates for the 2014 election for the Chamber of Deputies.

[8] In an interview with Borges Jr. (2010), the Maranhão representative and leader of AD Costa Ferreira states that "95% of his votes come from the Evangelical milieu" (p. 75). Similarly, representative Eliziane Gama, also from AD of Maranhão, says that "90% of its voters are also Evangelicals" (idem). The statements are unclear, but suggest that the AD congressmen would not only receive votes from AD constituents, but also from other Evangelical voters.

FIGURE 1. Evangelical candidates' voting



Candidates are divided between those who use religious titles in their electoral names (value 1) and those who do not (value 0). The % of votes of Evangelical candidates without religious title is superior to those with titles. The top quartile (the upper part of the "box") of Evangelicals without titles far exceeds the maximum value of Evangelicals with titles. I considered only candidates who had 0.02% votes or more in the election (which amounts to a total of 150 Evangelicals). However, if one considers the total number of Evangelical candidates, the difference between the two groups would be even greater. It is not rational to assume that candidates choose to use religious titles that will cause them to lose votes. The most plausible hypothesis, on the contrary, is that religious titles are a resource used by less competitive Evangelical candidates, being unnecessary (or even counterproductive) for the more competitive ones. In this way, any model that uses religious titles as a proxy for Evangelical candidates will be biased. The example of the IURD corroborates my point: in 2014, from 19 candidates supported by the church for the federal legislature, only two used religious titles.

Before proceeding to my own theoretical model, I offer a brief review of the literature on legislative elections and campaign financing in Brazil. It can contribute to the identification of important elements for any model – whether or not concerned with Evangelicals – that tries to explain the determinants of the vote in the Brazilian elections.

2.2 Brazilian legislative elections and campaign financing

Federal and state elections in Brazil are held concomitantly and every four years. They elect a president, 513 federal deputies and 81 senators at the federal level, and a governor and a varying number of state deputies at state level. Legislators can run indefinitely for reelection, but Brazilian OLPR electoral system makes reelection far more uncertain for incumbents than what is usually assumed for US politicians. Despite the fact that the presidential election is, by far and large, the contest that structures and influences all the rest (Limongi and Cortez 2010), Brazilian multi-party presidentialism makes important for chief executives to have a strong basis at Congress.

One of the most important aspects of the literature on legislative elections is the debate about the relationship between campaign spending and voting. The discussion on the effect of spending on votes is vast and I do not intend to offer a comprehensive review[9]. I shall limit myself to a few considerations, in so far as they may contribute to the construction of my own model. It is important to remember that in the US electoral system, the dispute in a district occurs in practice between an incumbent and a challenger. In Brazil, on the other hand, the OLPR system means that, within each district, there are several incumbents and several challengers. In the 2014 legislative elections for the state of São Paulo, for example, the dispute for federal deputy was between more than a thousand challengers and 58 incumbents (the state has 70 representatives). It is true that most of the challengers are uncompetitive candidates. Still, in theory, Brazilian incumbents need to compete with each other and with several competitive challengers.

Samuels (2001a, 2001b) was one of the first to investigate the relation between spending and votes in Brazilian elections using data made available by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). The author's OLS regression models are based on data from the 1994 and 1998 elections to the Chamber of Deputies. In addition to using expenditure as the main explanatory variable, Samuels uses as controls the districts' magnitude, incumbency and the quality of the candidates – measured by an index of the Institute of Socio-economic Studies (INESC) –, among others. Campaign spending appears to have a significant effect, but the same does not occur with the interaction between incumbency and expense, suggesting that, in Brazil, campaign spending would have a similar effect between incumbents and challengers. A final point to note is that for Samuels, incumbents should not be compared to all challengers, but only to those who are stronger or of higher quality.

Pereira and Rennó (2001, 2007) investigate the determinants of reelection to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. The authors use probit models with several independent variables, such as concentration of votes, degree of local competition, campaign spending, ideology, being a member

[9] For a good partial review, see Stratman (2005). For a good review of the Brazilian case, see Mancuso (2015).

of state or federal government coalitions, and a series of variables related to the performance of candidates in their terms. The first study deals with the 1998 election and the second with the 2002 election. The authors stress that belonging to the government showed statistical significance in 1998, but not in 2002. The explanation for this would be the absence in 2002 of a president competing Reelection.

Lemos, Marcelino and Pederiva (2010) investigate the cost of the electoral campaigns for the Chamber and the Senate in 2002 and 2006. They use all candidates who have been accountable for their spending and assume that in the Brazilian case there would be no incumbency advantage. Based on descriptive statistics, the authors argue that the elect have more expensive campaigns than the non-elected ones. The average spending of elected congressmen is higher in both 2002 and 2006. They also show that incumbents' campaign spending is higher than that of the challengers. It is also worth mentioning that political party and being at the government coalition would be two variables relevant for the candidates' finances.

Speck and Mancuso (2014) also seek to explain the relationship between campaign spending and electoral success. However, their focus is on the interaction between campaign spending and incumbency, on the one hand, and spending and gender, on the other. The authors conclude that there is a positive and statistically significant association between expenditure and electoral success, and that there would be a "Jacobson effect" not only for the challengers, but also for candidates with specific electoral disadvantages (women, for example). From this literature, as well as the literature on Evangelicals and elections, I present in the following section a theoretical model and the hypotheses that will be tested[10].

3. Theory and hypotheses: Pentecostals, churches and campaign spending

An ideal experiment measuring the causal effect of being supported by a Pentecostal church on electoral performance would need to randomly assign, in any given district, the support of identical Pentecostal churches (the treatment) to a given group of candidates and compare their performance with that of another group who had not received such support (control group). For several reasons, this research design is unfeasible. Men and women do not convert to Pentecostalism in a random way, nor do they ascend randomly in the church hierarchy. Therefore, official support from the church is not given randomly. In addition, there is extreme diversity among the Brazilian Pentecostal churches. They differ in terms of territorial extension, number of

[10] It is worth mentioning that, in 2014, the Brazilian Federal Police began an investigation (called "Lava Jato"), which has since revealed one of the largest corruption scandals in the world. Investigations revealed that a considerable part of Brazilian politicians (whether from executive or legislative) got elected with illegal financing. To date, however, as far as I know, there are no studies measuring the impact of the now known illegal financing on the candidates' performances.

temples, pastors and congregations, doctrine and theological vision, among other factors. Thus, neither the support is random among the candidates, nor is it given by identical churches.

Instead, I offer an observational study based on electoral data from the federal and state legislatures, through which I intend to estimate the effect of being supported by a Pentecostal church on electoral performance. To date, the difficulty in obtaining data on Evangelical candidates, as well as their relationship with churches, has prevented researchers from successfully addressing the electoral effect of churches' support with multivariate analyzes. Based on new data (detailed in the next section), I intend to contribute to fill in this gap.

Assuming there is a positive association between being a Pentecostal candidate and electoral performance, the phenomenon could be explained in different ways. A first basic explanation relies on Evangelical identity. Social identities based on race, gender and religion, among others, may generate political cohesion and be relevant to electoral contests (Huddy 2013, Green et al. 2002). There is evidence that, in addition to candidates and parties, social groups are one of the main ways in which individuals organize their general political cognition (Miller et al. 1991). In the case of Brazilian legislative elections, the use of religious titles in the electoral names would be an example of how certain candidates seek to signal their evangelical identity to voters.

A second explanation is based on the support that a church offers to its "official" candidate, giving him a more or less assured contingent of votes (or facilitated access to that contingent). The church leaders – pastors and bishops – promote the candidate to the faithful in a variety of ways: taking him to the pulpit, placing banners with his photos in or near the church, presenting him to the churchgoers in personal meetings, distributing political flyers, among others (Oro 2003b; Santos 2013; Valle 2013; Barbosa 2015). Since the church is an institution that encompasses several spheres of the life of the faithful, it is understandable that the confidence entrusted to the institution is transmitted easily to the candidates supported by it. In addition, the sectarian structure of Pentecostal churches makes them seek to keep the faithful within the churches and oppose their participation in spheres beyond their control (Freston 1993). This contributes to a high attendance to the churches' temples vis-à-vis other religions (Bohn 2004).

The support of the church led to the emergence of a new type of Evangelical candidate, whose historical emergence was set out in the 1980s during redemocratization (Freston 1993). While it is theoretically possible to think of the two explanations above (religious identity and church support) as distinct ones, the distinction is made more difficult in practice, since "official" church candidates can receive votes from Evangelicals pertaining to other churches, and unofficial candidates can win the votes from churches that already support another candidate.

In any case, the two basic explanations for the positive association between being a Pentecostal candidate and electoral performance allow different conjectures about the campaign spending of these candidates. It may be argued that, whether through "religious cues" or through

official church support, Pentecostal candidates need to spend proportionately less money on their campaigns. However, it would also be plausible to bring forth a competing explanation, that Pentecostal candidates would receive more resources from parties and/or donors with the expectation that (in comparison to others) they would more easily convert resources into votes. It should be noted, then, that the two explanations suppose that Pentecostal candidates have a comparatively lower "voting cost" than the other candidates – or at least a "voting cost" that makes them competitive candidates for the elections (see table 1, below).

Table 1. Spending/vote ratio (in BRL$) in 2014 elections.

	Chamber	Assemblies
Total of Candidates	13.15	14.21
Evangelicals	10.00	8.59
Assembleia de Deus	8.64	8.29
Igreja do Evangelho Quadrangular	8.36	9.00
Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus	4.57	3.79

Therefore, a first conjecture to be tested is whether Pentecostal candidates collect (and, by extension, spend) more or less money than the other candidates. A second conjecture concerns the difference between Evangelical and Pentecostal candidates. Official support from Pentecostal churches is an institutional resource that can make the candidates of these churches more competitive by offering them facilitated access to a contingent of voters. This should differentiate official Pentecostal candidates from Evangelical candidates. Thus, it is plausible to suppose that being an official Pentecostal candidate has a positive effect on the number of votes, and that this effect is greater than a possible Evangelical effect on the votes.

As discussed in the previous section, Pentecostal church support is a resource related to the church type. Thus, a third conjecture would be that churches with greater structure, decision-making centralization, and emphasis on candidate support will have a greater effect on candidates' electoral performance than others (Rodrigues and Fuks 2015). From this reasoning, I present below, in a simplified way, the hypotheses to be tested.

Hypothesis 1. Being a Pentecostal candidate has a negative effect on campaign spending.

Hypothesis 2a. Being a Pentecostal candidate has a positive effect on the number of votes.

Hypothesis 2b. Being a Pentecostal candidate has a greater effect on the number of votes than that of being an Evangelical candidate.

Hypothesis 3. Being a Pentecostal candidate supported by a church with larger structure, decision-making centralization, and emphasis on support has a greater effect on the number of votes than being a candidate of other churches.

4. Data

The data set used here comes from two sources. The electoral data, including most of the independent and control variables, come from TSE. However, in order to test the aforementioned hypotheses, I had to complement these data with information from the linkage between candidates and churches. This implied in a dedicated effort of data collecting, which, as far as I can tell, could not be automatized. More than 17,000 candidates ran for federal and legislative seats in 2014 Brazilian elections. Although it is relatively easy to identify elected Evangelical candidates, the same cannot be said for the non-elected. Most Pentecostal churches do not publicize their (often illegal) support for candidates. The churches' National Registry of Legal Entities (CNPJ) is not helpful, because most Evangelical candidates are not churches' employees[11]. Hence, I had to rely on different strategies for identifying Evangelical candidates and their linkages to churches.

First, I relied on the literature on Evangelicals and elections in Brazil, which offers valuable information on Evangelical politicians. Secondly, on the information contained in the TSE data about candidates' occupations and their electoral names. Many Evangelical candidates with ecclesial positions declare their occupation as "priest or member of religious order or sect". In addition, many also use religious titles in their electoral names. Third, I contacted the churches. Few, however, contributed to the research; most ignored my requests for information about which candidates they supported in elections. Fourth and last, I searched newspapers and news internet sites that had information about the religious identity and/or church to which the candidate was linked.

It is necessary to stress that despite the exhaustive work of identification of Evangelical candidates and their respective churches, it is considerably difficult to identify whether or not a Pentecostal candidate was "officially" supported by his church, as well as discerning what differentiates a candidate with official support from one who, without official support, tries to win the votes of his congregation. Such a difficulty does not exist in the case of IURD, since it does not allow unofficial challengers, but it is considerable in the case of AD. I opted to identify the candidates "associated" to the churches, although, in many cases, I do not know precisely if the

[11] I thank Cláudia Cerqueira for bringing this fact to my attention.

connection involved official support or not. Strictly speaking, I am assuming that candidates associated to Pentecostal churches can be a proxy for Pentecostal "official candidates".

The data set units of analysis are the candidates. The total number of candidates for the Chamber was 4,942, and for the state Assemblies, 12,589. A first matter to be taken into consideration concerns which candidates should be included in the analysis. Using all the candidates to federal and state legislatures of the 2014 elections would imply in considering in the analysis even those non-competitive candidates who received few or no votes and few or no resources for their campaigns. As noted by Samuels (2001a), most of the contestants in the US and Brazilian legislative elections are largely irrelevant. However, if they were included in the analysis, they would create a bias towards increasing incumbents' advantage, since incumbents would be compared to all other incumbents. For this reason, Samuels argues, only competitive candidates should be considered.

But the problem is not just the bias in favor of the incumbents. It is a broader one and concerns to what extent certain observations should influence the estimation of the regression parameters. Let's suppose two candidates, A and B. Both run for a seat of federal representative for São Paulo. Candidate A declared campaign spending of R$ 5.00 and got 10 votes. Candidate B, in turn, declared expenditure of R$ 170,000.00 and obtained 12,000 votes. In terms of electoral success, it is clear that the relation between spending and voting of the first candidate (A) is far from the true relation between spending and voting in the district in question. However, if it is included in the analysis, it will influence the parameter estimation.

To circumvent this issue, I opted to work with a sample containing only those candidates who received 0.02% or more of the total valid votes in their districts. It should be remembered that, in Brazilian OLPR legislative elections, candidates are elected with much lower percentages than would be required in a majority contest. As an example, the candidates elected in 2014 with the lowest percentage of votes received 0.1% of the valid votes for the federal Chamber and 0.12% for the Assemblies. The limit of 0.02% is, therefore, well below the minimum percentage of votes of the elected. It excludes a considerable number of non-competitive candidates, but does not exclude any elected candidates and still allows for the presence of a significant contingent of unelected candidates. Finally, although there is some arbitrariness in setting a limit of 0.02%, its sole objective is to remove from the sample candidates who are not competitive and whose inclusion could lead to some bias in the results. There would be no difference, therefore, if this limit were a little higher or lower than stipulated[12].

Among the candidates for the Chamber, I identified 186 Evangelicals. Of that number, 122 had their churches identified and 90 were defined as Pentecostals. Among the candidates for the

[12] To confirm this, I ran models with all candidates and models with a limit of 0.05%. I found small differences in the magnitude of the coefficients, but the signs and significance remained the same.

state Assemblies, I identified 338 Evangelicals, of whom 156 had identified churches and 113 were defined as Pentecostals. For the sample of competitive candidates, the number of Evangelicals is smaller, as shown in Tables 2 and 3, below. However, it should be noted that the number of Pentecostals in the two samples is almost the same, which only indicates that almost all Pentecostal candidates received a percentage equal to or greater than 0.02% valid votes in their respective districts.

Table 2. Total number of candidates, Evangelicals and Pentecostals.

Office	Total	Evangelicals	Identified Church	Pentecostals
Federal Representative	4942	186	122	90
State Representative	12589	338	156	113

Table 3. Sample containing only candidates with $\geq$ 0.02% of votes.

Office	Total	Evangelicals	Identified Church	Pentecostals
Federal Representative	3111	150	120	88
State Representative	7300	235	153	112

Dependent Variables

Campaign spending. This is a dependent variable for the test of the first research hypothesis and an independent variable for the other hypotheses. As seen in the literature review, campaign spending is a key aspect of candidates' electoral performance. In the case of the analysis of the Pentecostal candidates, it is necessary to investigate to what extent they collect more or less than other candidates. Like Lemos, Marcelino and Pederiva (2010) and Pereira and Rennó (2001), I chose to define this variable as the natural logarithm of per capita campaign spending. It is, therefore, the division of the absolute expenditure of each candidate by the number of voters of the district (in logarithm). However, I decided to use also the percentage of spending, as did Samuels (2001a, 2002b) and Speck and Mancuso (2014). It is the percentage, for each candidate, of its total campaign expenditure in a particular district. Thus, there is an alternative measure that, as in the case of per capita spending, allows comparison among candidates from different districts. The two measures have advantages and disadvantages. The log of per capita expenditure has a

distribution that is closer to a normal, whereas the percentage of expenditure has a rather asymmetric distribution. In addition, the percentage of spending has many outliers, which does not occur with the log of per capita spending. However, some models with the expenditure percentage have a larger R^2, and the coefficients of the independent variables of interest are slightly higher in models with the percentage of expenditure.

Votes. This is the dependent variable that will be used in the test of most hypothesis, and that measures the candidates' electoral performance. Similar to campaign spending, I chose to set it as the percentage of valid votes each candidate received in his or her district. Another possibility would be to work with a binary dependent variable that would distinguish the elected candidates from the non-elected. Although there are good arguments for using a binary variable (see, for example, Speck and Mancuso 2014), my goal in this study can be best achieved by working with a continuous variable.

The use of a binary variable would end up disregarding that candidates can perform well even if they are not elected. In Brazilian legislative elections, the best non-elected candidates become "substitutes" [*suplentes*], that is, they head a list of those who will take up a position if and when the elected candidates resign their mandates to take on other positions. It would be difficult not to consider a good proxy as a good electoral performance. This situation is properly captured when working with a continuous variable, but would not be captured with a binary variable. Take, for example, the case of the IURD in the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso in 2006 (see Cuyabano 2009). The church has supported two candidates for the state Assembly and one for the federal Chamber. None of them were elected. However, they all got good votings and probably good positions as substitutes (in fact, one of them was the third substitute). A second justification for using the percentage of valid votes in opposition to the 'elected' and 'non-elected' categories is that, in elections for Brazilian legislatures, candidates do not depend only on themselves. The possibility of electoral coalitions in high-magnitude districts with OLPR means that some candidates receive comparatively fewer votes but are still elected thanks to the coalition votes. This would be a problem if the variable is binary, but it will not be a problem if the variable is continuous.

Independent Variables

In this study, I use three main independent variables. They are three binary variables. The first and most comprehensive identifies whether or not the candidate is an Evangelical. The second and most important, if the candidate is linked to a Pentecostal church. It is, technically, a proxy to identify whether or not the candidate is supported by a Pentecostal church. The proxy is necessary because, as mentioned above, it is not always possible to distinguish candidates supported *de facto* by churches from those who, although related to them in some way, did not receive support. Table

4, below, shows the Pentecostal churches included in the variable and the number of candidates attached to them.

Finally, the third independent variable identifies whether or not the candidate is supported by the IURD. It will be used to test hypothesis 3, that is, if being a Pentecostal candidate for a church with a larger structure, decision-making centering, and emphasis on support has a greater effect on the number of votes than being a candidate for other churches. The IURD is the best choice for this, since it is the best example identified by the Pentecostal literature of a large church, with a centralized structure and emphatic support for its candidates. Each of these three variables – Evangelical, Pentecostal and member of the IURD – presents value 1 when candidates belong to the interest categories and 0 when they do not.

Table 4. Pentecostal candidates per church.

Church	Chamber	Assemblies
Assembleia de Deus	45	63
Universal do Reino de Deus	19	23
Evangelho Quadrangular	8	9
Mundial do Poder de Deus	4	9
Internacional da Graça de Deus	4	3
Maranata	3	2
Sara Nossa Terra	2	2
Renascer em Cristo	1	1
Brasil Para Cristo	1	0
Nova Vida	1	0
TOTAL	88	112

Control Variables

While the argument presented here is focused on the impact of being a Pentecostal candidate on campaign spending and electoral performance, other factors may affect that relationship. A first important factor is the use of a religious title. Many Evangelical and Pentecostal candidates use religious titles ("pastor", "bishop", "apostle", etc.) in their electoral names to attract Evangelical voters. As I have argued, the use of religious titles is not random, but is more often used by less competitive candidates, presumably to activate their Evangelical identity. The strategy of electorally focusing on Evangelical voters, even if it makes one losing votes among non-Evangelicals (see Boas 2014), is rational in an OLPR system with a high number

of competitors. I included in the models a *dummy* variable to identify candidates who use religious titles. Approximately 25% of Pentecostal candidates for the federal Chamber used religious titles. In the case of state Assemblies, this percentage was 38.4%.

In the literature on legislative elections, perhaps the most important factor for the performance of candidates is the incumbency. Jacobson (1978, 1985, 1990) argued about the difference that campaign spending may have on incumbent and challenging performance. In the case of Brazil, the discussion also exists. Samuels (2001a, 2001b) found no significant difference between the two groups, but Speck and Mancuso (2014) and Lemos, Marcelino and Pederiva (2010) managed to do so.

The importance of incumbency is justified by two basic assumptions that are, to some extent, related. The first is that incumbent candidates can use their resources during their terms to become known to voters, which would allow them to start the electoral campaign ahead of their rivals. The second is that incumbents are presumably stronger candidates with greater political capital, either because of their personal charisma, their political ability, or other factors. However, in the case of Brazil, it can be assumed that many candidates with greater political capital do not necessarily belong to the legislative branch. It is common, for example, that former mayors compete for seats in state and federal legislatures. The Brazilian political system offers incentives so that politicians do not necessarily seek to build careers in the legislative (Leoni et al. 2003). Offices in the local and state executives can be more interesting than a seat in a state Assembly or even in the Chamber of Deputies. Because of this, it seems reasonable to take into account not only whether the candidates are incumbent, but also whether they have already been mayors. Thus, I added to the models two *dummy* variables, one to identify incumbents, and another to identify those candidates who were elected mayors in 2004 and/or 2008. Just over a third of Pentecostal candidates competing in 2014 were incumbents, but only two of them were former mayors.

Another important factor to consider is the candidate performance in the last elections. It is true that, of the total number of candidates analyzed, only a small fraction corresponds to candidates seeking reelection. Most did not run in previous elections. However, it is possible to use as a control the performance of the candidates' parties in the last elections. This factor may account for holding voter preferences in their respective districts constant. Thus, I include a control variable with the percentage of votes for the candidate's party for the 2010 elections. The percentages refer to the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, in the case of candidates for federal representative, and for the Assemblies, in the case of candidates for state representative. It is worth emphasizing that most studies on the relation between spending and voting in the US Congressional elections use some kind of control for constituency preference (Stratman 2005)[13].

[13] In the case of parties whose registration was obtained after 2010, such as the National Ecological Party (PEN), the Republican Party of Social Order (PROS) and Solidarity (SD), the value attributed was zero.

The literature on the Brazilian case also highlights another relevant factor, namely, the party's belonging to the federal coalition (Pereira and Rennó 2001, 2007; Leoni et al. 2003). The assumption is that candidates would benefit from belonging to the federal government coalition, either for the benefits that membership could grant to their mandates in the case of candidates for reelection, or for a possible coattail effect that could benefit the candidates related to the coalition basis[14]. The reasoning could also be valid for state government coalitions, given the supposed power that Brazilian governors would have over state and municipal political leaders (Abrúcio 1998). However, as Pereira and Rennó (2007) argue, the institutional changes that occurred throughout the 1990s, such as the end of state banks and the approval of the Fiscal Responsibility Law, have diminished the power of state governments, making their influence less certain. Thus, I included in the models only a dummy variable to control for the belonging to the federal coalition in 2014.

Another factor stressed by the literature that deserves attention is that of parties. In the debate on the relationship between spending and voting in US Congress elections, the models incorporate variables specifying candidate parties (e.g., Jacobson 1978; Green and Krasno 1988). However, not all studies on the Brazilian case use parties as controls. The relevance of the party depends, of course, on what one wants to investigate. In the case of the relation between expenditure and vote, it seems plausible to suppose that the candidate's political party is a variable related to both spending and voting, and that, therefore, it should be incorporated. However, the focus of this study is not exactly the relationship between spending and voting, but rather between being a Pentecostal official candidate and voting.

It is reasonable to suppose that the performance of Pentecostal candidates does not depend much on parties. The literature usually characterizes Brazilian parties as weak and with diluted "brands" (Mainwaring 1992; Samuels and Zucco 2013). The exceptions would be the Workers Party (PT) and, to a lesser extent, the PSDB and the PMDB. However, as shown in table 5, below, Pentecostal candidates tend to pulverize into small, comparatively unstructured parties with diffuse ideology. They are, in general, center or center-right parties, but whose "brands" signal little to voters. In addition, parties hosting Pentecostal candidates are likely to contribute less to their candidate's campaigns than stronger parties such as PT and PSDB. The characterization of the Pentecostal candidate by the literature implicitly suggests that they are little dependent on their parties, since in theory they could count on their "electoral herds". These arguments could justify the exclusion of the parties from the statistical models of this study. However, based on Table 5, I

[14] It is worth remembering that, despite the fall in the popularity of President Dilma Rousseff between March and June 2013, she ended 2014 with relatively high approval ratings. See, for example: "Popularidade de Dilma Rousseff aumenta e 52% aprovam a maneira de governar da presidente" (*Agência de Notícias CNI*, 17/12/14).

chose to include *dummies* only for the parties with the highest concentration of Pentecostal candidates, namely: PRB and PSC.

Table 5. Pentecostal candidates per party.

No. of Candidates	Federal Chamber	State Assemblies
1	PMN, PPS, PROS, PSDC, PTC, PTN, PV	PMN, PP, PPS, PSDC, PSL
2	PDT, PEN, PP, PRP, PRTB, PTdoB, PHS, PSB	SD
3	PSD, PSDB, SD	PDT, PHS, PTC
4 to 6	DEM, PMDB, PR, PTB	PEN, PRP, PSB, PSDB, PTB, PTN, DEM, PR, PROS
7 to 10	-	PMDB
11 to 15	PSC	PSD
16 to 20	-	PSC
21 to 25	PRB	PRB

Finally, I add to the models control variables for gender, race, and age. The first two are *dummies* and the last one is continuous. In the case of gender, the variable assumes value 1 for women and 0 for men. In the case of race, it assumes 1 for blacks or browns [*pardos*], and 0 for the others. It is worth saying that, in the 2014 elections for federal and state legislatures, a quarter of the total number of candidates was woman. In the case of Pentecostal candidates, this proportion decreases to one-tenth. In other words, if, in the total set of candidates, one in four was a woman, within the subset of Pentecostals women represent only one in ten. Regarding race, the proportion of blacks + browns in the total of candidates is similar to that found in the subset of Pentecostal candidates (just under 40% in both groups). The under-representation of women and Afro-Brazilians in the Brazilian legislatures, as well as their lower potential for campaign financing (Sacchet and Speck 2012), suggests the importance of including controls for gender and race in the models.

5. Results

In order to test the hypotheses stated above, I use OLS regressions to estimate six models, replicated to the federal Chamber and state Assemblies. The coefficients of the main interest variables are presented in the graphs below (tables with the complete models are found in the Appendix). Models 1 and 2 are used to test the first hypothesis that being a Pentecostal candidate would have a negative impact on campaign spending (see Figure 2). The dependent variable of model 1 is the natural logarithm of per capita expenditure, and that of model 2, the percentage of expenditure. Models 3 and 4 refer to the second hypothesis that (a) being a Pentecostal candidate would have a positive effect on the number of votes, as well as (b) a greater effect than that of being Evangelical (see Figure 3). The dependent variable on both is the percentage of votes. The only difference between them is the specification of the independent variable of campaign expenditure (model 3 uses per capita expenditure and model 4, the percentage of expenditure). Finally, models 5 and 6 are used to test the third hypothesis, that being a Pentecostal candidate for a church with a larger structure, centralization, and emphasis on support would have a greater effect on the number of votes than being candidate for other churches (see Figure 4). Again, the dependent variable on both is the percentage of votes, and the only difference between them is the specification of campaign spending (model 5 uses per capita expenditure and model 6, the percentage of spending). Each of the models is presented in two versions, one for the federal Chamber, the other for the Assemblies.

FIGURE 2. Estimated effect of being Pentecostal on campaign expenditure



FIGURE 3. Estimated effect of being Evangelical or Pentecostal on vote



FIGURE 4. Estimated effect of being Pentecostal or supported by IURD on vote



Note: lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

The first hypothesis is not confirmed by models 1 and 2. For both, the main variable is 'Pentecostal', which specifies whether or not the candidate is supported by a Pentecostal church. The results differ according to the dependent variable adopted, but none of them suggests a negative effect of being Pentecostal on expenditure. On the contrary: the models point to a positive relationship between being Pentecostal and campaign spending, in spite of all controls. Adopting the log of per capita spending, the relation is positive and statistically significant (at level 0.01) in both federal and state elections. However, it loses its significance when adopting the percentage of spending, although it remains positive. Thus, although they depend on the specification of the

models, the results suggest a positive relationship between being a Pentecostal candidate and spending.

The second hypothesis finds support in models 3 and 4. In this case, the variables of major interest are 'Pentecostal' and 'Evangelical'. Regarding hypothesis 2.a, there is a positive and statistically significant effect (almost always at 0.01) of being Pentecostal on % of votes for all models. The effect holds even if controlled by incumbency, by candidate party's performance in previous elections (2010), by belonging to the federal government coalition, by gender, race and age, by religious title and even by the parties with the highest number of Pentecostal candidates – PRB and PSC. In model 3, which uses the natural logarithm of per capita spending, the effect of being Pentecostal decreases compared to Model 4, but is still positive and significant for the Chamber (at level 0.1) and for Assemblies (at level 0.01).

Hypothesis 2.b supposes the comparison between the coefficients of 'Pentecostal' and 'Evangelical'. For almost all cases, the confidence intervals of the coefficients do not overlap, indicating that the difference between them is statistically significant[15]. The exception is the comparison between the two coefficients in model 3 of the federal Chamber. A Wald test reveals that the hypothesis that the two coefficients of the model are different cannot be rejected for any level of significance below 30% (Prob> F = 0.2996), which means that it cannot possibly be rejected[16]. Still, the results seem to corroborate the conjecture that the effect of being a Pentecostal candidate is different from that of being evangelical.

The third hypothesis, tested with models 5 and 6, states that the type of church has relevance in the effect of being a Pentecostal candidate. A church with greater structure, centralization, and emphasis on support would have a greater effect on the candidate's votes than other churches. To test this conjecture, I opted for a comparison between the effect of being Pentecostal and the effect of being supported by the IURD. For this comparison, I created a new variable, 'Pentecostal – IURD', which is, as the name suggests, the same 'Pentecostal' variable, but without candidates belonging to the IURD. The reason is that, without this, it is not possible to obtain a coefficient for the variable 'IURD'[17].

The coefficient of 'IURD' is considerably higher than that of 'Pentecostal – IURD'. However, only in model 6 of the Assemblies, the confidence intervals of the coefficients do not overlap. The Wald test for the model 5 of Assemblies reveals that the hypothesis of difference between coefficients cannot be rejected at a significance level of 5%, but may be at a 10% (Prob > F = 0.0601). However, for the models of the Chamber, the hypothesis that the two coefficients

[15] See "*Overlapping Confidence Intervals and Statistical Significance*" (*StatNews #73*, 10/2008).
[16] All Wald tests were made with the post-estimation command of Stata 12.
[17] I also opted not to include controls for PRB and for pertaining to the federal coalition simply because all IURD candidates belonged to the PRB, and the PRB, in turn, belonged to the federal coalition.

are different cannot be rejected for any level of significance below 57% (model 5) and 20.6% (model 6). Thus, it seems reasonable to state that in the case of hypothesis 3, the effect of being a candidate supported by the IURD is greater than that of being supported by other churches, but the difference between the effects is statistically significant only in the models for the Assemblies.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the results of the coefficients of the control variables for the Chamber and Assemblies were similar. For all models, the effect of campaign spending (either as a percentage or as a log of per capita spending) was positive and significant. The same goes for incumbency and being a former mayor. The percentage of the party's votes in the last election has a positive and significant effect, yet almost null, for all Chamber models, but is almost equal to zero for the Assemblies models. Pertaining to the federal coalition has a positive effect and is statistically significant for the Chamber and Assemblies, but only when the dependent variable is campaign spending. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the effect of being a woman is, in general, negative and with statistical significance, while that of being Afro-Brazilian is generally negative, but close to zero and not always significant.

6. Qualitative analysis

It could be objected that I am not measuring the support of the churches as an institutional resource, but rather certain skills (acquired or innate) of the Pentecostal candidates, such as personal charisma, social capital, etc. Perhaps the identified effect of being a Pentecostal candidate on votes, despite all the controls used in the regression models, actually reveals certain capabilities of these candidates that would not have been properly controlled. Perhaps they are the same capacities that made them rise in the hierarchies of their churches, for example. I do not deny that there are factors related to these candidates that have not been controlled in the models presented previously. However, I will argue here that, despite the alleged abilities of Pentecostal candidates, their electoral performance is largely due to the support of the churches, and that the effect of being Pentecostal on the vote wanes or disappears when church support is absent.

To this end, I offer in this section qualitative evidence of six Pentecostal candidates who were elected with the support of their churches, broke up with them throughout their term and sill tried reelection. Such evidence can serve as a counterfactual basis for thinking about what the performance of these candidates would have been if church support were absent. Each of them had a marked decline in their votings and none of them were reelected. As far as I know, these are the only cases between 1998 and 2014 of Pentecostal politicians who have broken with the church during the term. Therefore, if I'm not mistaken, there are no cases which have resulted in equal or better electoral performance.

Magaly Machado. In 1998, Machado was elected state deputy by PFL-RJ with the support of the IURD. She received 33,678 votes (0.47% of valid votes). In 2002, she ceased to be supported

by the Universal Church and got support of the much smaller Igreja Nova Vida [New Life Church]. She also changed from PFL to PSB. Still, she ran for a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. She received 9,418 votes (0.12%) and was not elected[18].

Heriberto da Silva Farias. In 1998, "Pastor Heriberto" (PMDB) won a seat at state Assembly of Ceará with the support of the IURD. The candidate obtained 43,904 votes, or 1.61% of the valid votes. However, in 2002, he ran for reelection by another party (PL) and without church support. The pastor was not reelected, obtaining only 1,338 votes (0.04%)[19].

Paulo Cesar de Velasco. De Velasco (PRONA), a candidate supported by the IURD, was elected federal deputy by the Brazilian state of São Paulo in 1998, having received 94,880 votes (0.61% of valid votes). There is no precise evidence of date or circumstance, but at some point during his term the politician broke up with the IURD[20]. In 2002, he decided to run for a seat at São Paulo state Assembly by another party (PSL), and this time he obtained only 2,158 votes (0.01%), not getting reelected.

Nataniel Nazareno Ferreira. Known as "Nataniel de Jesus" (PMDB), the candidate was elected state deputy for the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso in 2002 and received 12,848 votes, or 1.0% of valid votes. He was an official candidate of the IURD[21]. The deputy was expelled from the church, but, nevertheless, tried reelection in 2006. His performance was much worse than that of the previous election and he was not reelected: he obtained only 4,286 votes, or 0.3% of the valid votes.

Denílson Segóvia. In 2010, "Pastor Denílson" (PSC) was elected deputy for state Assembly of Acre with the official support of IEQ, of which he was pastor and state president. The candidate obtained 2,939 votes. However, according to media reports, Segovia was expelled from the church in 2013[22]. In 2014, he sought reelection by another party (PEN), but obtained only 1,133 votes (0.28%) and was not reelected.

Zacarias Vilharba. In 2010, "Vilalba de Jesus" (PRB) ran for federal deputy in Pernambuco, a state of Brazilian northeast. He had the support of the IURD. Although he was not elected, he obtained the second *suplência* and a significant number of 39,173 votes. In 2014, the candidate sought reelection without church support[23]. He changed from the PRB to the PP and changed his electoral name to "Pastor Vilalba". His performance was much lower than that of the previous election, obtaining 11,199 votes (0.25%), which guaranteed him neither the election nor a good position as *suplente*.

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[18] See Oro (2003b).
[19] Idem.
[20] See Souza (2009).
[21] See Cuyabano (2009).
[22] See "Denílson Segóvia é destituído da presidência da Igreja Quadrangular" (*AC24Horas*, 21/10/13).
[23] See "Vilalba vai à reeleição, mas sem apoio da Igreja Universal" (*Inaldo Sampaio – CBN*, 5/05/14).

7. Conclusions

According to part of the literature on Pentecostal growth and politics in Latin America, the entry of Pentecostal churches into politics would be detrimental to democracy. By having control over the votes of their congregations, Pentecostal leaders could get elected (or elect other candidates) to legislatures, thereby benefiting their churches from parochial bills. Such an argument is based on the assumption that Pentecostal candidates would gain a considerable degree of support from their churches.

This work contributes to a better understanding of the relationship between churches, candidates and legislative elections in Brazil. Drawing on new data, I offer important quantitative evidence to evaluate the above argument and others in the literature on Pentecostalism and politics. It is the first work to use data for Evangelical candidates other than those based on religious titles. As has been seen, the use of religious titles is a resource used mostly by less competitive candidates. Most competitive Pentecostal candidates do not rely on it, which indicates that identifying Pentecostal candidates only by means of the titles in their electoral names will necessarily lead to biased models.

The literature review made clear the importance of investigating the relationship between campaign spending and election performance. I argued that, from a theoretical point of view, it was plausible to suppose that Pentecostal candidates could present a campaign spending higher or lower than the other candidates. I then showed that Pentecostals of the Assembleia de Deus, Igreja do Evangelho Quadrangular, and Igreja Universal have a comparatively lower "voting cost" than other candidates, with IURD's "voting cost" being considerably lower than that of other churches. The Pentecostal candidates vote costs less than the others, and that of the IURD candidates costs less than all other Pentecostals.

Through OLS regression models, I tested whether there was a negative relationship between being a Pentecostal candidate and campaign spending. The models do not allow a categorical statement, but point in the opposite direction. If the dependent variable used is the log of per capita expenditure, then there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between being Pentecostal and spending. Ceteris paribus, being a Pentecostal makes a candidate receive (and spend) more money. However, if the dependent variable chosen is the percentage of expenditure, the effect is no longer significant.

Then I inquired whether there would be an effect of being Pentecostal on the vote, and whether such an effect would be superior to that of being an Evangelical candidate. The results seem to confirm the two hypotheses, although in the case of the Chamber of Deputies, the difference between the effect of being Pentecostal and that of being Evangelical is statistically significant only in model 4, which uses the percentage of spending as an independent variable. It

is worth emphasizing that the effect of being a Pentecostal is still controlled by factors such as incumbency, spending, previous party performance, pertaining to the federal coalition, gender, race, age and pertaining to PRB and PSC. There is, therefore, strong evidence to confirm the conjecture that the support of Pentecostal churches contributes significantly to the electoral performance of the candidate. This could also explain why Evangelicals (Pentecostals included) are less underrepresented in Brazilian legislatures than other minorities.

To reinforce my argument, I offered in section 6 qualitative evidence for a counterfactual reasoning: what would be the performance of Pentecostal candidates, were church support absent? Between 1998 and 2014, there were at least six cases of Pentecostal candidates who, elected with the support of their churches, broke with them over the term, and yet decided to run for reelection. All of them had considerably lower performances and did not reelect.

It is also important to note that, while holding constant the effect of being Pentecostal, the effect of being Evangelical on the vote is negative for both the Chamber and Assemblies – though often not statistically significant. This result is intuitive and may indicate that, controlling for the effect of being supported by a Pentecostal church, being Evangelical does not necessarily bring any electoral benefit to the candidate.

Through models 5 and 6, I also tried to test whether the type and structure of the church matters in supporting candidates. To this end, I investigated whether the effect of being supported by the IURD would be greater than the effect of being Pentecostal. The effect is, in fact, greater, although the difference between them is statistically significant only in the tests for the Assemblies. The low number of IURD candidates causes the standard error of the coefficient to be high. Even so, the evidence gathered here is in line with the conjecture that churches with greater structure and centralization contribute more to the electoral performance of their candidates than the others, in addition to having a lower "voting cost".

Finally, it should be noted that the results presented here are based only on the 2014 elections. Strong as they are, they have a limited power of generalization. New investigations should retake these tests with new elections and, if possible, also examining municipal legislatures.

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APPENDIX

OLS regression models for the Chamber of Deputies.

	Dependent Variable					
	(Ln) Per capita spend	(%) Spend	(%) Vote			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
(Ln) Per capita spend			0.348***		0.345***	
			(0.011)		(0.010)	
(%) Spend				0.488***		0.489***
				(0.010)		(0.010)
Incumbent	2.601***	2.341***	0.952***	0.718***	0.944***	0.717***
	(0.110)	(0.104)	(0.071)	(0.061)	(0.071)	(0.060)
Ex-Mayor	1.401***	0.889***	0.567***	0.622***	0.567***	0.618***
	(0.197)	(0.187)	(0.118)	(0.101)	(0.118)	(0.101)
(%) 2010 Party voting	0.029***	0.014**	0.008**	0.011***	0.006*	0.012***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Pentecostal	0.909***	0.057	0.339*	0.682***		
	(0.223)	(0.212)	(0.201)	(0.172)		
Evangelical			–0.031	–0.075		
			(0.183)	(0.157)		
Religious title			0.030	0.086	0.016	0.053
			(0.208)	(0.178)	(0.171)	(0.147)
(Pentecostal – IURD)					0.330**	0.603***
					(0.153)	(0.131)
IURD					0.502*	0.933***
					(0.270)	(0.231)
Federal coalition	0.866***	0.381***	–0.068	0.046		
	(0.084)	(0.080)	(0.051)	(0.043)		
Woman	–0.212**	–0.071	–0.040	–0.078*	–0.042	–0.080*
	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.048)
Afro	–0.336***	–0.212***	–0.003	–0.017	–0.004	–0.018
	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.038)
Age	0.011***	–0.001	–0.010***	–0.006***	–0.010***	–0.006***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
PSC	0.231	0.164	0.002	0.004	0.014	–0.018
	(0.221)	(0.210)	(0.131)	(0.112)	(0.130)	(0.112)
PRB	–0.616***	–0.387*	0.239*	0.216*		
	(0.218)	(0.421)	(0.130)	(0.111)		
Constant	–5.987***	0.421***	2.738***	0.447***	2.722***	0.463***
	(0.161)	(0.153)	(0.115)	(0.082)	(0.113)	(0.082)
N	3109	3110	3109	3110	3109	3110
R^2	0.304	0.203	0.442	0.591	0.442	0.590

Note: standard errors in parentheses. * for p<0.1; ** for p<0.05; *** for p<0.01.

OLS regression models for state Assemblies.

	Dependent Variable					
	(Ln) Per capita spend	(%) Spend	(%) Vote			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
(Ln) Per capita spend			0.128***		0.128***	
			(0.002)		(0.002)	
(%) spend				0.504***		0.505***
				(0.006)		(0.006)
Incumbent	2.011***	0.871***	0.616***	0.434***	0.613***	0.431***
	(0.070)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Ex-Mayor	1.133***	0.358***	0.244***	0.209***	0.244***	0.209***
	(0.111)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.020)
% 2010 party voting	0.044***	0.011***	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001*
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Pentecostal	0.597***	0.022	0.360***	0.383***		
	(0.167)	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.043)		
Evangelical			–0.119***	–0.056		
			(0.046)	(0.040)		
Religious title			0.123**	0.071*	0.032	0.025*
			(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.036)	(0.031)
(Pentecostal – IURD)					0.253***	0.311***
					(0.042)	(0.035)
IURD					0.416***	0.546***
					(0.078)	(0.067)
Federal coalition	0.419***	0.068***	0.001	0.021**		
	(0.045)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.008)		
Woman	–0.071	–0.021	–0.035***	–0.033***	–0.035***	–0.032***
	(0.057)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Afro	–0.146***	–0.060***	–0.008	0.004	–0.008	0.004
	(0.041)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Age	–0.002	–0.002***	–0.002***	–0.001***	–0.002***	–0.001***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PSC	–0.209**	–0.028	0.005	–0.006	0.005	–0.014
	(0.105)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.019)
PRB	–0.135	–0.056	0.054**	0.066***		
	(0.126)	(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.023)		
Constant	–5.095***	0.315***	0.964***	0.150***	0.966***	0.158***
	(0.097)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.018)
N	7295	7300	7295	7300	7295	7300
R^2	0.191	0.215	0.502	0.638	0.501	0.637

Note: standard errors in parentheses. * for p<0.1; ** for p<0.05; *** for p<0.01.