

THE DICTATOR'S DILEMMA
AT THE BALLOT BOX

*Electoral Manipulation, Economic Maneuvering,
and Political Order in Autocracies*

Masaaki Higashijima

University of Michigan Press
Ann Arbor

Copyright © 2022 by Masaaki Higashijima
Some rights reserved



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. *Note to users:* A Creative Commons license is only valid when it is applied by the person or entity that holds rights to the licensed work. Works may contain components (e.g., photographs, illustrations, or quotations) to which the rightsholder in the work cannot apply the license. It is ultimately your responsibility to independently evaluate the copyright status of any work or component part of a work you use, in light of your intended use. To view a copy of this license, visit <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

For questions or permissions, please contact um.press.perms@umich.edu

Published in the United States of America by the
University of Michigan Press
Manufactured in the United States of America
Printed on acid-free paper
First published June 2022

A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data has been applied for.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2022932724
LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2022932724>

ISBN 978-0-472-07531-7 (hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-0-472-05531-9 (paper : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-0-472-90275-0 (open access ebook)

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.11978139>

An electronic version of this book is freely available, thanks in part to the support of libraries working with Knowledge Unlatched (KU). KU is a collaborative initiative designed to make high quality books Open Access for the public good. More information about the initiative and links to the Open Access version can be found at www.knowledgeteunlatched.org.

The University of Michigan Press's open access publishing program is made possible thanks to additional funding from the University of Michigan Office of the Provost and the generous support of contributing libraries.

Cover image: © Yuji Baba, Dictator's Speech, 2022.

Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	x
<i>List of Figures</i>	xvii
<i>List of Tables</i>	xix
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xxi
<i>Note on Translation and Transliteration</i>	xxiii
PART I. PUZZLES AND ARGUMENTS	
Chapter 1. Introduction	3
1.1. Twin Puzzles of Autocratic Elections	3
1.2. Argument in Brief	6
1.3. Contributions	11
1.4. Research Design, Key Empirical Findings, and the Organization of the Book	24
Chapter 2. A Theory of Autocratic Elections	32
2.1. Introduction	32
2.2. Fundamental Problems of Autocratic Rule and the Roles of Elections in Dictatorships	34
2.3. The Electoral Dilemma in Dictatorships	36
2.4. The Game of Autocratic Elections: The Dictator, Ruling Elites, and the Opposition	40
2.5. The Dictator's Tools at the Ballot Box: Electoral Manipulation and Economic Maneuvering	47

2.6. The Distribution of Mobilization Capabilities and Autocratic Election Design	53
2.7. Unintended Consequences of Autocratic Elections: Post-Electoral Political Conflicts	61
2.8. Operationalization and Preliminary Analysis: Mobilization Capabilities and the Correlates of Victory Margins	64
2.9. Conclusion	72
PART II. CROSS-NATIONAL EXPLORATIONS	
Chapter 3. Blatant Electoral Fraud	77
3.1. Variation in Blatant Electoral Fraud under Authoritarian Regimes	77
3.2. Literature on Electoral Fraud	80
3.3. Blatant Electoral Fraud and the Dictator's Mobilization Capabilities	83
3.4. Cross-National Statistical Analysis of Blatant Electoral Fraud	88
3.5. Conclusion	102
Chapter 4. Institutional Manipulation	103
4.1. The Puzzle of Electoral System Choice in Dictatorships	103
4.2. Literature on Electoral System Design	107
4.3. The Costs and Benefits of SMD and PR in Authoritarian Regimes	110
4.4. The Dictator's Mobilization Capabilities and the Strategic Choice of Electoral Systems	121
4.5. Cross-National Statistical Analysis of Institutional Manipulation	125
4.6. Conclusion	134
Chapter 5. Economic Maneuvering	137
5.1. Autocracies and Political Business Cycles	137
5.2. A Trade-off between Electoral Manipulation and Economic Maneuvering	142
5.3. Cross-National Statistical Analysis of Economic Maneuvering	146
5.4. Conclusion	157
Chapter 6. Backfiring at the Ballot Box	159
6.1. Popular Protests and Leadership Turnover in the Aftermath of Autocratic Elections	159
6.2. Literature on Post-Electoral Political Order	162

6.3. Destabilizing Effects of Autocratic Elections	164
6.4. Cross-National Statistical Analysis of Post-Electoral Political Conflicts	172
6.5. Conclusion	182
PART III. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES	
Chapter 7. From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering: Nazarbaev's Kazakhstan	187
7.1. Introduction	187
7.2. Limited Liberalization and Autocratization	188
7.3. Electoral Manipulation in Kazakhstan	194
7.4. The Strengthening of Nazarbaev's Mobilization Capabilities	204
7.5. Economic Maneuvering in Kazakhstan	221
7.6. Conclusion	227
Chapter 8. From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown: Akaev's Kyrgyzstan	229
8.1. Introduction	229
8.2. From Electoral Democracy to Electoral Authoritarianism	231
8.3. Electoral Manipulation and Post-Electoral Protests in Kyrgyzstan	236
8.4. The Weakening of Akaev's Mobilization Capabilities	246
8.5. Economic Maneuvering in Kyrgyzstan	258
8.6. Conclusion	262
Chapter 9. Conclusion	264
9.1. The Main Findings	264
9.2. Policy Implications	267
9.3. Future Research Avenues	269
<i>Appendix</i>	273
<i>References</i>	301
<i>Index</i>	325

Digital materials related to this title can be found on the Fulcrum platform via the following citable URL:
<https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.11978139>