

**Holding Parties Accountable: The Sources and Dynamics of Mass Partisanship in New
Democracies**

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Political scientists love parties. Most deem political parties to be essential elements of functioning democracies, and many value mass partisans for their engagement and activism.¹ Parties aggregate, articulate, and even moderate interests. In doing so they provide stable and simplified roadmaps for citizens as they navigate their labyrinthine political systems.² This commitment to parties is particularly clear in scholarship on so-called “Third Wave” or emerging democracies—such as those in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America—where many political and economic maladies are blamed on weak party systems and where the occasional success stories are attributed to stable and entrenched ones. These systems, allegedly, are marked by unstable party systems with consequent high electoral volatility and low levels and unstable partisanship.

In this paper we tackle this last issue: stability of partisanship. We propose a different interpretation about the role of partisanship in young democracies. We find that instability in partisanship is explained by voters’ applying evaluative criteria when judging parties. Therefore, voters hold parties accountable for their performance in office. Stability, on the other hand is a consequence of group identity criteria. Hence, young democracies, given its higher levels of variation in party identification, allows for better tests of the determinants of partisanship.

We claim that most voters’ reliance on evaluative criteria, based on retrospective evaluations of the economy, among other factors, is a sign of their ability to hold parties (and representatives) accountable for their performance in office. Furthermore, voters in new party systems will predominantly be independents or, at best, bounded partisans, switching between

¹ As one indication of this scholarly consensus, consider the following quotation: “There is little disagreement that political parties and, in particular, stable mass partisanship are essential for successful democratic consolidation” (Smyth 2006: 209).

² The political scientist’s commitment to parties is not just normative, but also analytical: “... party identification is quite arguably the most successful explanatory construct in political science ...” (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002: 166).

party identification and independence, but not between parties (Zuckerman, Dasović, and Fitzgerald 2007). Hence, a predominance of bounded partisans and independents represents gains in accountability and does not have the negative effects most of the literature attributes to unstable partisanship.

We focus on mass partisan identification in Brazil – a country whose partisan configurations, both as effect and cause, have received significant scholarly attention. In spite of its centrality in recent debates about Brazilian and Latin American politics, there simply are no studies that appropriately measure volatility of party identification in Brazil and in most other Latin American countries; a requirement to better understand how citizens engage with the political system.³ In this paper we fill in this gap in the literature by testing the stability and change of partisanship in Brazil using two unique datasets, a six-wave panel study in two Brazilian cities covering the 2002 and 2006 elections (citation) and the first-ever three-wave national level panel study in the 2010 elections (citation). We verify the dynamics of partisanship at the aggregate and individual level in the course of three national elections (2002, 2006 and 2010). We take into account the potential effect of measurement error in assessing partisanship and we are able to test distinct hypotheses about what factors motivate individual level stability and changes on party identification.

In spite of few Brazilians identifying with parties and that this number is decreasing over time, Brazilian voters are still able to hold their representatives accountable and partisanship itself is not an a-critical creed passed down from generation to generation and purely obtained through social group mechanisms. Instead, significant portions of voters hesitate between identification with a party and independence. These hesitant or bounded partisans strongly rely

³ For notable exceptions, see studies based on the Mexican Panel Study (McCann and Lawson 2003).

on evaluative criteria, based on the party's performance in office, to define if they sympathize or not with a party.

What are the implications of these findings to our understanding of democratic accountability? We draw on our empirical findings to argue that democratic accountability is maximized when stable partisans are counterbalanced by a large mass of independents responsive to political and economic events. Brazil, we assert, falls into this sweet spot. Such a situation is more inductive to promoting accountability than when parties have such deep social roots and most of the population has a stable party identity that citizen's ability to critically assess their party's performance is hindered.

Conceptions of Mass Partisanship

Established Democracies

Political scientists largely agree that individual partisan identification (party ID) is, at a minimum, an expressed sympathy for a political party.⁴ Beyond this barebones definition, however, there is little scholarly consensus. Disagreement exists over the individual-level origins and persistence of party ID, and over the possibility of individuals simultaneously identifying with multiple parties. Most crucially, a long-standing debate pits the "partisanship-as-identity" camp, which largely emerges from the original Michigan School formulation of the concept, against the revisionist "partisanship-as-evaluation" camp, influenced by rational choice theory.

The partisanship-as-identity school of thought sees party ID as a social group belongingness, akin to one's religious, ethnic, class, or racial identity (Campbell et al. 1960;

⁴ Party ID (party identification) is also known as "partisanship." We use these terms synonymously throughout this paper.

Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). Individuals develop a sense of connectedness to a particular party during early adult socialization, at which point the identity becomes enduring and impervious to new information (Jennings and Niemi 1981). Political events, national conditions, candidates and incumbents, and other relevant phenomena leave little mark on the partisan sympathies of adults. Party ID is thus exogenous, a virtual “unmoved mover” that provides a perceptual lens through which citizens observe and interpret the political world (Zaller 1992). Advocates of this identity camp see empirical evidence of partisan instability, which typically comes in the form of survey respondents switching party allegiances through time, as artificial measurement error that can be removed to reveal the stable, substantive identities lurking beneath.

In contrast, the partisanship-as-evaluation camp views individuals’ partisan attachments as much less stable and, ultimately, as the rational result of ongoing assessments of party performance. Most famously, Fiorina (1981) dubs partisanship as a “running tally” of evaluations of different parties’ performances in office. Others in this revisionist camp see party ID as a mere summary approximation of underlying – and ultimately much more stable – values and issue positions (Downs 1957; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Markus and Converse 1979). Either way, revisionists conceptualize party ID as endogenous, shifting in adulthood as parties’ successes in office ebb and flow, or as party elites shift their issue stances. Advocates of this camp interpret temporal instability in mass partisanship not as measurement error but as substantive change driven by mass interpretations of politicians and political events. Revisionist arguments were developed first for the American context, but they found a welcome audience among scholars of Western Europe, where party ID was deemed to be considerably more volatile (LeDuc 1981).

Recent years have seen something of a resolution to this debate in reference to partisanship in established democracies. A series of influential studies by Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler (2002) has demonstrated that observed fluctuations in individuals' expressed partisanship are indeed the result of measurement error and have little to do with shifting political evaluations and events. The shifts in party ID tracked by numerous panel surveys mask extremely stable partisan predispositions – these are evident once measurement error is removed, and this stability is present not just in the United States but also in European countries where partisan predispositions were previously believed to be more volatile. Similarly, in a major study of Britain and Germany, Zuckerman, Dasović, and Fitzgerald (2007) demonstrate that partisan identities are immune to political and economic events. Instead, identities are rooted in social (and most notably familial) relationships and interactions (see also Wolak 2009). Still others have chimed in to argue for a genetic basis to political and partisan predispositions (e.g., Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2004). In the wake of these studies, little to no scholarship has emerged defending revisionist claims for the established democracies.

This is not to say that the partisanship-as-identity view has gained an unequivocal victory. Zuckerman, Dasović, and Fitzgerald do differ from Green, Palmquist, and Schickler; they interpret individual-level fluctuations in expressed partisanship not as measurement error but as socially induced, substantive shifts in partisan support. Thus, they reject the notion of partisanship as a stable, unchanging social identity (p. 30). Still, both sets of scholars agree that ongoing evaluations of politicians and political events have virtually no impact on party ID. Overall, we summarize the current state of the literature on party ID in established democracies as follows: the partisanship-as-evaluation camp has fallen silent. Disagreement still exists over

exactly how to characterize party ID, but the main contenders now largely agree that a social logic—be it via group identity or via interpersonal exchange—drives mass partisan identities.

New Democracies

Still, even as the revisionist model has fallen from prominence in studies of established democracies, it has found enthusiastic adherents in another literature—namely, among scholars examining emerging democracies. Initially, this acceptance of partisanship-as-evaluation occurred partly by assumption. “Third wave” democracies (Huntington 1993) often featured new parties and new party systems, so scholars assumed that voters could not possibly possess stable identities rooted in early adulthood socialization, reinforced by parties’ social characters and established brand names. Indeed, the leading advocates of the social identity school themselves write that “the psychological processes of self-categorization and group evaluation are ... most apparent in established party systems, in which parties have cultivated symbols and group imagery” (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002: 13).⁵ In a partisan *tabula rasa* (Brader and Tucker 2008), where else were citizens to learn a newfound partisan affiliation than from observations of party activity, candidate and incumbent behavior, and political and economic events? Moreover, empirical support eventually appeared that documented the emergence of new partisan identifications and their basis in evaluations of political leadership, economic trends, and policy platforms (Brader and Tucker 2001; Domínguez and McCann 1996; Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli 1998; Samuels 2006; Smyth 2006).⁶

To be sure, scholarly portrayals of party ID in new democracies as more socially grounded do exist. Many new democracies never experienced ruptures in their party systems, even during authoritarian interludes (Lupu and Stokes 2010; Mainwaring and Scully 1995;

⁵ See Converse (1969) for the canonical empirical statement of this claim.

⁶ For example, Brader and Tucker (2001) say, “partisanship is not baseless or superficial: to the contrary, the voter makes a connection between her interests and beliefs and the program and performance of party leaders” (page 71).

Scully 1995). Similarly, others saw new party systems emerge bearing a striking resemblance to long-standing historical political configurations (Wittenberg 2006). Still others developed party systems that immediately took on a clear social character. For example, party affiliations in many of Africa's new democracies quickly assumed an ethnic logic (Ferree 2006; Posner 2005), and partisan sympathies elsewhere seemed to be forged via class and other identities (Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power 2000). In the end, however, it is safe to conclude that while the revisionist model is not the only model of party ID in new democracies, it currently enjoys a more active life in these contexts.

Brazil

Among third wave democracies, Brazil's parties and patterns of mass partisanship have been closely watched and hotly debated. Early studies of Brazil's "New Republic" (1985-present) labeled it a case of "inchoate," or extremely "underdeveloped" parties (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1999). These scholars observed that Brazil had very few mass partisans, as the share of citizens expressing no partisan allegiance was persistently high (>50% of the population). The reasons for high rates of political independence were manifold. First, as elsewhere in the third wave, most parties were young and thus had no consistent brand or history of building mass sympathies. Second, voters surely struggled to make sense of platforms and issues in one of the world's most fragmented party systems. Third, as evidenced in part by extremely high rates of party switching among office holders, most parties were deemed non-programmatic machines for politicians' clientelist needs and ambitions (Ames 2001; Desposato 2006). At best – and in the spirit of the revisionist model – existing partisan identities were ephemeral guises for attraction to particular politicians.

Moreover, notoriously high rates of ticket splitting, along with the mismatch between the distribution of partisan identities and the vote distributions in legislative and executive elections both suggest only a loose relevance of party ID to voting behavior (Ames, Baker and Renno 2009). To be sure, from 1989 to 1998 the centrist Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) was the most successful party in Brazil's legislative (winning 20% of seats) and gubernatorial elections, and it also had the largest number of mass sympathizers (averaging about 15% of the population). In contrast, the remaining large parties of Brazil's clientelist center and right—the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB) and the Liberal Front Party (PFL) — typically polled between 10 and 20% on election day, but they had virtually no mass sympathizers – less than 4% -- of which to speak. Furthermore, in this period the party with the second largest number of sympathizers (the left-of-center Workers' Party or PT) averaged just 7% of legislative seats.⁷

This early rendering of Brazil as an underdeveloped party system has subsequently been revised, albeit only slightly. Scholars eventually found parties to be more structured in the legislature than previously thought (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999). Moreover, the number of declared political independents, which ranged between 45% to 60% from 1989 to 2005, was high by cross-national standards, though not exceedingly so (Samuels 2006). Finally, the PT was deemed to be exceptional, touting a much more cohesive and programmatic leadership, with deep roots in numerous social movements and, perhaps as a result, a relatively large number of stable, mass partisans (Hunter 2007; Mische 2008). Since 2000, about twenty percent of the entire adult population, and half of all declared partisans in Brazil, have been *petistas*; the

⁷ The information on party ID in this paragraph come from Samuels (2006). The information on legislative elections and seats are from Nicolau (1996).

remaining identifiers are diffusely spread among the remaining non-leftist parties, and the PMDB has been hemorrhaging sympathizers since 1998 (Samuels 2006).

More recently, with the PT in the national government after 2003, the literature has pointed out to a possible realignment in the support of the PT (Carreirão 2007, Singer 2009). First, Yan Carreirão argues that the PT may have lost its gravity over left-wing voters, dissatisfied with some of the party's positions in government; i.e. pension reform and maintenance of the Real stabilization plan. Therefore, the PT lost some of its long-term supporters and its ideological purity. Singer makes a similar claim, but from a very distinct point of view. The economic achievements of the Lula administration lead to an increase in his popularity and broadened his constituency. Former independents and poor conservative voters were attracted first to Lula and then, as a consequence, to the PT. Therefore, one would expect an increase in the number of bounded partisans or weak identifiers over the years. Still, in both of these authors' perspective, the evaluative dimension of partisanship clearly explains variation in party identification over the years in Brazil.

Competitive views on this specific matter are skeptical of any type of alignment or realignment (Zucco 2009; Rennó e Cabello 2010). At most, there is some movement from independents towards the PT, but this is purely due to positive government evaluations and therefore this newfound loyalty is very likely temporary. What one observes, therefore, is not a consistent movement towards the Worker's Party or Lula, but a repetition of "*governismo*", or a tendency to simply support the party in government.⁸

Two Unanswered Questions

⁸ Unfortunately there is no similar data available for the Cardoso administration, which would allow verification if there was an inflation of PSDB supporters then.

For the first two decades of its existence, Brazil's democratic party system was, to many scholars, "institutionalizing," and thus in flux. In accordance with the revisionist model, we would expect party ID to grow as experience with and opportunities to vote for parties grew, and as parties stabilized and promulgated more consistent ideological brand names. For the most part, however, this growth has not occurred. Admittedly, the number of *petistas* has grown steadily since 1989, especially in the lead up to its first presidential victory by eventual two-term President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2002. Despite years of collective incumbency and thousands of prominent politicians, however, the number of adherents to Brazil's other prominent parties has declined (Samuels 2006). The PSDB, for example, enjoyed two terms with the presidential sash under Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), and it is the only non-leftist party to run a candidate in all of the New Republic's presidential elections. Despite this, the share of *tucanos* (as PSDB sympathizers are known) in the Brazilian electorate remains pegged at about 5%. Similarly, Brazil's remaining major parties have all seen declines – or at best stasis – in their pools of partisan identifiers. Overall, in 25 years of democracy the percent of Brazilians identifying with a party has not budged from about 40%. In addition, the number of independents, as our data shows, is on the rise.

This leads to an interesting puzzle. Taken alone, the growing number of *petistas* seemingly supports a revisionist account of partisanship, as Brazilians have flocked to the party due to positive experiences and evaluations, especially of its years in the Federal government. But this claim is paradoxical, because scholars regard *petistas* as the set of partisans with the most genuine and stable form of partisanship-as-identity. However, this may be true of long-time *petistas* and not of the recent brand, incorporated after the PT occupied the presidency.

Of course, these aggregate percentages are ambiguous. Tracking aggregate percentages does not reveal who is stable, who switches, and what explains individual-level propensities toward continuity and change. In this regard cross-sectional survey data are little better, able to identify traits that characterize different partisan groups but unable to locate change (Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power 2000; Samuels 2006). In addition, post-electoral surveys, which the literature on Brazil relies exclusively to analyze partisanship, may suffer a bias of inflating party identification, because of campaign exposure to political parties and rationalization of vote choice. Hence, measures taken in-between elections become important to avoid the endogeneity bias of partisanship when measured close to and immediately after elections. In the end, panel data are necessary to understand the genuineness and stability of party IDs in Brazil, and to decipher the factors and events that shape it. Therefore, our main question is how has individual level party identification changed over the course and during the campaign in the three most recent elections?

A second issue touches on a conceptual and empirical paradox in the study of partisanship. Many authors define party-ID as a social phenomenon, and there is certainly reason to suspect that party ID may be social in its construction in Brazil. After all, Brazilians cite interpersonal discussion as their second most-used information source (after television) during election campaigns, and research has already shown how social exchange shapes vote choice (Ames, Baker, and Renno 2008; Baker, Ames, and Renno 2006). Yet very few scholars of partisanship – in Brazil or elsewhere – ever measure and assess the impact of socially defined criteria: “We often know little about the partisan consistency of a person’s networks” (Brader and Tucker 2008: 270). For example, in Green, Palmquist, and Schickler’s (2002) authoritative study, the immediate social environment is an extremely important determinant of party ID:

“partisan stability is traceable to constancy in citizens’ primary group environment” (p. 21; see also pages 6 and 23). However, these authors never assess whether interpersonal exchange actually influences party ID. Our second major question, therefore, is what explains variations in party identification? What are the roots of partisanship in Brazil?

Data

We address these shortcomings and puzzles by analyzing a six-wave panel survey conducted in two Brazilian cities from 2002 to 2006 and a three-wave panel study at the national level conducted in the 2010 elections. In addition, our first dataset contains rarely measured information on the balance of political opinion in respondents’ discussion networks and neighborhoods.

Survey interviews were conducted in two mid-sized cities: Caxias do Sul in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, and Juiz de Fora in the southeastern state of Minas Gerais. The two cities relatively similar in social-economic and demographic regards, but they differ in how politics is organized and practiced. Caxias (and the state of Rio Grande do Sul as a whole) has a long history of polarization and outright mutual distaste, both at the mass and elite levels, between left and non-left parties. The left (frequently embodied by the PT) is stronger than the national average in Caxias, but this is counterbalanced by a more ideological and less fragmented non-left, which tends to congregate in a PMDB that is to the right of its national presence. In Caxias’s municipal elections, alternations in power are common and viewed as high-stakes affairs. By contrast, Juiz de Fora (JF) resembles the more clientelistic and personalized patterns common throughout the rest of Brazil. As an example, Juiz de Fora’s favorite son was former

president Itamar Franco, a politician who has toyed with both the left and the right and who was not affiliated with any party while serving as vice president (1990-1992) and interim president (1992-1994) in the early 1990s. The well-organized left is weaker, and local power tends to shift within the clientelist non-left, although in the 2002 and 2006 elections Lula polled well in JF. If anything, what one sees in Juiz de Fora is very similar to Singer's argument that some voters support Lula in spite of strong attachments to the PT, what he calls *Lulismo*. Therefore, in JF one sees low levels of partisanship and strong personal attachments to specific leaders.

The panel study implemented six waves of interviews and re-interviews over a 4½ year period. This period spanned numerous relevant – even momentous – political events, including the historic election (2002) and re-election (2006) of Brazil's first leftist president (Lula), a resulting shift in the occupant and ideology of the presidency, an off-year municipal election (2004), and a corruption scandal that impugned much of the leadership of Lula's party (2005). Figure 1 depicts the timing of the panel waves (the black diamonds), superimposed on some of the most important political events. All of the waves occurred in election years. Two of them, waves 3 and 6, are “electoral” waves that occurred between the first and second rounds of the 2002 and 2006 (respectively) national elections. Two others – waves 1 and 4 – occurred long before campaigning began and can be considered to have occurred in periods of normal political intensity. Waves 2 and 5 are thus pre-electoral waves that occurred during campaigns, although partisan identification was only asked of 1000 new respondents in wave 2, so most of our statistical investigations consist of five-wave, not six-wave, analyses.⁹

Finally, the dataset contains novel measures of respondents' personal discussion and neighborhood networks. Modeled after Huckfeldt and Sprague's (1995) classic study of 1984 South Bend, Indiana, the dataset incorporates aspects of social context in two ways: First,

⁹ We do make use of some independent variables measured in wave 2. These are described below.

respondents listed up to three political discussants (i.e., the three people with whom they most discussed politics), reporting for whom these discussants voted or intended to vote; the dataset also includes interviews with many of these listed discussants (i.e., a “snowball” component). Second, the project carried out a critical mass of interviews in each neighborhood (about 120 in the first wave), so as to gauge the bias of aggregate opinion in respondents’ residential environments.

[Figure 1 here]

Our second dataset, the first-ever national panel study based on a probabilistic sample of the population will be used to address volatility in partisanship during the 2010 elections. Following a similar design as that of the two-cities study, a first wave was conducted in April, before the election began, wave two occurred after candidates were nominated but before the free electoral airtime for political advertisement started (September) and the final wave took place after the second round of the election, in November, capturing the full-blown impact of the campaign on vote choice. Unfortunately, the nationally representative sample did not allow for an accurate measurement of discussants opinions.¹⁰ However, the dataset includes evaluative and group identity variables that will allow us to test hypotheses inspired by these two theoretical frameworks to explain partisanship.

Analysis

We measure partisanship using answers to the following survey question: “Do you sympathize (*simpatiza*) with a political party?” If “yes,” then respondents were asked to name

¹⁰ We did include a discussant name generator in wave one, but very few respondents named people they talk politics with and even less were able to provide us with contact information for such voters. Finally, when we attempted to interview the political discussants, we found the contact information available to be incorrect, which drastically reduced the sample, prohibiting analysis.

which one. If “no,” then respondents were labeled as independents.¹¹ Throughout the data analysis, we focus on five partisan categories: *Independents*, Petistas (PT sympathizers), *Pemedebistas* (PMDB sympathizers), *Tucanos* (PSDB sympathizers), and *Other partisans*. The PT and PMDB are the only parties with a sizable mass following (typically greater than 10%), both in our two cities and nationwide. Indeed, they are the only two genuinely national parties in Brazil whose bases of support are not highly regionalized. We also report figures for *tucanos* who, while small, are the third largest party by number of mass partisans; this is particularly important for our purposes because of the party’s hold on the presidency during waves one through three and participation in both presidential campaigns (as runners-up in both 2002 and 2006). The “other parties” of the last category collectively encompass more than a dozen, but each individually can truthfully call less than 2% of the population (and often far less) identifiers.

Aggregate Stability

We begin by looking at the aggregate time trends across our six panel waves of 2002 to 2006 and three waves of 2010. These are reported separately for each city and for the national panel in Figure 2, which reveals three interesting findings about the dynamics of partisanship in Brazil.

First, the share of independents grew by about 10 percentage points in both cities between 2002 to 2006. This mostly came at the expense of the PT, which saw a drop in its pool of sympathizers. Somewhat surprisingly, the entirety of this decline occurred not after the corruption scandal of 2005, but prior to it, during Lula’s first 18 months in office. This finding,

¹¹ We recognize that debate exists – at least in the American literature – on the meaning and measurement of political independence (e.g., Alvarez 1990; Green 1988). It is not immediately clear what some of these arguments mean in other contexts, though methodological work on the measurement of party ID indicates that a dichotomous approach is the best way to treat partisanship in multiparty systems (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) – we adopt that approach here.

therefore, contradicts Singer's argument that there was a party realignment in place during Lula's first term leading to an increase in the number of petistas (2009). In fact, our data indicates that just the opposite has occurred: there is a significant partisan de-alignment in place in Brazil during 2002 and 2006. In 2010 the number of independents was stable throughout the campaign, but at overall higher levels than in the prior election. The 10% increase in independents from 2002 to 2006 was maintained in 2010, with approximately 70% of independents in the last elections. At this rate, in three more elections, all Brazilians will be independents!

Second, in Caxias do Sul, as in developed countries, there is almost no tendency for citizens to increase their degree of partisan identification at election time (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002: 41; Zuckerman, Dasović, and Fitzgerald 2007). There was, however, a significant flocking to Lula's PT in 2002 in Juiz de Fora, potentially a sign that – as expected – party ID in this city was at the time less stable and more an expression of short-term factors affecting vote choice than in Caxias: a possible sign of Lulismo leading partisanship to the PT. At the national level, there was a similar increase of petistas during the 2010 elections, but not as dramatic as in 2002 in Juiz de Fora. Hence, there is more stability at the national level than in specific municipal contexts within Brazil. Still, there are signs that petismo is conducted in part by the campaign dynamics and is very much lead by the increase in the likelihood that the party's candidate will win the election. The flocking of voters to petismo, therefore, could simply be a simple rallying-around-the-winner phenomenon. It could also be due to the high exposure of the PT during the campaign, given its dominant presence in the free electoral airtime.¹² This is a valid hypothesis as well, given that the PSDB, who has the second longest program in the free

¹² The Free Electoral Airtime is a public space for political adversiment on national tv and radio during prime time. It is defined by law and allocated according to the size of the parties that compose the electoral coalition in the Chamber of Deputies. Given that the PT had the largest coalition, it also had the greatest amount of minutes in the free adversiment. The PSDB had the second longest advertisement time.

television airtime also sees a relevant increase in supporters during the campaign. So, changes in partisanship could be a factor of the higher exposure of the party during the campaign. We include a variable for exposure to the free electoral airtime in our analysis to control for this possibility.

Third, for the two non-left parties there are indications of both change and continuity. The number of *pemedebistas* remained rather steady through time, although there may have been a downtick in JF after March of 2002. In contrast, the number of *tucanos* seemingly doubled from about 2.5% to about 5% in JF after 2002. This could be a result of a governor bandwagon effect in Minas Gerais due to *tucano* Aécio Neves' extremely successful administration and high popularity levels.¹³ We will also test this hypothesis, including feeling thermometers for distinct politicians, including Neves, as determinants of partisanship in the two cities. However, at the national level, in 2010, we find a similar effect: a doubling of the PSDBistas. This may indicate, instead, that a different explanation might be more plausible, given that the effect of Neves should not be felt at the national level. Therefore, a similar logic as that of the PT, high exposure during the free electoral airtime, may apply to the PSDB too. The high visibility of the PSDB presidential candidate during the campaign, whereas there is a lack of such exposure for the PMDB, explains the increase in tucanos during the campaign and the stagnation of PMDBistas.

Overall, these results suggest stability in the aggregate shares of various partisan and independent groups in our two cities, although this stability is punctuated by occasional shifts inducted by campaign exposures and maybe bandwagon effects from certain candidates. However, at the aggregate level we are completely unable to determine whether partisan identities are persistent within individuals. Thus, we now turn to individual-level analysis.

¹³ Given the small number of PSDB supporters, we cannot discard that this result could be simply due to measurement error.

[Figure 2 here]

Individual-Level Stability: Cross-Tabular Results

How stable are partisan and non-partisan orientations in Brazil? Because previous scholars have exclusively used single cross-sections, or – at best – rolling cross-sectional survey data to assess Brazilian partisanship, the existing scholarly answer is surely that we do not yet know. In this section, we exploit our repeated observations of individuals to offer the first definitive answer to this question.

Table 1 presents cross tabulations of party ID at wave t with that at wave $t-1$, when the time gap between the two consecutive waves was less than a year. In other words, the figures are based on comparison of party ID across the wave 1 and wave 3 pairing (six months), and across the wave 5 and wave 6 pairing (three months). We thus refer to these as patterns of short-term change.

[Table 1 here]

By far the most stable “identity” is that of independents. Between 75% and 80% of independents remain independent in the short-term. PT partisanship, however, is a very close second. Between 70% and 75% of *petistas* remain so over a short time span in the two cities. In Caxias, *pemedebismo* is almost equally stable, as 60% of PMDB sympathizers remain so over the course of a few months. The difference in JF’s version of *pemedebismo*, however, is stark. Here, identification with the PMDB is a more ephemeral phenomenon, as nearly 70% of self-identified *pemedebistas* no longer express the same sympathy just a few months later. Identification with the PSDB is nearly equally transient in JF, with 55% of *tucanos* abandoning ship over the course of few months. For both of these, independence has been the option of choice for most, but impressive numbers of switchers due so in favor of the PT, the party of the

front-runner in both elections. *Tucanismo* is also the most short-lived version of party ID in Caxias, where fully half of professed PSDB sympathizers move elsewhere in a short span.

By international standards, are these rates of change high or low? Zuckerman, Dasović, and Fitzgerald's (2007) study of Germany and Britain provides one point of reference. They report that about 77% (in Germany) and 86% (in Britain) of major-party sympathizers maintain their identities over a one-year period. By comparison, Brazilian partisans have lower rates of stability over an even shorter period of time, so party ID appears to be – as many would expect – more ephemeral in Brazil, especially among the non-left parties.

However, a second glance at Table 1 reveals an interesting pattern that *is* more reminiscent of those obtaining in countries with older party systems. In particular, Brazilians show evidence of “bounded partisanship” (Zuckerman, Dasović, and Fitzgerald 2007). In both cities, switching tended to occur between independence and identity for one party, but individuals did *not* tend to cross party lines, except for switches to the PT in Juiz de Fora. This is particularly true of *petismo*, where fully 83% of PT identifiers in Caxias who later abandoned the party did so for independence and not for another party. The corresponding figure is 73% in JF and 69% among the occasional PMDB identifiers in JF. In the other instances, the boundaries between party pairs were more porous. For example, in JF, 22.5% of expressed *pemedebistas* ended up as *petistas* just a few months later. Still, the largest destination for switchers in every case was independence. 36% of former *pemedebistas* in JF chose independence, as did 29% of *tucanos* in that city. In Caxias, these numbers are significantly smaller. Overall, however, the rate at which citizens cross partisan lines is faster than it is in established democracies,¹⁴ but such changes are far less frequent in Brazil than switches from partisanship to independence.

¹⁴ Zuckerman, Dasović, and Fitzgerald (2007) report that only about 15% of partisans switch to another party in a subsequent year, and very few of these switches cross *major* party lines.

In 2010, at the national level, when contrasting waves 2 and 3 (2 months apart), one sees a much lower level of stability among *Petistas*. Now, only 57% of the *petistas* stay as such during the campaign. All other parties and independents present similar levels of stability as in prior elections. Also, as in prior elections, voters appear to be bounded-partisans, switching between partisanship and independence. Also, as in the two-city panel, switching to the PT is the second most common option for voters, but much less frequent than to independence. Brazilian voters hesitate between independence and affiliation to the government party that has led the polls in the electoral campaign, the PT.

How do these patterns hold up when looking at longer-term changes in party ID? Table 2 tracks shifts in party ID over a four-year time period. It groups together two sets of pairwise comparisons: wave 1 with wave 5 (separated by four years and three months), and wave 3 with wave 6 (precisely four years apart). The stability of independence remains extremely high. Fully 80% of independents remained so four years later. Hence, one cannot talk about partisan realignment in the long run, again contradicting Singer's claims. Rates of partisan stability were much lower, and not surprisingly, more switching occurred over the course of four years than over the course of a few months. About 40% to 45% percent of *petistas* in both cities stuck with their party over a four-year course. Rates of stability among sympathizers of the other two parties were also lower than in the short-term results, yet, somewhat surprisingly, the gap in stability between *petismo* and identification with the other two parties is much smaller in the long-term case. *Pemedebistas* in Caxias were actually more faithful than were their *petista* adversaries in that city, and *pemedebistas* in JF and *tucanos* in both cities were only slightly less mobile than *petistas*. This is an indication that hesitant partisans are affected by the president's bandwagon effect during the election, rationalizing their vote choice through declared

identification with the president's party. Once the mobilizing effect of the campaign is over, these voters switch back to their "normal" state of independence.

Moreover, patterns of bounded partisanship are evident, even over the long term. Very few *petistas* ever crossed party lines (8% in Caxias and 9% in JF), and *pemedebistas* in Caxias were also particularly loathe to sympathize with another party (11%). *Pemedebistas* in JF and *tucanos* in both cities were again less bounded, but, even so, independence was the modal destination for switchers.

[Table 2 here]

We draw several general conclusions from these results. They confirm part of the conventional wisdom about Brazilian partisanship – there is a very large pool of independents that *never* report identifying for any party. This number, in effect, is on the rise when measured at the aggregate level. Moreover, we also find that party ID, when it does exist, is less stable than in more established party systems. Brazilians deviate from their previously expressed partisan sympathies more frequently and more rapidly than do, for example, Britons and Germans, and they are also more prone to partisan infidelity by crossing party lines. Brazil, therefore, can be seen as the land of independents and of bounded partisans.

Individual-Level Stability: Dealing with Measurement Error

Though these findings are revealing, they suffer from one nagging difficulty, that is, the problem of measurement error. Remember that cross-tabular findings take instances of temporal change very seriously, treating them as substantive conversions in partisanship. In actuality, switches may be far less meaningful. Respondents may struggle to understand the academically constructed survey questions and response categories; thus it might not be their preferences that

vary through time but their understanding of the questions, response options, and the ways their preferences map onto these artificial, overly simplified constructs. Many respondents, for example, may be persistently on the fence about their partisan identification, and thus they may waver when they try to fit this ambiguity onto a binary response. Others get caught up in semantics, possibly “supporting” a party while not necessarily “sympathizing” with it as an organizational entity (and in turn equivocating on how this translates into the question wording). Finally, respondent attention to interviewers may wax and wane, across different interviews and even during a single interview. If any of these conditions hold, many answers will be based on measurement error rather than genuine opinion.

Panel data are excellent for separating substantive change from measurement noise. The multiple observations per person provide the leverage to identify an underlying, or “latent” propensity that is sporadically clouded by meaningless response variation. Scholars have developed statistical techniques to produce a “disattenuated” correlation that expresses the relationship between two latent variables – that is, two variables that have been stripped of measurement error (Heise 1969; Wiley and Wiley 1970). Applications of these techniques to longitudinal measures of partisanship produce much higher intertemporal correlations in partisan identity than techniques that do not adjust for measurement error. For example, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) find that intertemporal correlations in partisanship in the United States jump from about $+0.88$ to $+0.98$. They also find disattenuated correlations in other established democracies, such as Great Britain and Germany, to be well into the $+0.90$ to $+0.99$ range. McCann and Lawson (2003) apply similar techniques to partisanship in Mexico (where two of the three major parties are quite old but democracy is quite new) and also return correlations in the $+0.90$ to $+0.99$ range.

Recall the ambivalent findings from Tables 2 and 3: rates of switching were high – especially by established-democracy standards – yet much switching occurred between identification for one party and independence. It is certainly possible that the higher rates of switching are the result not of less stable partisanship in Brazil but of higher measurement error, perhaps due to the larger number of possible response categories in Brazil’s fragmented party system and/or culturally distinct notions of what it means to sympathize – or identify – with a party. In addition, educational levels are overall lower in Brazil, which could hinder understanding of survey items.

Table 3 reports the disattenuated polychoric¹⁵ correlations in our two cities. We choose the pairings of (1) waves 3 and 4 and (2) waves 4 and 5, both of which reflect a similar, medium-term time span (19 months and 26 months, respectively).¹⁶ We code party ID as a set of dichotomies with, for example, *petismo* coded as one for all PT identifiers and zero for everyone else (i.e., independents *and* identifiers of all remaining parties) – this dichotomous approach finds support in work on party ID in multiparty systems (Green et al. 2002). Using this technique, we are also able to assess the stability of *Independents* (for whom independence equals one and partisanship of any kind equals zero).

[Table 3 here]

The results show a stunning degree of stability in Caxias, akin to that observed in most established democracies. The intertemporal correlations in *petismo*, *pemedebismo*, and *tucanismo* are all above +.90, and *petismo* is not more stable than identification with either of the two non-leftist parties. Independence is also stable in Caxias, although it is less persistent than is partisanship. As expected, partisan identities are less stable in JF, ranging – with just two

¹⁵ To calculate polychoric correlations, we used the *stata* .do file developed by Kolenikov (Kolenikov and Angeles 2004).

¹⁶ We use the formula described on page 233 of Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002).

exceptions – from +.80 to +.89. Still, these correlations are high; they are not as high as those achieved in most established democracies, but are nonetheless indicative of a reasonably stable identification. In other words, we conclude that party ID in Brazil, in the small portion of the population that displays this type of preference, is genuine and surprisingly stable. Stated more technically, much of the instability in partisan identities observed in the cross-tabular results (Tables 1 and 2) is measurement noise.

(include national sample?)

Hence, Brazil is a case in which a minority of voters identify with political parties but these attachments seem to be stable over time. Furthermore, changes occur between partisans and independents and only rarely across party lines, with the exception of movement towards the PT.

Sources of Hesitant Partisanship

Do the findings from the previous section close the book on our investigation? No, since the rates of *relative* stability – as tracked in the disattenuated correlations of the previous section and often interpreted as evidence of party-ID-as identity – are not incompatible with events-driven partisan change, or party-ID-as-evaluation. Recall, after all, that Figure 2 showed important aggregate shifts in party ID that are not captured in the Table 3 correlations: independence and *tucanismo* rose after 2002, whereas *petismo* declined. Furthermore, there was a very significant inflation of petistas in JF as a result of the 2002 campaign. Dissattenuated coefficients only tell us that the probability of being a partisan and an independent in one wave and the next is high. We still need to uncover what motivates such stability and what may stimulate change in identification, even it at the margins.

Therefore, the book is still open as to the real-world roots of partisan identities in political events and experiences. Indeed, broadly speaking we have said nothing about the *sources* of mass partisanship in Brazil. Do exogenous political events shape partisan identities? Can we identify a social component to party ID in Brazil? We seek to answer these questions in a series of panel data regression models.

Panel Data Regression Results

We estimate the impact of four types of short-term factors on party ID in our two cities. The first set of variables measures evaluations of national politicians. If party ID in Brazil is responsive to ongoing political events, then we would expect evaluations of the two two-term presidents—Cardoso of the PSDB and Lula of the PT—to weigh heavily in formulations of mass partisan ID for these two parties. Similarly, in 2002 and 2006 the highly visible runner-up presidential candidates, José Serra and Geraldo Alckmin, were *tucanos* like Cardoso. We use 0 to 10 point feeling thermometer scores to capture respondents' evaluations of the *tucano* candidates, and we employ an index of evaluations of Lula's personal traits (honesty, decisiveness, compassion, and intelligence).

The second set of variables also tracks evaluations of politicians, but does so for those at the state and local level. Brazil is a case of strong federalism, with powerful and highly visible governors (Samuels 2003) and mayors (Ames 1994). Similarly, even the federal legislature elects many candidates with geographically concentrated local followings, and clientelistic, pork-barrel concerns structure legislative log-rolling and roll-call voting (Ames 2001). We thus expect evaluations of high-profile favorite sons and daughters hailing from our two cities to be just as important as national-level politicians in shaping party ID. In specific, the popularity of Minas Gerais governor, tucano Aécio Neves, should be strongly noted in Juiz de Fora, and should help

us understand the rise in PSDB partisanship after 2002. We use 0 to 10 feeling thermometers for a variety of locally based office holders such as mayor, federal deputy, and governor.

Our third set of variables focuses on issues – namely, the valence issue of the economy and the positional issue of privatization. Economic evaluations are central to the “running tally” notion of the “party-ID-as-evaluation” school, so we analyze the impact of *sociotropic*, *retrospective* economic assessments. The response choice set for this item was five-fold (improved a lot, improved a little, remained the same, worsened a little, worsened a lot). Given the change in incumbency between waves 3 and 4, we perform the following adjustment to raw measures of economic assessments: During Cardoso’s presidency, the variable is coded so that higher values mean more negative assessments; during Lula’s presidency, the coding order is flipped so that higher values constitute more positive assessments. We thus expect this variable to have a positive correlation with PT partisanship and a negative one with PSDB partisanship.

We also track the impact of a positional issue stance. Debates surrounding the liberalization of Brazil’s economy in the 1990s and early 2000s dominated national politics, and the privatizations of numerous state-owned enterprises during Cardoso’s administration were among his most controversial and contested measures. Individuals who shift their *privatization attitude* may update their partisanship to find a more accommodating party. For example, a perception that privatization is bad might push a citizen into the hands of the PT, which strictly opposed all privatizations as they occurred (Baker 2009). The five-fold response set for this item is coded such that higher values indicate higher support for privatization.¹⁷ We expect this variable to have a positive coefficient in models of PSDB and PMDB partisanship, and a negative sign in models of PT identification.

¹⁷ Specifically, this is coded as: (1) Strongly believes that privatization is bad. (2) Believes slightly that privatization is bad. (3) It depends. (4) Believes slightly that privatization is good. (5) Strongly believes that privatization is good.

Finally, our last set of items incorporates the possible social dimension of party ID in Brazil. Having measured the make-up of respondents' discussion networks by asking respondents to list their three main political discussants, the survey also measured the political slant of these networks by recording the presidential vote preference of each discussant (as perceived by the main respondent). We include in our models the proportion of mentioned discussants that was inclined to or did vote for Lula (*Petista discussants*) and the proportion of mentioned discussants that was inclined to or did vote for Serra or Alckmin (*Tucano discussants*). Discussants' perceived vote choice could only be asked during or just after presidential campaigns, so both variables are missing for wave 4.¹⁸

We employ two types of panel regression models. One is a version of a standard fixed-effects approach, which models each respondent's level of partisanship at any given time as a deviation from their long-term fixed mean. We include a lagged dependent variable as well as both the contemporaneous and lagged measure of each independent variable, to capture both immediate and delayed effects. The inclusion of these three elements makes this an "autoregressive distributed lag" model (ADL), a model more flexible than many time series specifications (De Boef and Keele 2008). The model does have drawbacks, however, in that a fixed effects model with a lagged dependent variable is known to be biased, especially when T is small (Hsiao 2003). As a result, we also report results of Arellano-Bond (A-B) estimations (Arellano and Bond 1991), which are not biased in the presence of fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable. (This is also the estimation technique employed by Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002).) However, A-B specifications come with their own cost: because they use the second lagged difference $[X_{(t-1)} - X_{(t-2)}]$ as an instrument for the first lag ($X_{(t-1)}$), two waves of data

¹⁸ Also, discussant preferences were not measured in wave 1, and nor was party ID measured in wave 2. As these two waves were relatively close together, we couple discussant preferences of wave 2 with party ID in wave 1.

rather than just one, are lost. Since both sets of models have drawbacks, we report both and look for findings that are robust across both specifications.

Tables 4 and 5 present results for Caxias do Sul and Juiz de Fora, respectively, and we discuss the results in broad brush. First, and not surprisingly, perceptions of Lula weigh heavily in determining PT partisanship. Shifting assessments of Lula as a person and politician cause corresponding shifts in the propensity for individuals to self-identify as *petistas*. This finding is substantively large and robust across both cities. Similarly, changing perceptions of Caxias mayor Pepe Vargas also lead to shifts in *petismo*, although the highest profile local *petista* in JF does not. Second, political discussion has a sizable and robust effect on identification with the PT – larger portions of network discussants supporting Lula predict greater partisan sympathy.

[Tables 4 and 5 here]

Third, little seems to affect mass *tucanismo* or *pemedebismo*. *Tucanismo* is not affected by evaluations of outgoing president Cardoso, evaluations of presidential candidates Serra and Alckmin, or support for the PSDB in political discussion networks. At best, we have some evidence that economic evaluations correspond with PSDB sympathy in JF. The roots of *pemedebismo* are equally elusive, especially in JF where we return no statistically significant results whatsoever (in Caxias, locally based candidates and economic evaluations do seem to matter). Finally, the impact of positional issues on partisanship is nearly non-existent.

Overall, our most compelling findings concern the fluidity in and short-term influences on mass *petismo*. *Petismo* is reinforced by political conversations with Lula supporters. More generally, however, our findings suggest that the high disattenuated correlations we find are not incompatible with evidence that ongoing political events and evaluations shape mass partisanship.

At the national level, we cannot test an identical model as the prior one, due to the lack of some variables and increased relevance of other factors in the 2010 elections in contrast to prior ones. Nonetheless, the same theoretical logic applies. That is, we can test evaluative and group identity criteria to join parties. At the group level we use several indicators to measure social cleavages, such as gender, age, educational level and social class, measured as self-placement on a seven-point scale ranging from lower to upper classes. On the evaluative side we focus on current issues in Brazilian politics that may have affected voters party identification. Therefore, we include in the model perceptions of corruption as a national problem, coded as a dummy, retrospective sociotropic economic evaluation coded as a five-point scale, a dummy for Bolsa Família beneficiary, perceptions of main candidates (Dilma and Serra) competence and attention to the free electoral airtime.

Our dependent variable below is identifying with the PT or being an independent. This proves to be the most common option for most voters (80% of the full sample) and the most common form of bounded partisanship. We use a transition model to evaluate how the different covariates affect the probability of changing from independent to petista or to staying a petista between the second and third waves of the panel, in September and November of 2010. Transition models have been extensively described in Ames et al. (2011). It is based on the estimation of interaction terms between lagged PT identification (with independents as the base category) and all independent variables. Table 6, therefore, contains the coefficients for the main effects in column one, when the lagged PT identification equals zero (0), and the conditional coefficients and respective conditional standard errors for when the lagged PT identification equals one (1) in the second column. Hence, the first column indicates the impact of the covariates on the probability of September independents switching to petistas in November. It is

titled Independents – September. The second column indicates the probability that those who claim to be petistas stay as such in November. Positive values in the first column indicate increase in the probability of switching from independent to petista in November. In the second column, positive values indicate the determinants of stability on petismo between September and November.¹⁹

[Table 6 here]

Results indicate that both evaluative and social group criteria apply to partisanship. Sociotropic economic evaluations, Bolsa Família beneficiaries, and Dilma evaluations all have the expected positive effect in leading September independents to switch to petismo in November. All of this seems motivated by the PTs high exposure on the Free Electoral Airtime, which also leads to increased partisanship for the PT. On the other hand, the factors that promote stability are fewer, including here the only social group indicator that matters in affecting partisanship; educational level. Hence, social group leads to stability in partisanship, as expected. Evaluative criteria, on the other hand, increases the likelihood of change.

Discussion and Conclusion

Scholars of new democracies have thrown in their lot with parties. Weakly institutionalized party systems are frequently diagnosed as the cause of poorly functioning democracies. At the mass level, the construction of stable partisan identities among voters is

¹⁹ We modeled other possible changes, such as between independence and identifying with all other parties (dominated by PSDB and PMDB) and between all other parties and the PT. The sample sizes for these choices are small and there aren't many significant results in these equations that add to our understanding of bounded partisanship. We also included a variable for government evaluation in the above models. For the independence-petismo equation the including of the government evaluation covariate is positive and statistically significant indicating that PT partisanship is very much guided by government evaluation. In this case, the other evaluative criteria loose explanation power because government evaluation is itself explained by sociotropic economic evaluations, perceptions of corruption, being a Bolsa Familia beneficiary. Hence, because of its endogeneity to the model, it was removed from the equation above.

taken for granted as a universal good. Consider the following reflection, worth quoting at length, by two scholars of Mexico's new democracy:

When citizens lack firm, enduring dispositions to guide their thinking about politics, it is difficult for them to hold leaders accountable or to offer much guidance about policy. ... If partisan attachments are only loosely held ... the quality of democratic governance is likely to suffer" (Lawson and McCann 2003: 60-61, 64).

Lawson and McCann reason that unstable mass political predispositions cause low government accountability because leaders can assume wide discretion in their policy choices. In this scenario citizens are myopic and fickle, so leaders need not fear retribution, even with free and fair elections.

While this view has a kernel of truth, we argue that the literature is too enamored with mass partisanship. True, partisans make democracy work better. Partisans tend to better approximate ideal citizenship — with respect to participation, knowledge, and engagement — than independents. Still, partisans are also more biased, opinionated, and intolerant of opposing views. Partisans process political events and information through a biased lens, and ultimately they create, contribute to, and perpetuate political polarization (but see Fiorina et al. 2009):

[P]artisanship is the antithesis of open-mindedness and tolerance. Partisans have already decided who is right and who is wrong, and thus they are unlikely to be objective judges of political information. Instead, their perceptual biases reinforce and perpetuate strong differences of opinion between [parties] (Mutz 2006: 128).

At the same time, one could argue that it is independents – not partisans – who maximize elite accountability, precisely because they are more responsive to elite performance.

Independents switch due to retrospective evaluations of incumbents, whereas partisans do not; independents punish bad incumbents by turning away from them in droves (Zaller 2004).

In Brazil, most voters are independents and bounded partisans. Party identification is stable among the minority that support a party, but it responds to political events and, in the case

of some identities (the PT), party identification responds to social forces and current events. At the same time, this combination of stability, responsiveness, identification, and independence appears to function effectively. At least at the presidential level, Brazilians seem to be fiercely retrospective, voting for Fernando Henrique Cardoso after his Real plan stabilized the economy in 1994, abandoning his party under high unemployment in 2002, then re-electing Lula during good economic times in 2006 (Meneguello 1994, Camargos 1999, Singer 2009, Renno and Cabello 2010, Peixoto and Renno 2011). Voters often throw out corrupt politicians (Renno 2010, Pereira, Renno and Samuels 2010). Hence, low party levels are compatible with voters' ability to hold representatives accountable.

Over time we do not see more party ID in Brazil – we see less. Many of Brazil's clientelist, non-leftist parties will probably never build critical masses of partisans. Brazil's party system equilibrium may be one in which some partisans (collectively sympathizing with just a few of the major parties) are counterbalanced by a much larger number of independents. However, in terms of the quality of democracy and governance in Brazil, this creates no *a priori* problem. Identification is distinct from evaluation (Green et al. 2002), and whether partisan or independent, Brazilians uphold democratic accountability.

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Figure 1: Timing of Panel Waves and Election Events






Figure 2: Marginal Distribution of Party ID in Two Brazilian Cities through Time

Panel A: Caxias



Panel B: Juiz de Fora



Panel C: National Sample in 2010




Table 1: Patterns of Short-term Change in Partisan Identification:

Panel A: Caxias do Sul

	N=2,415	<u>PID at t</u>					Total
		Indepen- dent	PT	PMDB	PSDB	Other party	
<u>PID at $t-1$</u>	Independent	78.2	8.9	8.0	2.2	2.7	100
	PT	23.7	71.2	3.1	0.4	1.6	100
	PMDB	28.0	5.9	59.9	4.1	2.2	100
	PSDB	18.1	4.7	17.5	50.0	9.7	100
	Other Party	31.4	4.8	10.3	5.9	47.7	100
	Total	56.0	19.7	16.3	3.2	4.9	100

Panel B: Juiz de Fora

	N=2,506	<u>PID at t</u>					Total
		Indepen- dent	PT	PMDB	PSDB	Other party	
<u>PID at $t-1$</u>	Independent	75.5	16.5	1.8	2.1	3.1	100
	PT	18.0	75.3	2.0	0.8	3.9	100
	PMDB	36.4	22.5	32.8	4.6	3.8	100
	PSDB	29.6	14.3	6.9	45.5	3.7	100
	Other Party	36.4	24.5	3.8	2.7	32.6	100
	Total	54.9	30.3	5.9	4.2	4.7	100

Panel C: National Sample in 2010.

	N=1942	<u>PID at t</u>					Total
		Independent	PT	PMDB	PSDB	Other Party	
<u>PID at $t-1$</u>	Independent	74.5	16.0	3.1	3.1	3.4	100
	PT	36.3	57.0	1.5	3.0	2.2	100
	PMDB	37.3	10.8	39.2	10.8	2.0	100
	PSDB	30.4	12.5	5.4	44.6	7.1	100
	Others	39.4	13.8	3.2	2.1	41.5	100
	Total	61.6	24.1	4.7	4.6	5.0	100

Table 2: Patterns of Long-term Change in Partisan Identification

Panel A: Caxias do Sul

	N=1,791	PID 2006					Total
		Indepen- dent	PT	PMDB	PSDB	Other party	
<u>PID 2002</u>	Independent	79.6	7.1	8.6	2.7	2.0	100
	PT	45.9	46.2	4.1	1.0	2.8	100
	PMDB	37.5	4.5	52.1	3.0	3.0	100
	PSDB	29.4	3.8	18.4	44.6	3.8	100
	Other Party	41.9	9.0	12.5	2.7	34.0	100
	Total	60.7	15.9	16.1	3.0	4.4	100

Panel B: Juiz de Fora

	N=1,658	PID 2006					Total
		Indepen- dent	PT	PMDB	PSDB	Other party	
<u>PID 2002</u>	Independent	79.4	9.2	3.8	4.6	3.0	100
	PT	50.0	41.4	2.7	2.3	3.8	100
	PMDB	39.6	14.0	35.5	8.9	2.1	100
	PSDB	45.4	9.4	11.2	32.2	1.9	100
	Other Party	52.7	19.2	4.5	9.0	14.7	100
	Total	62.8	20.7	7.3	5.4	3.8	100

**Table 3: The Temporal Stability of Partisanship in Brazil:
Disattenuated Polychoric Correlations**

	Caxias do Sul				Juiz de Fora				National Sample
	PT	PMDB	PSDB	Indep.	PT	PMDB	PSDB	Indep.	
$r_{3\cdot4}$	.97	.95	.94	.90	.85	.93	.84	.83	
$r_{4\cdot5}$	.90	.92	1.01	.84	.82	.83	.72	.80	

Table 4: Sources of Partisanship Dynamics in Caxias do Sul: Panel Regression Results

	PT				PMDB		PSDB			
	No Discussants		Discussants		No Discussants		No Discussants		Discussants	
	A-B	ADL	A-B	ADL	A-B	ADL	A-B	ADL	A-B	ADL
<i>Dependent Variable</i> $t-1$	.138* (.055)	-.170* (.041)	.090 (.060)	-.234* (.052)	.175* (.071)	-.205* (.049)	-.044 (.200)	-.246* (.129)	-.056 (.188)	-.357* (.155)
<i>National Politicians</i>										
Lula traits $_t$	.059* (.019)	.063* (.015)	.056* (.020)	.054* (.021)						
Lula traits $_{t-1}$	.019 (.016)	.038* (.014)	.017 (.019)	.036* (.019)						
FHC thermometer $_t$							-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.004 (.005)	-.006 (.005)
FHC thermometer $_{t-1}$							.003 (.003)	.001 (.003)	-.004 (.002)	-.004 (.003)
<i>Tucano Cand.'s thermometer$_t$</i>							.006 (.004)	.004 (.003)	.005 (.004)	.005 (.004)
<i>Tucano Cand.'s thermometer$_{t-1}$</i>							.003 (.003)	.003 (.002)	-.001 (.003)	.002 (.003)
<i>Local & State Politicians</i>										
Pepe Vargas (PT) thermometer $_t$	.014* (.004)	.011* (.003)	.012* (.004)	.011* (.004)						
Pepe Vargas (PT) thermometer $_{t-1}$	.006* (.004)	.009* (.003)	.004 (.004)	.007* (.004)						
Sartori (PMDB) thermometer $_t$					.009 (.006)	.009* (.005)				
Sartori (PMDB) thermometer $_{t-1}$					.009* (.005)	.007 (.005)				
Rigotto (PMDB) thermometer $_t$					.007 (.007)	.010* (.006)				
Rigotto (PMDB) thermometer $_{t-1}$					-.011 [?] (.005)	-.008 (.005)				
Pauletti (PSDB) thermometer $_t$							-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.000 (.003)
Pauletti (PSDB) thermometer $_{t-1}$							-.000 (.003)	.001 (.003)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.003)
<i>Economic and Issue Assessments</i>										
Sociotropic retrospective $_t$	-.001 (.009)	.001 (.007)	.010 (.010)	.003 (.010)	.005 (.013)	.013 (.012)	.002 (.008)	-.003 (.008)	.008 (.008)	.009 (.009)
Sociotropic retrospective $_{t-1}$	-.016 [?] (.008)	-.009 (.006)	.007 (.008)	.002 (.008)	.019* (.010)	.020* (.009)	.004 (.005)	.003 (.006)	-.002 (.007)	-.001 (.008)
Privatization attitude $_t$	-.000 (.007)	-.004 (.006)	-.013* (.007)	-.015* (.008)	-.006 (.008)	.000 (.008)	.004 (.005)	.003 (.006)	.001 (.008)	-.000 (.008)
Privatization attitude $_{t-1}$	.015 [?] (.007)	.007 (.006)	.006 (.008)	.001 (.008)	-.023 [?] (.009)	-.013 (.008)	.001 (.004)	.001 (.006)	.003 (.007)	.000 (.007)
<i>Discussants</i>										
<i>Petista discussants$_t$</i>			.107* (.038)	.111* (.041)						
<i>Petista discussants$_{t-1}$</i>			.021 (.038)	.065 (.040)						
<i>Tucano discussants$_t$</i>									-.026 (.022)	-.010 (.025)
<i>Tucano discussants$_{t-1}$</i>									-.001 (.024)	-.002 (.026)
N of respondents	864	1484	691	1416	635	1137	443	926	405	731
N of responses	1844	3411	1189	2605	1230	2405	809	1763	511	1242
<i>Note:</i> Entries are coefficient estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. “A-B” models use the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM estimator, and “ADL” models are autoregressive distributed lag models estimated with ordinary least squares. All models contain wave fixed effects and constants that are not shown, and ADL models also contain respondent fixed effects that are not shown.										

Table 5: Sources of Partisanship Dynamics in Juiz de Fora: Panel Regression Results

	PT				PMDB		PSDB			
	No Discussants		Discussants		No Discussants		No Discussants		Discussants	
	A-B	ADL	A-B	ADL	A-B	ADL	A-B	ADL	A-B	ADL
<i>Dependent Variable</i> $t-1$	.085 (.048)	-.214* (.038)	.045 (.051)	-.236* (.045)	.002 (.050)	-.255* (.041)	.110 (.130)	-.196* (.082)	.030 (.198)	-.330* (.095)
<i>National Politicians</i>										
Lula traits $_t$	.067* (.025)	.084* (.024)	.075* (.031)	.087* (.033)						
Lula traits $_{t-1}$	.035 (.022)	.065* (.021)	.048* (.023)	.080* (.026)						
FHC thermometer $_t$							.001 (.004)	.000 (.005)	.006 (.006)	.004 (.005)
FHC thermometer $_{t-1}$							.009* (.004)	.006 (.004)	.004 (.004)	.003 (.004)
<i>Tucano</i> Cand.'s thermometer $_t$							-.003 (.004)	.003 (.004)	.002 (.005)	.007 (.005)
<i>Tucano</i> Cand.'s thermometer $_{t-1}$							-.010 [?] (.004)	-.008 [?] (.004)	-.005 (.003)	-.002 (.003)
<i>Local & State Politicians</i>										
Paulo Delgado (PT) thermometer $_t$	.009* (.005)	.007 (.006)	.008 (.006)	.010 (.007)						
Paulo Delgado (PT) thermometer $_{t-1}$	.002 (.005)	.004 (.005)	.000 (.005)	.004 (.006)						
Itamar (PMDB) thermometer $_t$					.001 (.003)	.002 (.003)				
Itamar (PMDB) thermometer $_{t-1}$					-.004 (.003)	-.001 (.003)				
Aécio Neves (PSDB) thermometer $_t$							.004 (.005)	.001 (.004)	.007 (.005)	.004 (.005)
Aécio Neves (PSDB) thermometer $_{t-1}$							-.006 (.004)	-.003 (.004)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)
Custódio Mattos (PSDB) thermometer $_t$							.003 (.005)	-.002 (.005)	-.000 (.005)	.002 (.006)
Custódio Mattos (PSDB) thermometer $_{t-1}$							.007* (.004)	.007* (.004)	-.002 (.005)	.003 (.005)
<i>Economic and Issue Assessments</i>										
Sociotropic retrospective $_t$	-.001 (.012)	.011 (.012)	-.009 (.015)	-.011 (.016)	.006 (.006)	.006 (.007)	-.016* (.008)	-.021* (.010)	.007 (.013)	-.001 (.015)
Sociotropic retrospective $_{t-1}$	.006 (.010)	.012 (.010)	-.002 (.013)	.009 (.014)	-.005 (.008)	-.001 (.008)	-.003 (.008)	-.009 (.009)	.014 (.009)	.006 (.010)
Privatization attitude $_t$	.023 [?] (.010)	.017 [?] (.010)	.019 (.012)	.011 (.014)	-.005 (.008)	-.004 (.008)	.006 (.008)	.005 (.009)	.002 (.011)	.002 (.014)
Privatization attitude $_{t-1}$	-.009 (.009)	-.010 (.010)	.012 (.011)	-.001 (.013)	-.017 [?] (.006)	-.019 [?] (.007)	.006 (.009)	.003 (.009)	-.004 (.010)	-.005 (.011)
<i>Discussants</i>										
<i>Petista</i> discussants $_t$			.130* (.044)	.132* (.049)						
<i>Petista</i> discussants $_{t-1}$			-.038 (.036)	-.008 (.039)						
<i>Tucano</i> discussants $_t$									-.058 (.049)	-.028 (.054)
<i>Tucano</i> discussants $_{t-1}$									.028 (.046)	.029 (.045)
N of respondents	657	1217	579	1001	971	1703	481	1091	527	908
N of responses	1199	2443	716	1717	1483	3186	881	2005	644	1552
<i>Note:</i> Entries are coefficient estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. “A-B” models use the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM estimator, and “ADL” models are autoregressive distributed lag models estimated with ordinary least squares. All models contain wave fixed effects and constants that are not shown, and ADL models also contain respondent fixed effects that are not shown.										

Table 6: Transition Model for PT Identification in the Third Wave (November) in relation to the Second Wave (September) Brazil, 2010 elections.

VARIABLES	Independents – Sept.	Petista – Sept.
Evaluative Criteria – Campaign issues		
Corruption as National Problem	-0.86 (0.821)	0.00 (1.00)
Retrospective Economic Evaluation	0.40** (0.166)	0.18 (0.217)
Bolsa Familia Beneficiary	0.49* (0.298)	0.00 (0.991)
Attention to Free Electoral Airtime	0.60*** (0.141)	0.18 (0.285)
Dilma - Competent	1.95*** (0.551)	1.93*** (0.645)
Serra Competent	-0.20 (0.297)	-0.57 (0.389)
Social Group		
Women	-0.41 (0.254)	0.14 (0.346)
Age	-0.01 (0.107)	0.13 (0.141)
Education	0.02 (0.040)	0.13** (0.06)
Social Class	0.07 (0.092)	0.03 (0.133)
Lag PT ID	2.90 (2.62)	-4.56 (1.92)**

Constant	-7.47***
	(1.76)
Observations	647
R-Squared	0.24
Wald Chi2	130.9***

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1