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*“Seu Petralha! Seu Coxinha!” - Measuring Affective
Polarization in Brazil*

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1 Introduction

Guido Mantega was likely not in a great mood to begin with. He was at Hospital Albert Einstein in São Paulo in February 2015, waiting in the café, as he accompanied his wife, who was undergoing cancer treatment. Yet when the ex-Finance Minister for the governing Workers' Party (PT) was recognized by other patrons, things got even worse. Before long, he was being serenaded with insults, called “shameless,” a “son of a bitch,” and even told to go to the public health care system rather than the private hospital he was in. He beat a hasty retreat.¹

Henrique Meirelles probably was not expecting anything out of the ordinary either. The current Finance Minister was in New York in September 2017, accompanying his boss, President Michel Temer, to the U.S. General Assembly. Yet he was suddenly found and followed by Brazilian protesters, who called him a “coup-monger” and “thief” who was “taking from the people and giving to the banks” and “selling Brazil.”²

The political crisis in Brazil has led to many moments of contentious exchanges between supporters of the Brazilian left and right, both public and private figures. This has even led to the popularization of two pejorative terms for both: *petralhas*³ (for supporters of the PT) and *coxinhas*⁴ (for conservatives seen as being especially uptight and worried about personal security).

Yet, despite these well-publicized moments, how deep does this division go in Brazil? The debate on mass political polarization has been receiving extensive attention from political science over the last twenty years. One of the most important questions in this debate is whether the polarization of elites, a

¹See <http://g1.globo.com/sao-paulo/noticia/2015/06/haddad-diz-no-twitter-que-ouviu-critica-de-coxinha-cicloviarias.html>

²<https://www.poder360.com.br/internacional/meirelles-e-hostilizado-em-rua-de-nova-york-assista/>

³The origin of the word Petralha is not clear, but it likely starts with the conservative columnist Reinaldo Azevedo's book, *O País dos Petralhas*, or *The Country of the Petralhas*. Petralha is a combination of petista, a supporter of the PT, with metralha, the Brazilian word for the Beagles brothers (Irmãos Metralha), who would continuously attempt to rob Scrooge McDuck in the Disney cartoons. See <http://veja.abril.com.br/blog/reinaldo/pt-tenta-mudar-o-conteudo-da-minha-criacao-e-transformar-petralha-em-algo-positivo/>

⁴A coxinha is literally a type of fried snack, generally filled with chicken, that is common in cafes and bars across Brazil, but especially in São Paulo. It's difficult to know for sure how this type of person became associated with the snack, but some (both specialists and laymen) hypothesize that it comes from policemen's association with the snack. See <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/saopaulo/2012/04/1078798-tipicamente-paulistana-giria-coxinha-tem-origem-controversa.shtml>. One well-known superimposition of these two meanings was when the PT mayor of São Paulo, Fernando Haddad, complained tongue-in-cheek on Twitter that he had gone to a popular bar to eat a coxinha, but was instead criticized by one for his well-publicized bike-path project. See <http://g1.globo.com/sao-paulo/noticia/2015/06/haddad-diz-no-twitter-que-ouviu-critica-de-coxinha-cicloviarias.html>.

finding about which just about everyone agrees (Theriault 2008; Fleisher and Bond 2004), is also found among the general American citizenry. Some scholars argue that the radicalization of American politics is restricted to members of Congress (Fiorina et al., 2005, 2008), while others contend that voters are also becoming more and more radical in their political attitudes (Abramovitz and Saunders, 2008). Others find mixed results, suggesting that mass polarization is found only among sophisticated voters (Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008) or on specific issues, such as the evaluation of presidential candidates (Hetherington et al., 2016).

Recently, other scholars have been moving away from an ideologically centered concept of polarization and framing it as an issue of social distance and affection (Iyengar et al. 2012, Iyengar and Westwood 2015, Mason 2015). The identification of voters with different parties triggers negative feelings for partisan opponents, even though their policy preferences may not differ dramatically. Given the inconsistency and instability of voters' political attitudes (Converse 1964), it is plausible that partisan animus may exist in the absence of ideological constraint.

Experiments on social identity theories suggest that the trivial divisions of groups are enough to make individuals perceive members of out-groups more negatively (Tajfel 1970). Researchers have even been able to induce ingroup-outgroup bias with minimal treatment such as the gift of a \$7 pocket transistor radio (Rabbie and Horwitz 1969), or even simple random assignment, and even with children (Sherif et al. 1961; Dunham et al. 2011). This effect has also been noticed in politics in Brazil, where it has been referred to as a Fla-Flu effect, alluding to the rivalry between two soccer teams from Rio de Janeiro, Flamengo and Fluminense (Reis 2014).

In this paper, we investigate affective polarization in Brazilian public opinion. Although we have learned a great deal about polarization in the American context, not much is known about it in Brazil. Our argument is that the debate on mass *ideological* polarization in Brazil is misplaced, and only makes sense when it comes to more sophisticated voters. This is because Brazil has not yet met two necessary conditions for mass polarization: the polarization of Congress and the sorting of partisans into left and right political parties.

Given the rising tension between the major political parties in Brazil after a political and economic crisis that has resulted in the impeachment of the leftist president Dilma Rousseff, we believe that the

insights from theories of social identity may be more useful to the analysis of the attitudes of Brazilian voters. As a result, we believe that the debate on polarization in young democracies must be reframed as an issue of social distance and political tolerance.

The first section of our paper defines the term “polarization” and contextualizes it within the Brazilian political scenario. In the second section, we outline the conditions that are necessary for mass polarization. Third, we present our hypotheses, and in the fourth, we present our results, showing that ideology has little effect on this polarization, which is likely a simple ingroup-outgroup effect between supporters of the two parties. We then conclude the paper with suggestions for future research on mass polarization, particularly within the Brazilian context.

2 Theory and Empirical Findings

The study of mass political polarization has been growing recently in American political science, especially due to concerns related to its consequences for democracy. Considering the empirical findings associating the polarization of public opinion with increases in turnout (Abramovitz and Saunders, 2008) and group hostility (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Mason, 2015), it is not surprising that the subject has drawn attention in many corners. Indeed, the study of polarization may serve as a proxy for the quality of representative democracy by revealing how political elites and public opinion behave. The radicalization of the masses could represent a threat to the ideals of a pluralist democracy by dividing society into opposing factions with irreconcilable interests (Baldassari and Gelman 2008). An additional concern is that, as Iyengar and Westwood (2015) point out: "the rhetoric and the actions of political leaders demonstrate that hostility directed at the opposition is acceptable, even appropriate." (690). In sum, mass political polarization is likely to make the resolution of the conflicts inherent to democratic regimes more difficult.

One of the main points of contention between scholars of polarization is the very concept used to measure it. Several authors focus on divergences in political attitudes, ideological self-identification and policy preferences between voters, although their findings differ considerably. Some suggest that polarization is a trend only found among political elites and that American public opinion remains essentially centrist (Fiorina et al. 2005, Fiorina and Abrams 2008). Fiorina, Abrams and Pope (2005)

present evidence that most American voters are moderate in their policy preferences and only differ considerably in subjects related to morality and social values, such as abortion and gay marriage. The apparent division of the United States into “Red” (Republican) and “Blue” (Democrat) states, the authors argue, is a consequence of the condensation of voter preferences into their electoral choices; that is, conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans have no choice but to cast a vote for a candidate from one of the two camps, even though their political attitudes may not differ considerably on most issues.

Others argue that American voters have indeed become more polarized since the 1990s (Abramovitz and Saunders 2008; Abramovitz 2010, Brewer 2005). Analyzing data from the 2004 U.S. elections, Abramovitz and Saunders (2008) show that voters have become increasingly concerned with who wins presidential elections. The authors also present evidence that the most politically engaged voters have considerably more extreme attitudes than their less engaged counterparts.

Others, however, have found that mass polarization is found only among a subset of sophisticated voters (Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008) or on specific issues, such as the evaluation of presidential candidates (Hetherington et al., 2016). Different people use different heuristics in politics, particularly because considerable differences exist across citizens in regards to political sophistication and few fully utilize ideological categories (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Lupia, McCubbins, and Popkin 2000; Baldassarri and Schadee 2006). Because we already know that who are politically active voters are also more likely to be politically influential (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955) and extreme in regards to political views (Baldassarri 2008), we also need to determine the degree to which trends in issue partisanship and alignment among the politically interested differ from those in population at large.

In contrast, Iyengar et al. (2012) propose a different concept of polarization by focusing on social identity. Based on experiments by Tajfel (1970) and Tajfel and Turner (1979), the authors argue that the polarization of mass publics is associated with a feeling of hostility toward opposing groups. Voters may agree on several policy issues and still have negative feelings toward each other due to partisan identities (Mason 2015). In other words, the proper measurement of polarization among citizens should be centered on affective identities, not on ideological divergences (Iyengar et al. 2012).

Using an experiment in which participants evaluate the curricula of hypothetical candidates for

a scholarship, Iyengar et al. (2015) find that Democrats and Republicans alike are much less likely to select a candidate who is a member of an out-party organization (i.e., President of the Young Democrats/Republicans). As Iyengar et al. (2015) underscore, such bias in the assessment of candidates suggests that political identities matter even in nonpolitical contexts. The authors also find evidence that partisans are less likely to donate larger amounts of money in a trust game.⁵

3 The Brazilian Context

Over the last couple of decades, Brazilian presidential elections have been dominated by two political parties: the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT) and the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira - PSDB). These parties have the largest levels of identification among the Brazilian electorate, according to the 2014 Brazilian Electoral Study (Estudo Eleitoral Brasileiro - ESEB).

Although the levels of party identification in Brazil are considerably lower than those of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, all second-round presidential disputes since 1994 have been between these two parties. This type of concentration could be a factor behind the strengthening of in-group alignments and out-group rejection. Brazilian voters could therefore be ideologically centrist (Borges and Vidigal 2016) but affectively polarized, as evidence suggests for the United States (Mason 2015).

Given recent developments in Brazilian politics, with corruption scandals uncovered by “Operation Car Wash”⁶ and the impeachment process against then-President Dilma Rousseff, segments of the media have been suggesting that Brazil is also going through a process of mass political polarization.⁷ Indeed, the building of a dividing wall in front of the National Congress (*Congresso Nacional*) to separate and avoid conflict between pro-Rousseff and anti-Rousseff militants during the voting for President Rousseff’s impeachment seems to confirm that Brazilian voters are becoming increasingly divided.

Notwithstanding the rising tension in Brazilian politics, there are several reasons to be skeptical of

⁵In trust games, participants are allowed to donate any amount of money that is initially given to them to a second player. The money given by the first player is tripled and given to the second player, who is allowed to donate any amount back to the first player.

⁶Operação Lava-Jato is an ongoing investigation by the Federal Police into corruption in Brazil which started in 2014.

⁷See, for instance, <http://cultura.estadao.com.br/blogs/estado-da-arte/basta-de-silencio-a-insuportavel-polariz>

conclusion suggesting that Brazilian voters are becoming more polarized. First, levels of party identification have always been low, and are getting even lower, with the percentage of voters identifying with any party at all decreasing from 39% to 28% just between 2002 and 2006 (Veiga 2007).⁸ This makes it doubtful that partisan preferences are really a source of animus. Another reason is that the political interest and knowledge of Brazilians is quite low (Freire, Masson and Turgeon 2016), just as it is for Americans (Converse, 1964; Carpini and Keeter, 1997).

Some segments of the literature have argued that Brazilian politics has become more polarized in recent years. Reis (2014), for instance, states that the polarization between the PT and the PSDB in presidential elections could be one reason for one to expect that partisan-led clientelism is on its way out in Brazilian politics. In other words, since the PT and the PSDB are becoming more clearly divided, the problems related to high degrees of party fragmentation could soon be attenuated. The polarization of party politics, however, could also become dysfunctional, warns Reis, as has been evidenced by the current state of politics in the United States.

Nevertheless, the contention that Brazilian politics is now essentially divided is somewhat problematic when we consider that Reis himself recognizes that the issues related to social problems have become so central in Brazilian politics that all parties embrace some form of social policy for the poor. This is in stark contrast to American politics, in which health policies for the poor, for instance, have created divisions in Congress that adhere strictly to party lines.

We believe that a more careful analysis of current events in Brazilian politics and its effects on the electorate is still lacking. Our argument is that a set of conditions for the polarization of the masses has not yet been met in the Brazilian context. A mixture of party fragmentation in Congress and low levels of strong partisan identification is unlikely to push voters away from the center in regards to political attitudes. Nonetheless, we recognize that polarization may be a reality among a small subset of more sophisticated voters. Scholars have found that knowledgeable and sophisticated voters tend to be more radical and ideologically constrained (Palfrey and Poole 1987), as well as more prone to engage in motivated reasoning (Taber and Lodge 2006). Network bias, we believe, could be leading some Brazilian

⁸The U.S., on the other hand, had 62% of respondents identifying with either the Republicans or Democrats in 2016, according to Pew:<http://www.people-press.org/2016/09/13/2016-party-identification-detailed-tables/>. That number rose to 92% when counting those who leaned Republican or Democrat.

analysts to infer that Brazil is undergoing a broader process of polarization.

Before accepting the argument that Brazilian voters are polarized, one should note that, as Fiorina et al. (2005) have argued, partisan sorting is not the same as partisan polarization. Since the 1960s, the United States has undergone a process of partisan “purification,” in which liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats are becoming increasingly rarer. Although most voters in the United States may be more constricted in their political attitudes than a few generations ago, Fiorina et al. (2005) present evidence that attitudinal convergence is the rule, not the exception, when it comes to American voters. Since partisan attachments in Brazil are considerably weaker than those found in more developed democracies, it seems unlikely that Brazilian voters are becoming more polarized, at least through this mechanism.

The role of elites in sending cues to voters must also be considered when analyzing the rise of mass polarization. Hetherington (2001) presents evidence of the importance of the behavior of elites in making political positions clearer to the mass public. The author finds a systematic positive effect of elite polarization on the clarity of elite positions for the electorate and on proxies of mass polarization (partisan thermometer feeling and the number of likes and dislikes for each party).

It is also important to note that not every shift in public opinion is part of a process of mass polarization or an enduring radicalization of a segment of the electorate. Couto (2014) states that the 2014 elections, in which the PSDB candidate Aécio Neves was defeated by then-President Dilma Rousseff, from the PT, gave birth to an extreme and authoritarian right-wing movement. However, there are important differences between processes of mass radicalization and normal oscillations of public opinion between the left and right. As Wlezien (1995) shows, public opinion tends to move like a thermostat, sending signals to elites to adjust policies according to the preferences of the mass public. Consequently, the apparent radicalization of Brazilian voters reported by parts of the literature could actually be a temporary movement towards the right as a response to undesired policies and problems associated with the left-wing Workers’ Party (PT) (especially after the election of Dilma Rousseff), such as large increases in public expenditures, corruption scandals revealed by Operation “Car Wash,” and the loss of control over inflation rates.

Finally, one must also take into account the fact that many voters are ambivalent when it comes

to ideology. A look at the 2014 Brazilian Electoral Study (ESEB) reveals that more than 40% of the electorate does not know what “left” and “right” represent in terms of ideology. Furthermore, many of those who self-identify (20%) on a left-right scale tend to select the median point, suggesting that most Brazilian voters are indifferent to ideology. Borges and Vidigal (2016), for instance, find that, over the long run, there has actually been a convergence in ideology between supporters of the PT and PSDB. People who support the PT and PSDB might very well not like one another, many voters who do not like the PT do not end up voting for the PSDB. As a result, although some segments of Brazilian voters may, indeed, have become more radical in their political attitudes, such change may not be enduring and would be unlikely to be expressed electorally in a durable partisan ideological cleavage.

While several studies present contrasting findings about mass polarization, few of them pay attention to the mechanisms that generate more extreme attitudes among voters. Levendusky’s (2009) analysis is enlightening in this regard. Using data from the American National Election Study, he finds that small increases in attitude extremity may not differ from measurement error in the short run (three or four years), but may ultimately lead to large aggregate increases in polarization in the long run. This is a crucial aspect in the study of mass polarization because shifts from the center among the electorate could be caused by atypical events in elite politics, such as political scandals or gridlocks, but not necessarily lead to larger, more permanent, changes in voters’ political attitudes. As a result, any analysis of mass polarization needs to account for the fact that voters are likely to respond to changes in elite behavior.

4 Method and Data

Our data comes from the 2014 Brazil Electoral Panel Study (BEPS), which had 7 waves, each of which was conducted in Brazil with stratified random sampling and a nationally representative sample. We used data from the seventh wave, which had 1,001 respondents.⁹ Our dependent variable is the respondent’s thermometer rating of partisans of the PT and the PSDB (0-10 with 0 indicating a negative opinion and 10 indicating a positive opinion).

⁹It is important to note that, while this was the most recent dataset available, these data do not, however, take into account the political crisis that developed in Brazil after 2014 that culminated in the impeachment of the unpopular President Dilma Rousseff and the installment of the even more-unpopular President Michel Temer. We argue that these developments should only have intensified the process we have started to identify here, but we cannot say with 100% certainty that things have not changed since the time of the survey.

We use political sophistication, exposure to the presidential campaign, partisanship, sex, race, religion, and income as our independent variables. All of these variables came from the 2014 BEPS as well. We used a linear regression with ordinary-least-squares estimation, with the model being estimated as follows:

$$\gamma_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x_{i_1} + \gamma_2 x_{i_2} + \gamma_3 x_{i_3} + \gamma_4 x_{i_4} + \gamma_5 x_{i_5} + \gamma_6 x_{i_6} + \gamma_7 x_{i_7} + \gamma_8 x_{i_8} + \gamma_9 x_{i_9} + \gamma_{10} x_{i_{10}} + \mu_i$$

Where γ_i was the dependent variable, a political thermometer rating of adherents of the PT and PSDB, respectively;

x_{i_1} measured campaign exposure dichotomously, receiving a score of 1 if the respondent had been exposed to political advertisements on either the radio or TV. Considering the effect of partisan media exposure on fostering negative impressions of out-party members (Iyengar et al. 2012), we expect it to have a positive effect on the absolute difference in out-party thermometer feeling.

x_{i_2} measured political sophistication dichotomously, assuming a value of 1 when respondents got 3 out of 5 knowledge questions right. The value of 3 is one standard deviation above the mean. We expect a positive and significant effect for this variable.

x_{i_3} measured dichotomously whether the respondent said she identified with the PT or the PSDB. We expect it to have a positive and large effect on the dependent variable.

x_{i_4} and x_{i_5} correspond to the vote for Aécio and Dilma, respectively, on the second round of the 2014 Presidential elections. We expect both to have a positive effect on the dependent variable, since voting for a candidate is often a representation of group identity.

x_{i_6} is a dummy variable measuring the respondent's ideological views on inequality, more precisely, whether she thought that the government should intervene in the economy to reduce inequality. We expect that this variable will have no effect on the dependent variable.

x_{i7} measured whether the respondent was a woman; x_{i8} measured the respondent’s age; x_{i9} measured race, with 0 indicating that the respondent was non-white and 1 indicating that she was white; x_{i10} and x_{i11} measured dichotomously whether the respondent was Catholic or evangelical, respectively; x_{i12} measured income with seven values, each corresponding to a range of income based on the 2014 minimum wage and u_i was an error term.

Regarding the control variables, following Rennó and Turgeon (2016), we did not expect the socioeconomic and demographic variables (sex, age, race, income and religion) to have any significant impact on our dependent variable. We did, however, expect that campaign exposure would increase the difference in evaluation of PT and PSDB supporters, given the findings of Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012).

We estimated this model on all respondents and on two subsets of respondents: those who had not and those who had followed the campaign. For these two subsets, we removed variable x_{i1} from our equation. We expected that party identification would be a significant determinant of one’s opinion about partisans of the two parties, but that ideology would not.

The descriptive statistics of our dependent variables are as follows:

Table 1: Absolute Difference in Out-Party Affection

Statistic	N	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	Min	Max
All Respondents	1001	3.071	2.0	4.12	0	10
Exposed Respondents	693	3.137	2.0	4.21	0	10
Un-exposed Respondents	308	2.92	2.0	3.93	0	10

Source: BEPS 2014.

Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of our independent variables.

Figure 1 displays the distribution of our dependent variable. As the graph clearly shows, most Brazilians seem to be indifferent to out-party members. More than 70% of respondents reported a difference of no more than four points in the thermometer scales for PT and PSDB partisans. This is consistent with Borges and Vidigal’s (2016) contention that Brazilian voters are mostly indifferent when it comes to politics. However, one should also note that approximately 10% of respondents reported a difference of 8 or more points. As a result, voters who are in fact partisan can indeed have negative views of their counterparts.




Figure 1: Distribution of Differences in Out-Party Affection

Source: BEPS 2014.

Table 2: Independent Variables

Statistic	N	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Campaign exposure	1,001	0.692	1	0.462	0	1
Sophisticated	1,001	0.180	0	0.384	0	1
Partisan	950	0.247	0	0.432	0	1
Vote on Aécio	972	0.288	0	0.453	0	1
Vote on Dilma	972	0.563	1	0.496	0	1
Inequality	958	0.884	1	0.320	0	1
Woman	1,001	0.531	1	0.499	0	1
Age	1,001	41.525	40.0	15.927	16	91
White	992	0.415	0	0.493	0	1
Catholic	994	0.601	1	0.490	0	1
Evangelical	994	0.241	0	0.428	0	1
Income	955	1.973	2.0	1.283	1	7

Source BEPS 2014.

5 Results

Table 3 displays the results of the OLS regression models. In models 2 and 3 we use a subset of respondents that were and were not exposed to the campaign, respectively. Our results show that, as expected, our ideological variable had no effect on opinions about PT and PSDB supporters for our full sample. We were, however, surprised to see that it did have an effect on one subset, but not the one we had expected—it had an effect on those who had not been exposed to the campaign. Partisan affiliation was, as predicted, a strong and significant predictor in all our models.

Nevertheless, contrary to our expectations, political sophistication exhibited no significant effect on our dependent variable. If anything, sophisticated voters may be more likely to have less negative views of partisan opponents, as the sign of the coefficient for this variable suggests in Models 1 and 2.

The results for our other variables also give plenty of food for thought. Our results further strengthen the conclusions reached by Rennó and Turgeon (2016), who find that sociodemographic variables did not have a decisive impact on the political attitudes of Brazilian voters, even in the case of the “new middle class.” The only variable that had a significant effect, according to our results, was age; sex, race and religion had no effects. Income also had no significant effect as well. A vote for Dilma in the second round increased our dependent variable, but only for respondents who had not been exposed to

the campaign; in all other circumstances, second-round presidential vote had no effect.

Another interesting result is that exposure to the campaign had, at most, a marginal effect. Despite the findings of Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012), the coefficient for campaign exposure had no effect on our results. Furthermore, creating a subset of our sample based on campaign exposure gave us results that went contrary to our theory (such as ideology and a second-round vote for Dilma mattering, but only for those who had not been exposed to the campaign). Perhaps this result implies that those who have already decided their votes are more likely to not pay attention to the campaign.

6 Discussion and Future Research

In short, we find that, as expected, whatever polarization between PT and PSDB supporters in Brazil has little to do with ideological differences, and much more to do with affect. Party identification, and with it, ingroup-outgroup dynamics, are more likely to account for much of the political divisions that are becoming ever more evident in Brazilian society. As Borges and Vidigal (2016) also found, there is indeed little support in the data to back up the argument that these divisions are ideological in nature.

It is important, however, to be cautious when interpreting our results. Our results come from observational data from one election, which makes it difficult to establish changes over time, much less certainty that affect (and not an omitted variable) is truly driving our results. Furthermore, some questions, such as ideological extremity, were not able to be included.

As a result, we will, for the next phase of this project, introduce an innovative new experimental design using a board game, which we will use as an immersive environment. This design will help us evaluate with more rigor the trust (or lack thereof) between the two opposing groups, even in an environment that has nothing to do with politics or ideology. We hope to thereby evaluate the plausibility that a simple ingroup-outgroup dynamic has more explanatory power over the current PT-PSDB divide in Brazilian politics than any sort of ideological polarization.

Table 3: Results

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Absolute Difference in Out-party Affection		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Campaign exposure	-0.172 (0.233)		
Sophisticated	-0.028 (0.283)	-0.105 (0.327)	0.020 (0.583)
Partisan	1.834*** (0.245)	2.122*** (0.284)	1.253** (0.507)
Vote on Aécio	0.207 (0.340)	0.044 (0.445)	-0.032 (0.535)
Vote on Dilma	0.052 (0.315)	-0.630 (0.424)	1.027** (0.474)
Inequality	0.611* (0.345)	0.239 (0.426)	1.027* (0.596)
woman	-0.094 (0.210)	-0.244 (0.251)	0.213 (0.385)
Age	0.026*** (0.007)	0.026*** (0.008)	0.025** (0.012)
White	-0.325 (0.216)	-0.339 (0.259)	-0.053 (0.401)
Catholic	0.201 (0.295)	0.493 (0.357)	-0.433 (0.530)
Evangelical	0.283 (0.342)	0.388 (0.419)	0.019 (0.592)
Income	-0.053 (0.084)	-0.123 (0.096)	0.095 (0.181)
Constant	1.208** (0.612)	1.764** (0.781)	0.451 (1.010)
Observations	764	541	223
R ²	0.100	0.128	0.108
Adjusted R ²	0.086	0.110	0.062
Residual Std. Error	2.837 (df = 751)	2.844 (df = 529)	2.766 (df = 211)
F Statistic	6.979*** (df = 12; 751)	7.068*** (df = 11; 529)	2.334*** (df = 11; 211)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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