Navegando por Autor "Silva, Thiago"

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Cabinet rules and distribution of powers in presidential and parliamentary executives
(2018) Vieira, Marcelo; Silva, Thiago; Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
It defines and discusses the role of cabinets in presidential and parliamentary systems, as well as it presents an argument on the distribution of powers between chief executives and cabinet ministers.
Cabinet rules and power sharing from a comparative perspective : presidential and parliamentary democracies reconsidered
(2016) Araújo, Victor; Silva, Thiago; Vieira, Marcelo; Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
It analyzes the formal rules of cabinet decision-making processes within and across constitutions in parliamentary and presidential systems.
Eleições no Brasil antes da democracia : o Código Eleitoral de 1932 e os pleitos de 1933 e 1934
(2015) Silva, Thiago; Silva, Estevão; Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
Objetiva compreender o processo de reconfiguração do quadro partidário e eleitoral brasileiro pós-1930 e anterior ao primeiro período democrático do país (1945-1964). Nossa análise centra-se em dois momentos: (i) a relação entre elites políticas e a construção de uma nova ordem política-institucional no país e (ii) os efeitos de mudanças institucionais sobre a competição e representação políticas. Demonstramos que as eleições realizadas em 1933 e 1934 são as primeiras eleições competitivas no Brasil em que às oposições vitoriosas é garantida a possibilidade de assumirem o poder. Esses pleitos expõem, portanto, um cenário muito diferente daquele frequentemente apresentado pela literatura consolidada sobre a Primeira República brasileira.
Measuring presidential dominance over cabinets in presidential systems : constitutional design and power sharing
(2016) Araújo, Victor; Silva, Thiago; Marcelo, Vieira; Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
This study focuses on the degree of political dominance exercised on cabinets by the executive chief in presidential systems. According to a debate that began in the 1990s, presidential systems are characterized by a non-collegial decision-making process, led by and personified in the figure of the president, in contrast to parliamentary systems where a joint decision-making process is prevalent. The key argument of this research note is that, although the majority of presidents have the constitutional power to remove cabinet ministers, the executive decision-making process in presidential systems is not necessarily vertical or based on a non-collegial process. By building a new index, we reveal a significant variation in the executive power exerted by presidents over their cabinets. To classify the degree of political dominance of presidents over their cabinets, we analyzed the rules of cabinet decision-making processes as defined in 18 Latin American constitutions.