América do Sul
URI permanente desta comunidadehttps://bibliotecadigital.tse.jus.br/handle/bdtse/9850
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4 resultados
Resultados da Pesquisa
Artigo La crisis del sistema político ecuatoriano y la caída de Gutiérrez(2005) Paltán, Julio; Tribunal Superior EleitoralAnaliza el curso de deslegitimación y declive del sistema democrático representativo reflejado en el triunfo electoral del populismo autoritario, corporativo y clientelista del gobierno de Lucio Gutiérrez. Además, se ubican algunos elementos que inciden en su caída, y que reflejan un déficit de ciudadanía y de integración nacional.Artigo La democracia cristiana en el área chica de la posdictadura. Prácticas políticas y relaciones clientelares en una comuna chilena(2018) Luján Verón, David; Pérez Contreras, Aníbal; Tribunal Superior EleitoralExplora las interacciones entre la población de una comuna chilena y dos autoridades locales del Partido Demócrata Cristiano: un exalcalde y un concejal en actual ejercicio. Específicamente, a través de un análisis diacrónico, entrevistas en profundidad y etnografía política, se da cuenta de cómo se anclan concepciones y prácticas relacionadas con el trabajo político en personeros de este partido y cómo ello interactúa con la población local y sus nociones sobre política, lealtad y buen ejercicio de un cargo público. Los temas analizados invitan a repensar el clientelismo en clave de vida cotidiana y construcción del Estado a nivel local.Artigo Clientelism and local politics : interactions between municipal councilors and voters in the state of Minas Gerais(2019) Rocha, Marta Mendes da; Souza, Augusto Carvalho de; Araújo, Paulo Magalhães; Tribunal Superior EleitoralIt addresses the subject of clientelism with reference to an unprecedented set of data resulting from a survey of 422 municipal councilors in 44 brazilian municipalities. The aim was to verify whether a propensity for clientelist behavior was uniformly distributed among the councilors surveyed and, in the event that it was not, to identify factors that could explain any variations. The analysis revealed that clientelism - understood as the degree of exposure on the part of councilors to voter demands for individual benefits, and the councilors' willingness to attend to such demands by means of informal strategies - varies among councilors. Through a multivariate analysis of data, it concluded that these variations are related, as it expected, to such characteristics of the municipalities as population, poverty levels and political competition, and to such individual attributes of councilors as ideology and position in relation to the executive branch. It also concludes that there is an interaction between poverty and competition: competition seems to be more relevant than poverty to explain the observed variations, and its effect is intensified; the explanatory power of poverty is higher in the context of low political competition.Outro How social policy undercuts the appeal of clientelism : Bolsa Família, policy feedback and collective confidence(2018) Phillips, Jonathan; Tribunal Superior EleitoralIt provides some of the first evidence of the strength and contingency of policy feedback effects in developing democracies. In contexts where clientelist practices are common, convincing vulnerable voters to reject clientelist candidates depends on creating 'collective confidence' that enough other voters will also reject those candidates. A targeted household survey in Northeast Brazil provide evidence that programmatic social policy can help coordinate voting behaviour expectations among voters, reducing collective vulnerability and suppressing the demand for clientelism. Leveraging plausibly exogenous variation between Bolsa Família recipients and those who have been approved for the same benefits but remain on the waiting list, the evidence suggests recipients are markedly more likely to reject hypothetical vote-buying offers. To confirm the mechanism, a novel application of a conjoint survey experiment suggests that social policy receipt raises confidence in other recipients' willingness to reject clientelism, helping resolve an important collective action problem. Consistent with the theory, these effects and mechanisms are strongest in states where clientelism is most widespread, and absent in states where local programmatic reform has been deepest.