How social policy undercuts the appeal of clientelism : Bolsa Família, policy feedback and collective confidence

Abstract

It provides some of the first evidence of the strength and contingency of policy feedback effects in developing democracies. In contexts where clientelist practices are common, convincing vulnerable voters to reject clientelist candidates depends on creating 'collective confidence' that enough other voters will also reject those candidates. A targeted household survey in Northeast Brazil provide evidence that programmatic social policy can help coordinate voting behaviour expectations among voters, reducing collective vulnerability and suppressing the demand for clientelism. Leveraging plausibly exogenous variation between Bolsa Família recipients and those who have been approved for the same benefits but remain on the waiting list, the evidence suggests recipients are markedly more likely to reject hypothetical vote-buying offers. To confirm the mechanism, a novel application of a conjoint survey experiment suggests that social policy receipt raises confidence in other recipients' willingness to reject clientelism, helping resolve an important collective action problem. Consistent with the theory, these effects and mechanisms are strongest in states where clientelism is most widespread, and absent in states where local programmatic reform has been deepest.