América do Sul
URI permanente desta comunidadehttps://bibliotecadigital.tse.jus.br/handle/bdtse/9850
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Artigo Promesas, expectativas y resultados a diez años del debut de las PASO(2021) Gallo, Ariadna; Tribunal Superior EleitoralTranscurrieron diez años del debut del sistema de primarias abiertas simultáneas y obligatorias (PASO) - elemento central de la LeyNº 26.571 - a las que debe someterse toda aquella o todo aquel que aspire a competir en los comicios nacionales, con voto obligatorio para la totalidad de las y los ciudadanos registrados y con carácter vinculante y eliminatorio para los partidos. Las PASO se estrenaron para las elecciones presidenciales y legislativas de 2011. Posteriormente, se emplearon en los comicios presidenciales y parlamentarios de 2015 y 2019, y en los de renovación legislativa de 2013 y 2017. En 2021 se han vuelto a celebrar para las elecciones parlamentarias de medio término. Esta normativa se instauró teóricamente con el objeto de fortalecer y democratizar a los partidos, restablecer su centralidad en la escena política y transparentar las vías de acceso al poder. En este trabajo se pasó revista por la discusión establecida en torno al cumplimiento o no de las metas originarias a diez años de la primera aplicación de las PASO. Se concluye que los resultados observados no son acordes con los objetivos propuestos inicialmente.Outro Reforma política e aprofundamento democrático na América latina : os casos de Chile e Argentina(2015) Borel, Marcelo Barbosa Miranda; Tribunal Superior EleitoralApresenta uma análise das reformas políticas promovidas por Argentina e Chile em suas legislações específicas sobre o tema do financiamento de campanhas eleitorais, desde a década de 80, discutindo como o desenvolvimento histórico dessas leis atua apoiando ou preterindo o desenvolvimento dos valores democráticos que permeiam as discussões e a prática do financiamento eleitoral. Entende-se que os valores inerentes à questão são a) a equidade entre os eleitores, diminuindo a assimetria de expressão de preferências políticas e de influência no pleito; b) a competitividade entre candidatos, evitando que arrecadação e gastos permitam prever os resultados eleitorais; c) a independência dos partidos, garantindo que não seja necessário estabelecer relações clientelísticas com financiadores em troca de recursos; e d) a transparência, disponibilizando publicamente dados sobre os financiamentos privados. Objetiva-se, então, entender os impactos de cada lei sobre o fortalecimento ou enfraquecimento desses valores, colaborando ou não para tornar as eleições mais competitivas, equânimes, independentes, transparentes e, com isso, aprofundando a democracia em cada um desses países.Periódico Revista democrática : vol. 6 (2020)(Tribunal Regional Eleitoral de Mato Grosso, 2020) Tribunal Superior EleitoralPeriódico Revista do TRE-RS : ano 25, n. 48 (jan./jun. 2020)(Tribunal Regional Eleitoral do Rio Grande do Sul, 2020) Tribunal Superior EleitoralPeriódico Paraná eleitoral : revista brasileira de direito eleitoral e ciência política : vol. 5, n. 2 (2016)(Tribunal Regional Eleitoral do Paraná, 2016) Tribunal Superior EleitoralArtigo Legislative accountability : should Brazil break up its big electoral districts?(Câmara dos Deputados, 2016) Carey, John M.; Tribunal Superior EleitoralProposes that Brazil could improve the political accountability by breaking up many of the statewide districts it uses to elect its deputies into smaller districts, each electing fewer deputies. The central argument is that districts that elect low-to-moderate numbers of legislators make it possible to optimize the well-known trade-off between inclusive representation and accountable government. I suggest there are three broad goals that we should seek in legislative representation; representativeness, collective accountability, and Individual accountability. I acknowledge that there are inevitable trade-offs among these goals, but I suggest that the trade-offs are not linear, and that electoral rules can be designed to maximize the quality of representation. I suggest that the most straightforward way to achieve such gains is by maintaining proportional representation systems of elections, but by limiting district magnitude (the number of representatives elected per district) to moderate levels, in the range from 4 to 8.Artigo The last political reform in argentina in 2009 : disclosing implications beyond the formal law(2012) Prats, Mariana Laura; Del Cogliano, Natalia C.; Tribunal Superior EleitoralIn 2009 the Argentinian Congress passed the Law 26.571 of Democratization of Political Representation, Transparency and Electoral Equity. Considering the importance of these kinds of reforms for the political system, this paper aims to describe and analyze this political reform from a new approach in the study of institutional changes: a two-level theory. Taking into account distributive and efficiency principles, as well as historical precedents, a more comprehensive model is proposed. It lets us reflect on the diverse elements of the new legislation, its objectives and pretended effects, some of which could not or will difficultly be reached. In addition to this, it is argued that this last political reform in the country is part of a new trend in Latina American democracies. Its design and its purposes reveal that this institutional amendment is more than just that. As in consolidated democracies changes are no longer radical; on the contrary, incremental amendments to ordinary legislation are becoming the rule.To conclude, some reflections about the effects of the political reform on Argentinean democracy and political institutions are proposed. A comparative research agenda of last electoral amendments in other countries of the sub-continent is suggested.Artigo Does the electoral rule matter for political polarization? : the case of brazilian legislative chambers(2015) Bernabel, Rodolpho Talaisys; Tribunal Superior EleitoralThis study explores the effects of electoral rules on political polarization in the legislative branch of government. Since in Brazil the districts are also the states, and senators are chosen according to the plurality-majority rule while representatives are determined by a proportional rule, the comparison between legislative chambers enables one to test whether the plurality-majority rule induces politicians to behave less moderately, and whether the proportional rule has the opposite effect. To estimate these effects, roll call data from 1988 to 2010 was analyzed and legislators ideal points were estimated using WNOMINATE. Evidence in favor of the hypothesis was found, although not in every circumstance.