The normative bases of semi-presidentialism : Max Weber and the mitigation of caesarism

Abstract

It aims to locate the normative origins of the semi-presidential government in the theoretical contribution of German thinker Max Weber. It argues that Weberian reasoning about the Head of State, when freed from the German background in which it arose, may shed light on how semi-presidentialism can be justified in other national contexts nowadays. Methodologically, this work draws a link between Weber's constitutional thought and part of the literature concerning forms of government, especially semi-presidentialism. It evaluates particularly whether it is possible to build a normative theory of the semi-presidential system from similar concerns raised by him, that is, goals of national strengthening, selection of political leaders, and a popularly elected presidency working as a check on congressional and bureaucratic particularism. The analysis suggests that Weber's reasoning may be employed to defend a change to semi-presidentialism, provided the domestic powers of the popularly elected president be curtailed while her or his influence over foreign affairs is emphasized.